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The first thing the intellect does with an object is to class it
along with something else. But any object that is infinitely
important to us and awakens our devotion feels to us also
as if it must be sui generis and unique. Probably a crab
would be filled with a sense of personal outrage if it could
hear us class it without ado or apology as a crustacean, and
thus dispose of it. "I am no such thing," it would say; "I
am MYSELF, MYSELF alone."'
- William James
The cry to be judged for "myself alone" is heard daily in the
2criminal courtroom. This is because most laws governing criminal
conduct require an inquiry into the mental state of the accused.3
The question is not what most reasonable persons would think but
rather what the defendant in fact thought when allegedly commit-
ting the crime.4 Mental state determines whether a defendant is
guilty of a crime and, if so, the degree of the crime. For example,
homicide may be punished less severely when the killer is merely
aware of but ignores a risk of death-"recklessness"-than when the
killer desires the victim's death-"purposefulness. 5 The defend-
ant's unique thoughts thus govern the degree of culpability.
An individualized inquiry is also required in proving acts. Un-
like civil cases, where the identity of the parties is generally known,
the central determination in criminal cases is often discovering who
did the wrongful deed.6 Consequently, the jury's focus must be on
1. WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 29-30 (1978) (based
on lectures delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-1902).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 56-118.
3. See LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
208 (1987).
4. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) ("The contention that
an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or
transient notion. It is . . .universal and persistent in mature systems of law ....");
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 102 (1987) ("Punishment without evi-
dence of subjective fault (i.e., punishment for negligence) is highly controversial.").
5. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(a),(c), 210.2, 210.3 (defining recklessness and
purpose and assigning more severe punishments to purposeful killings than reckless
ones). Note, however, that a homicide involving a special type of recklessness, that is,
recklessness showing an extreme indifference to the value of human life, is punished just
as severely as homicide involving purpose. See id. at § 210.2.
6. See Frederic D. Woocher, Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testi-
mony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 969 (1977) ("Iden-
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whether a particular defendant committed the crime. In making this
judgment, what the defendant thought may be highly relevant in
proving what she did, so again an examination of what was in the
defendant's mind-not what should have been there-is key.7
The law thus requires that each defendant be treated as unique,
a "universe of one."8 But what the law requires and what the de-
fendant receives are often two very different things. Overburdened
criminal courts behave more like bureaucracies than centers ofjus-
tice.9 The pressure to "move cases" leaves little time, and fewer
resources, to treat each defendant as unique. Add to these pres-
sures the stereotypes, myths, and presuppositions that we all bring
to the courtroom and the result is trial by assumption, not by a fair
and thorough evaluation of each defendant as a special human
being. 10
The question, therefore, is whether there are ways to move
judges and juries closer in practice to the "individualized justice"
required by the basic tenets of criminal law. This Article suggests
one way to help achieve that goal: using expert character testimony.
Because such testimony focuses on what "kind of person" the de-
fendant is, it can tell the jury the defendant's story and of special
circumstances that may require treatment different from the "aver-
age person.""i t Correspondingly, the prosecution, although more
rarely than the defense, may seek to focus on the ways in which the
defendant differs from the average. In this way, expert character
testimony, or, to reflect more precisely the type of experts involved,
"psychological character evidence,"12 offers the prospect of moving
the jury toward the individualized assessments of guilt that the law
requires.
tifying the defendant as the wrongdoer presents an issue, and often the sole one for
determination, in every criminal trial.").
7. See infra text accompanying notes 83-128, 136-141.
8. DONALD SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS THINK IN
ACTION 108 (1983) (coining the term "universe of one" to describe how psychothera-
pists view their patients).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 83-118.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 83-118.
11. See Juanita R. Brooks, Creative Defenses and Desperate Defenses, 18 LITIG. 22 (Winter
1992) (making a similar point from a practitioner's perspective, although the author did
not explicitly recognize that much of what she described in her article was "psychologi-
cal character evidence"); infra text accompanying notes 83-141.
12. The term "psychological character evidence" is used as a shorthand for expert
opinions regarding character, regardless of whether the expert is a psychologist, psychi-
atrist, or other qualified evaluator.
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But how good are psychologists in making these kinds of judg-
ments? Can the jury understand and effectively use expert character
testimony without being "overawed" by it? 3 Questions of this type,
which focus on whether the probative value of the evidence is out-
weighed by the danger that it will mislead the jury-what some have
called "pragmatic relevancy" 4 -are the subject of this Article.
Consequently, the Article examines much of the science underlying
expert character evidence to develop a sense of its probative value.
It also examines psychological research regarding the effect of such
evidence on a jury.
In weighing the balance between the benefits and burdens of
using psychological character evidence, this Article argues that at-
tention must be paid to the moral and political bases for the rules of
evidence, rather than focusing solely on how those rules affect truth-
seeking. These bases are too often ignored in evidence scholarship
and case law. This Article further argues that evidentiary rules need
not be used primarily as screening devices to weed out inadequate
evidence. Instead, evidentiary rules can also be used to increase the
quantity and quality of the evidence available to the jury.
The Article concludes that the powerful role that expert charac-
ter evidence can play in individualizing justice requires trial judges
to adopt an activist stance that will enable them to improve the value
of such evidence to ajury in a fashion that recognizes the moral and
political values involved and the sharp differences between the laws
of evidence in civil and criminal trials.
This Article is also about stories, including stories that tell what
expert character witnesses do and how they do it. The Article re-
counts some stories told by such witnesses, and examines recent
theories maintaining that the creation of stories that make sense is
precisely what jury deliberations are designed to produce. To the
extent expert character testimony helps to build better stories, it will
be of particular value for both prosecutors and defendants in ex-
plaining facts to jurors in a way that will make the most sense to
them.
13. Curiously, scholars have not addressed these questions as "character evidence"
issues in any depth for more than 35 years. See, e.g., WilliamJ. Curran, Expert Psychiatric
Evidence of Personality Traits, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 999 (1955); Judson F. Falknor & David T.
Steffen, Evidence of Character: From the "Crucible of the Community" to the "Couch of the Psychi-
atrist", 102 U. PA. L. REV. 980 (1954).
14. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES:
TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 79 (1988) (coining the term "pragmatic relevance").
1993]
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Part I of this Article, "Psychological Character Evidence and the
Attribution of Responsibility," examines the moral and psychologi-
cal bases for the criminal law's requirement of individualized justice
and the social forces that make that goal difficult to achieve. It is
precisely these realities, this part argues, that require treating the
principles of criminal and civil evidence very differently. Part I con-
cludes with an overview of how psychological character evidence can
help overcome bureaucratized trial by myth, stereotype, and suppo-
sition, focusing jurors' attention instead on the person before them.
Part II, "Tools of the Trade," examines the techniques and in-
struments expert character witnesses use in plying their trade and
how they apply them. This review of both the science and the art of
the psychologist, the typical expert character witness, offers the
reader an understanding of the kind of information that can be con-
veyed to a jury to help it evaluate the evidence before it. This sec-
tion also offers information that may be useful to practicing lawyers
in preparing direct and cross examinations of expert character
witnesses.
Part III, "Evidentiary Analysis," answers the pragmatic rele-
vancy-related objections to psychological character evidence. 5
Moral, scientific, and artistic principles are combined with a study of
the political role of the jury, to craft a set of guidelines for courts in
addressing many admissibility questions concerning expert psycho-
logical character evidence. The guidelines emphasize, contrary to
the usual focus of American evidence law, the value of persuading
and cajoling, not commanding, jurors into doing what is right.
I. PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND THE ATTRIBUTION OF
RESPONSIBILITY
The argument in this part proceeds in three steps. First, moral
psychology teaches us that the human sense ofjustice requires indi-
vidualized treatment in criminal cases, yet powerful social forces
15. "Pragmatic relevancy" concerns are usually addressed under the rubric of Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 403, which permits a court to exclude evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by certain countervailing concerns, particularly im-
proper jury impact. See id. at 79. There are, however, other evidentiary rules that have a
weighing of probative value against jury impact as their primary concern. These rules
are therefore also addressed in this Article. Furthermore, this Article argues for an ex-
panded notion of pragmatic relevancy in which the judge's discretion under Rule 403 is
guided in part by moral, political, and fairness-of-process concerns, concepts not usually
addressed in standard ideas of pragmatic relevancy. There are many non-pragmatic rel-
evancy issues raised but not addressed herein (for example, hearsay-related and consti-
tutional questions), but these issues will have to be addressed in future articles.
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push juries away from such treatment. Second, our formal rules of
criminal law embody this important but, in practice, unfulfilled psy-
chological need; to remedy this inadequacy, we must recognize that
the law of criminal evidence can help to return the justice system to
an individualized ethic by increasing the flow of quality information
to the jury. Third, psychological character evidence is one means by
which we can, in appropriate cases, effectively move the system to-
ward greater individualization. Before reaching these points, how-
ever, it is first necessary to define psychological character evidence
and illustrate it more clearly.
A. What Is "Psychological" Character Evidence?
"Character evidence," as the term is used in this Article, is evi-
dence offered to help the jury answer the question, "What type of
person is the accused?"' 6 It is any testimony by a psychologist or
other mental health professional that suggests that because a de-
fendant is a certain kind of person, she is less likely-or more likely,
in the case of prosecution testimony-to have committed the crimi-
nal deed with the requisite level of intent. To be useful, such evi-
dence must ordinarily concern a specific pertinent trait of the
accused, not a general description of how she is likely to think or act
in all situations.' 7 Because psychological character evidence rests
upon the expertise and training of a mental health professional, it
must be offered in the form of that professional's opinion, based
upon examination and testing, concerning a particular trait of the
accused's personality.' 8
Note that this definition, contrary to the definition of "charac-
ter" offered by some commentators, does not necessarily have a
moral connotation: the testimony need not concern whether the de-
16. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 186, at 549-50
(Edward E. Cleary, ed., 3d ed., 1984). The rules, of course, permit the use of character
evidence as to persons other than the accused. See FED. R. EVID. 404 (a)(2)-(3), 608
(permitting certain uses of character evidence to prove a pertinent trait of a crime victim
and the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of a witness). However, this Article
focuses solely on evidence as to the character of the accused.
17. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 14, at 487 (noting that character evi-
dence is most significant when it concerns specific inclinations); FED. R. EVID. 404
(a)(1),(2) (requiring defense-proffered character evidence to concern a "pertinent" trait
of the accused).
18. See GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY 79 (1987) ("Character is a trait of personality
.... ); infra text accompanying notes 142-163.
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fendant is in some sense a good or a bad person.' 9 This makes
sense because a conception of character evidence based solely on
morality would be inconsistent with the policy concerns that have
led courts to treat such evidence cautiously.2 ° Courts have often
been wary of character evidence, fearing that juries will convict or
acquit because of who the defendant is-a good or bad person-
rather than what the defendant has done.2' The law, however, also
has broader concerns.
Specifically, when character evidence is used circumstantially, a
jury must engage in a two-part analysis: it must determine, first,
whether the evidence offered as to the defendant's reputation, opin-
ion, or specific acts proves that the defendant indeed has a certain
personality trait and, second, whether someone with that trait is
more-or less-likely than someone without it to commit the crimi-
nal deed. The value of step one turns on the trustworthiness of the
proffered evidence: whether it suggests that the defendant has the
identified trait. The value of step two turns on another accuracy
judgment: whether having the trait affects the likelihood that the
defendant committed the crime. The jury may, without proper gui-
dance, overvalue the worth of the evidence on both points. That is
why courts so mistrust character evidence.22
These dangers exist with much evidence that does not necessar-
ily carry moral overtones about a defendant's worth as a human be-
ing. Indeed, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence rejected
the traditional criticism that character evidence is primarily offered
for "moral overtones," noting that "nonmoral considerations [are]
crop[ping] up" more frequently and describing the proper focus as
"the kind of person one is."'23 The drafters specifically offer the ex-
ample of a psychiatrist's opinion-what would be identified here as
psychological character evidence-as a way to prove that someone is
19. Compare Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific
Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777, 779 (1981) (" '[C]haracter' probably includes only
those qualities of personality that have some moral overtone .... ") with Edward J. Im-
winkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The
Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 575,
582 (1990) (adopting a non-morality based conception of character evidence).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 244-265.
21. See RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES: CASES, MATERIALS
AND PROBLEMS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 452 (3d ed. 1991).
22. See Imwinkelried, supra note 19, at 575-84.
23. See FED. R. EvID. 405 advisory committee's note ("If character is defined as the




indeed a particular "kind of person." 24
This definition, and the practical value of this class of evidence,
is best understood by example. From the practitioner's perspective,
psychological character evidence's most immediately recognizable
use is in proving or disproving criminal acts and mental states.
1. Criminal Acts.-In State v. Hickman,2 5 the defendant was
charged with felony murder based upon a death that occurred in the
course of forcible sexual abuse.26 At trial, Hickman testified that his
sexual contact with the victim had been consensual, not forcible.27
In rebuttal, the prosecution called a psychiatrist, who testified that
he had done a study of rapists, and Hickman fit the class of "hatred
rapists."'2 8 Because hatred rapists are likely to engage in forcible
rather than consensual sex, according to this argument, the defend-
ant probably committed the forcible sexual act with which he was
charged.29 The Supreme Court of Iowa held that this was proper
rebuttal.30
Expert testimony can also help disprove a criminal act without a
direct opinion being offered on the likelihood that the defendant
committed the crime. One of the more creative examples of this
arose in United States v. Roark." t There, the primary evidence that
the defendant was a co-conspirator in a bank robbery was her con-
fession.32 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
24. Id.
25. 337 N.W.2d 512 (Iowa 1983).
26. Id. at 514.
27. Id. at 516.
28. Id.
29. The traditional amount of force necessary to commit forcible rape is force suffi-
cient to overcome the woman's resistance. See SUE BESSEMER, THE LAWS OF RAPE 59
(Landmark Dissertations in Women's Studies Series, Anne K. Baxter, ed., 1984).
"Force" is thus logically relevant to proving lack of consent, an element of rape. See id.
at 59-60. The focus in Hickman, however, was not on the victim's mental state (her "con-
sent") but on the acts of the defendant: did he or did he not use violence to achieve
sexual intercourse? See 337 N.W.2d at 513-14, 516.
30. Hickman, 337 N.W.2d at 516. It is important to note that the defendant in Hick-
man had not offered character evidence, lay or expert. Rather, Hickman simply took the
stand and testified that the sexual intercourse was consensual. Hickman, 337 N.W.2d at
516. It is, therefore, questionable whether under Rule 404 and considerations of undue
prejudice the court was correct in permitting the prosecution to make the first use of
expert character evidence on the grounds that it was proper "rebuttal." See FED. R.
EvID. 403, 404(a); infra notes 245-250 and accompanying text. Nor did the Hickman
court examine the science underlying the prosecution expert's testimony or whether
values other than truth-seeking justified admitting it. See infra Parts III.B.4 & III.C, notes
664-667 and accompanying text.
31. 753 F.2d 991 (1lth Cir. 1985).
32. Id. at 992.
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cuit held that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of a
defense psychiatrist who would have testified that Roark confessed
only because of her "highly suggestible personality"-that she made
up the confession to please her examiners.3 3 The appellate court
held that the expert's testimony would clearly assist the trier of fact
in determining whether it was "more or less probable that Roark
was somehow psychologically coerced into making the inculpatory
statements. '3 4 If the confession were untrue and there was no other
convincing evidence that Roark had conspired with the bank robber,
she should not have been convicted of that crime.
2. Guilty Minds (the Susceptibility Defenses).-When psychological
character testimony is offered to prove guilty minds, a common
theme runs through many of the cases, a theme characterized in this
Article by the term "susceptibility defenses." This term encom-
passes the most common defense argument in favor of the admis-
sion of psychological character evidence to prove the defendant's
state of mind: Because of some unusual trait, the defendant is more
or less susceptible than most to an extreme reaction to a particular
type of situation. Thus, a defendant might be more fearful, more
impulsive, more gullible, or more easily tempted or coerced than
others. Psychological character testimony offers a "plausible alter-
native to normal" that asks the jury to take the defendant's unusual
weaknesses into account.3 5
a. Negating Mental State.-One of the primary uses of psycho-
logical character testimony to bolster a susceptibility defense is to
negate entirely a mental state required as an element of a crime.
For example, a defendant may argue that when he picked up a gun
upon the arrival of FBI agents to arrest him on another charge, he
did so because he contemplated harming himself, not the agent.3 6
A psychologist's testimony that the defendant was the type of per-
son more likely to turn his aggression toward himself than others
would thus be relevant and helpful against a prosecution for assault-
ing a federal officer.3 7 Similarly, a defendant may contend that his
compulsion to gamble, as demonstrated by his diagnosed "patho-
logical gambling disorder," would make it unlikely that his failure to
33. Id. at 994-95.
34. Id.
35. See RichardJ. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Profession-
als in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 485 (1980).
36. See United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1073-76 (7th Cir. 1977).
37. See id.
[VOL. 52:1
1993] PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE 11
pay taxes was "wilful," because his financial mismanagement came
from a need to gamble, not from a knowing effort to evade taxes.38
b. Mitigation.-A second use of expert character testimony for
a "susceptibility defense" arises when a defendant argues that she
lacked the mental state for the most serious crime but may still be
guilty of a lesser offense.39 One critical application of this approach
is when a defendant argues that because of some personality trait,
such as impulsiveness under stress, an alleged murder lacked pre-
meditation. This finding would mitigate the crime from first-degree
to second-degree murder. A second application is when it can
be demonstrated that the defendant acted in the heat of passion-
and did so reasonably-which would reduce the crime to
manslaughter.4 °
An analogous effort to negate "specific intent" was made in
United States v. Roberts,4 ' in which the defendant was charged with
possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute.42 Roberts testi-
fied that he was a vigilante engaged in a one-man undercover opera-
tion to catch a major drug dealer and that he therefore possessed
the cocaine not with the intent to distribute, but merely as a way of
38. See United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 58 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817
(1987). Neither the parties nor the court in Shorter viewed the proffered expert testi-
mony as "character" evidence. Nevertheless, that is essentially what was involved, be-
cause the defense expert was called to explain that Shorter's "cash lifestyle" was
characteristic of compulsive gamblers as a group. See id. at 59; see also infra text accompa-
nying notes 119-135 (defining and illustrating "group" character evidence). This testi-
mony was offered to respond to the government's claim that Shorter's lifestyle was
evidence of his efforts to evade taxes. See Shorter, 809 F.2d at 59. The defense appar-
ently viewed that lifestyle as an aspect of obsession with gambling, not an indication of
an effort to avoid paying taxes. See id. In any event, the appellate court affirmed the
exclusion of the expert testimony because it failed the Frye test and was, in the court's
view, unhelpful to the jury. See id. at 58-62. For a discussion of the Frye test, see infra
text accompanying notes 266-346.
39. Obviously, "negating mental state" and "mitigation" both involve disproving a
particular mental state. However, the former is a complete defense while the latter
merely reduces the severity of the crime of which the defendant is convicted. This dis-
tinction is deemed important in substantive criminal law, see, e.g., Dressler, supra note 4,
at 474 (discussing a "mitigating defense" to homicide), and is therefore treated as im-
portant here.
40. See, e.g., State v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 580, 583 (Ariz. 1981) (suggesting that
psychiatrist's opinion that defendant had character trait of "acting without reflection"
could mitigate first-degree to second-degree murder or even manslaughter); State v.
Hallman, 668 P.2d 874, 878 (Ariz. 1983) (holding that expert testimony regarding de-
fendant's "impulsive personality" was relevant to negate mental state for first-degree
murder).
41. 887 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1989).
42. Id. at 535.
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catching a wrongdoer.4 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that the testimony of Roberts's psychiatrist-
which illustrated the defendant's naive and autocratic personality-
was consistent with the defendant's claims and was both relevant
and admissible.4 4
c. Affirmative Defenses.-A third and final major function of psy-
chological character testimony, as used to bolster a special suscepti-
bility claim, is to establish the elements of an affirmative defense.
Different susceptibilities may be relevant to different defenses. For
example, the susceptibility to extreme fear of physical harm in cer-
tain situations helps to establish self-defense in jurisdictions that
take a subjective approach to this type ofjustification. In such juris-
dictions, a defendant's honest belief that deadly force was necessary
to prevent the defendant's imminent death or serious bodily injury
is a complete defense to homicide or assault.45 It is therefore irrele-
vant that the defendant may not have behaved reasonably if the jury
is persuaded that, because of the defendant's unusual susceptibility,
she was honestly in fear.46 The battered woman syndrome is the
best-known example of an argument of susceptibility to this type of
fear.47
Even in jurisdictions where self-defense claims may succeed
only if the defendant acted as would a reasonable person under the
circumstances-and the defendant's unusual traits might not be
deemed an appropriate part of the reasonable person's "circum-
43. See id. Presumably (although not discussed by the court) the defendant would be
guilty of simple possession, even under his version of the facts; it is for this reason that
this case is offered as an example of mitigation, instead of a complete defense.
44. See id. at 536. Despite so holding, the court affirmed the conviction, finding the
error harmless, given the "very strong evidence to support Roberts' conviction ..... Id.
at 537.
45. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. Sco-rr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 454-58 & n.28 (2d
ed. 1986). The subjective approach is also followed by the Model Penal Code for crimes
requiring more than negligence or recklessness. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04(1) ex-
planatory note, 3.09(2),(3) (1985).
46. See, e.g., State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 569 (Kan. 1986) (explaining that battered
woman syndrome testimony is relevant to a self-defense claim, both in jurisdictions ap-
plying a subjective test and those applying an objective one). Such testimony is relevant
even in objective jurisdictions because it must still be shown that the defendant's reason-
able fear was honestly held. See Commonwealth v. Light, 326 A.2d 288, 294-95 (Pa.
1974) (Manderino, J., dissenting) (providing a particularly well-reasoned explanation of
why expert testimony relating to subjective mental state is relevant in jurisdictions tak-
ing an objective approach to self-defense).
47. See Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense Claims, 67 ORE. L. REV.
393, 409-10 & n.62 (1988).
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stances" 4S-a defendant may still use evidence of unusual suscepti-
bilities to support an "imperfect self defense" claim. To do so, the
defendant must show that, although a complete defense is barred
because the defendant's beliefs were unreasonable, the crime
should be reduced from murder to manslaughter because the de-
fendant's fears were nevertheless honestly held.4 9
Another type of susceptibility used to establish an affirmative
defense is based on a defendant's susceptibility to the threats of
others. While this appeal may involve fear as an element, its empha-
sis is on a defendant's weak will, her unwillingness to resist. The
most obvious example involves the defense of duress or coercion. 50
A defendant who was "passive and easily led" could therefore offer
a psychologist's testimony to support a claim that she was an "un-
willing participant" forced by a cohort into participating in theft,
daytime housebreaking, and felony murder.5 ' Likewise, a defendant
could argue that expert testimony regarding his relationship with
his father would demonstrate that he was especially susceptible to,
and was indeed, coerced by his father into assisting in murder.52
It is worth mentioning one further type of susceptibility that can
lead to an affirmative defense: susceptibility to the influence, urg-
ings, and persuasion of others. Here the emphasis is on gullibility,
temptation, and reaction to others' persuasive powers, not necessar-
ily passivity or fear of physical harm. This susceptibility is often
most relevant to a subjective entrapment defense, which generally
requires the defendant to offer some evidence of inducement by
48. See id. at 413-22 (discussing whether the "reasonable person" standard should
include a battered woman's emotional and intellectual characteristics).
49. DRESSLER, supra note 4, at 199 (defining imperfect self-defense); see also Simmons
v. State, 313 Md. 33, 38-45, 542 A.2d 1258, 1260-64 (1988) (explaining that expert
testimony should be admissible to support imperfect self-defense when the testimony
suggests that the defendant's psychological profile was consistent with an honest belief
that deadly force was necessary).
50. "Duress" or "coercion" is a complete defense to many crimes where:
[a] person's unlawful threat (1) which causes the defendant reasonably to be-
lieve that the only way to avoid imminent death or serious bodily injury to him-
self or to another is to engage in conduct which violates the literal terms of the
criminal law, and (2) which causes the defendant to engage in that conduct ....
LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 45, at 432-33. The defense is ordinarily not available in
homicide prosecutions. See DRESSLER, supra note 4, at 259. But see infra text accompany-
ing notes 51-52 (discussing homicide cases in which defense was raised).
51. See Kanaras v. State, 54 Md. App. 568, 587-88, 460 A.2d 61, 72-73 (1983).
52. See State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 78-79 (Minn. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1141 (1986). The defendant's arguments were, however, ultimately unsuccessful. The
appellate court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of psychiatric testimony regarding
duress partly because it concerned, in the trial court's view, a matter within the common
experience of jurors. See id. at 79.
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government agents to commit the crime. If that burden is met, the
onus shifts to the government to prove that the defendant was
predisposed to commit the crime; absent such proof, the defendant
prevails.53 Thus, a clinical psychologist's testimony that a defendant
was particularly susceptible to persuasion and psychological pres-
sure has been held admissible to prove that the government induced
the defendant to distribute narcotics.54 Similar testimony also may
be relevant to establish that a defendant was not "predisposed" to
commit the crime, that is, not the type of person likely to commit the
crime.55
B. Criminal Justice and the Psychology of Moral Attribution
Having defined psychological character evidence and illustrated
some of its practical uses at trial, we may now examine the major
assumption in this discussion thus far, namely, that there is a deeply
felt sense that a moral system of criminal prosecution should judge a
defendant by that defendant's unique thoughts, feelings, and ac-
tions. This task will be accomplished by examining the concepts of
"rule and case logics," developed by Professors Lempert and Sand-
ers, 56 which help to explain the interrelationship of the process of
proof, the rules of criminal liability, and the social process of attrib-
uting moral responsibility.
1. Rule Logics.-Lempert and Sanders ground their arguments
heavily in psychological research regarding when and why we hold
one another accountable for violations of social norms. The re-
53. See JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, JR., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT: LAW, PROCEDURE,
FORMS § 14.12, at 631-32 (1985).
54. United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 516 (3d Cir. 1981). Accord United States v.
Newman, 849 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining that testimony that a defendant had
an intense reaction to perceived situational threats would have been admissible to prove
inducement in an entrapment defense claim but for trial counsel's untimely, lengthy,
and inconsistent offer of proof).
55. See, e.g., Hill, 655 F.2d at 516. Accord United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098,
1115 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting that "expert testimony concerning a defendant's predispo-
sition may be invaluable in an entrapment case," but affirming the exclusion of such
testimony because of inadequate notice).
56. See RICHARD LEMPERT &JOSEPH SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCI-
ENCE: DESERT, DISPUTES, AND DISTRIBUTION 27-30, 60-66 (1986). Lempert and Sand-
ers's theories are presented as reflecting basic human needs. It may be, however, that
cultural factors modify the analysis somewhat. For example, mental state is important in
both the United States and Japan in making responsibility judgments. See V. LEE HAMIL-
TON &JOSEPH SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE: RESPONSIBILrrY AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN JAPAN
AND THE UNITED STATES 127, 134 (1992). However, Americans place a heavier weight on
mental state and find it significant in a wider variety of situations than do the Japanese.
See id. at 120-22, 124-34.
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search reveals that moral responsibility judgments are guided by
two notions: (1) intention and (2) ability to do otherwise.57
Although Lempert and Sanders do not precisely define the word
"intention," they apparently mean something similar to the Model
Penal Code's definition of "purpose": acting with the awareness of
particular attendant circumstances and with the "conscious object"
of engaging in conduct of a particular nature, or of achieving a par-
ticular result.5" "Ability to do otherwise" encompasses a wide range
of concerns, including whether an actor (1) had the opportunity to
act differently, (2) had the literal physical ability to do so, (3) could
have learned to do so, and (4) would have had particular difficulty in
doing so.59 Legal concepts like constraint, compulsion, duress, mis-
take, unforeseeability, and irresistible impulse all embody notions of
inability to do otherwise.60
Although "full" moral responsibility requires both intention
and ability to do otherwise, we sometimes consider persons respon-
sible but not "fully so.'"6 Legal rules similarly often require less
than full moral responsibility before an actor may be held accounta-
ble.6 2 "Rule logics" define the degree of moral responsibility re-
quired by a particular rule of substantive law.6 3
Lempert and Sanders posit four types of rule logics: (1) the
criminal rule logic (for malum in se crimes), requiring both intention
and the ability to do otherwise; (2) contractual liability, requiring
only intention-to agree-but rendering ability to do otherwise ir-
relevant; (3) negligence liability, requiring only ability to do other-
wise but ignoring intention; and (4) strict liability, for which neither
intention nor ability to do otherwise is relevant.6
These four rule logics represent "ideal types" used for clarity of
exposition, but they oversimplify the real world.65 The real world of
law may contain rules demonstrating varying degrees of concern
with intention and ability to do otherwise beyond that embodied in
the four ideal types. For example, crimes requiring "recklessness"
57. LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra note 56, at 18-22, 27-28.
58. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a); see also LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra note 56, at
31-32 (distinguishing true intention--"meaning to do it"-from recklessness and mere
accident).
59. See LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra note 56, at 27 & n.7.
60. Id. at 33.
61. See id. at 27-28.
62. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (explaining that recklessness merely requires
a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk).
63. LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra note 56, at 27-30.
64. Id. at 28.
65. Id. at 3, 30, 35.
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require proof that an actor was consciously aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk of harm.66 Because actual awareness of the
risk is required, recklessness embodies a closer concern with inten-
tion than does a negligence rule, but still falls short of true "inten-
tion" or desire to bring about harm.67 The real world is thus
populated by spectrums of rule logics.
Rule logics, which specify what must be proved, are meaning-
less, however, without an understanding of how the requirements of
substantive rules are proven. The process of proof is controlled by
case logics.
2. Case Logics.-Case logics turn on the difference between
"actor" and "social" meanings.6" An "actor meaning" is the mean-
ing an actor actually gives to his own behavior.6 9 A "social mean-
ing" is the normal or typical meaning of behavior.7" Observers
often attribute social meanings to another individual's actions in-
stead of truer actor meanings. This may be so for many reasons, but
one of the most important is that observers are often unaware of
"the variety of historical and contextual forces that impinge on [an
individual actor's] behavior" in ways that are not immediately obvi-
ous." The likelihood that an observer will come to understand a
particular actor's meaning-her true thoughts and feelings-is thus
governed to a large extent by how much the observer learns about
these forces. How much the observer learns is in turn controlled by
the observer's willingness to recognize the "uniqueness" of the ac-
tor's situation72 and to engage in an "extensive" inquiry.73
66. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
67. See id. § 2.02 cmts. 3-4 (defining recklessness); see also LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra
note 56, at 31 n. 10 (justifying criminal recklessness as either demonstrating a depraved
nature or serving as a proxy for true intent).
68. LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra note 56, at 51-52.
69. Id. at 51.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 51-52.
72. "Uniqueness" is defined as "the degree to which we attend to the special charac-
teristics of a situation in identifying its legal implications." Id. at 59. Its opposite, "typi-
cality," focuses on broad descriptions of commonalities instead of on the details that
make each action unique. See id. at 43-44, 51-52. Obviously, there are wide ranges in
the degree of detail we observe in any particular situation and in our willingness to view
certain types of events as unique.
73. Id. at 45-51. "Extensiveness" refers to "the degree to which we search out and
accept evidence that is temporally or spatially removed from the event in question." Id.
at 59. Its opposite, "immediacy," focuses solely on what happened at a particular time
and place. See id. at 49-51, 62-63. Again, the real world involves a wide range of varia-.
tion in the degree to which we inquire into the history leading up to a particular event.
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The two dimensions of uniqueness and extensiveness are, of
course, interrelated: focusing on what is unique in an individual
may require one to learn more about that individual's history, while
learning more about that history may make the individual's situation
appear more relatively unique.74 The central point, however, is that
when observers employ immediate, typical analyses-what Lempert
and Sanders call "shallow case logics" 7 5-they are likely to ascribe
social meanings to an actor, for example, to ascribe a "normal"
mental state to the actor even though the actor's mental state may
have been different from what a normalized account might sug-
gest.76 This tendency is magnified when circumstances fit a conve-
nient stereotype, for then the attributor is more likely than ever to
overlook the possibility that a unique actor-meaning accounted for
the behavior. 7 By contrast, when observers use unique, extended
inquiries-"deep case logics"-they are more likely to uncover true
78actor-meanings.
These "ideal types"-shallow and deep case logics-determine
whether rule logics have any real meaning in a particular context.
Thus, shallow case logics may involve typifications that distort or
ignore intentions in a civil negligence case. But these logics do little
harm, for most negligence rules by definition ignore actor inten-
tions. 79 A pure criminal rule logic, by contrast, requires proof that
an actor acted with purpose;80 yet a shallow case logic may result in
a jury attributing purpose to the actor when he had none, a truth
that might have been revealed by a closer examination of the actor's
history and of the special qualities that make him unique. 8 A shal-
low case logic may thus lead to unreliable results, inconsistent with
the rule logics that are the moral bases underlying the substantive
rules of criminal liability.8 2
74. Id. at 59.
75. Id. at 63.
76. See id. at 63-64 (comparing examples of actor- and social-meanings).
77. See id. at 63 ("When circumstances and behavior fit a convenient stereotype, an
attributor is less likely to consider the possibility that a particular actor meaning ac-
counts for behavior.").
78. Id.
79. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at
173-74 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining that an action in negligence involves an objective in-
quiry to determine what a "reasonable person" would do, rather than a subjective ap-
proach to ascertain the defendant's intentions).
80. See LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra note 56, at 28.
81. See id. at 63-66.
82. Id. at 85, 131.
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3. Typification and How to Overcome It.-Yet Lempert and Sand-
ers report a strong natural tendency to employ shallow logics in
both civil and criminal cases."3 This tendency alone requires special
efforts by judges and attorneys in criminal cases to move fact-finders
toward the deeper analyses required by the substantive criminal law.
Apart from this natural tendency toward shallow logics in every
case, however, there are special forces at work in criminal cases that
amplify the likelihood of fact-finders using typified, immediate anal-
yses and thus make even more urgent the need to respond.
First, the limited resources available to the criminal justice sys-
tem result in a burden of cases that create pressure for judges and
lawyers to move cases quickly, devoting little time to any individual
case. 4 This "assembly-line justice" becomes depersonalized and
dehumanized, resulting in a reluctance to treat defendants as indi-
viduals; instead, the defendants are viewed stereotypically and their
cases are dropped into neat, predefined categories, with little effort
made to explore what may be special or different about particular
defendants .85
Second, criminal cases often involve highly emotionally charged
issues reflecting broader societal conflicts, values, and fears. Thus,
deep-seated stereotypes and myths about racial groups, sex-roles,
and cultural groups may be especially powerful, amplifying the like-
lihood of typified analyses.86 When a criminal defendant has had
unusual life experiences or is in some way emotionally dysfunc-
tional-but not to the point of mental illness-jurors are even more
likely to draw on "superstition, fear, and popular wisdom." 87
Third, the high stakes and sometimes troubling emotional is-
sues raised in criminal cases may exaggerate the effects of limited
information. An analogy to the economist's explanation of racial
discrimination may help to explain why this is so. Economists rely
on the theory of "information costs," which, as its title implies, em-
phasizes that there are costs associated with obtaining informa-
tion. 8 It would thus be costly to seek out information contrary to
83. Id. at 86.
84. Id. at 63, 75-78.
85. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 292 (1968) ("So
great is the crush of cases and so little is the time available to deal with any given one
that there is an almost total lack of attention to the situation of the individual defendant.
The process is depersonalized and dehumanized.").
86. LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra note 56, at 63; see infra text accompanying notes 113-
118, 129-135.
87. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 492.
88. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 362 (2d ed. 1983).
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the teachings of one's parents, community, or one's own experi-
ence. Racial stereotyping, for example, saves people from incurring
these costs, because it allows people to make decisions about others
based on generalizations, instead of forcing them to seek out spe-
cific information regarding the particular person in question. Over
time, such stereotypes may be abandoned if costs are imposed on
the racist for using the stereotype, for example, losing the best
workers to those who are not racists. 89
In a trial, however, there are severe constraints on the informa-
tion that jurors may obtain, for the lawyers and the judge control
the flow of information. Moreover, the trial ends after days or
weeks, with no impact thereafter on the jurors' lives, so that time
passage cannot offer incentives-like the loss of good workers-for
the jurors to abandon their stereotypes.90 Finally, the jurors know
that their decision may imprison someone, a heavy emotional bur-
den that may require them to receive assurance from somewhere
that their decisions about guilt or innocence are accurate ones.
These are powerful pressures on individual jurors to resort to stere-
otyping for guidance.
The most effective weapon for combating each of these pres-
sures toward shallow logics is information. That is precisely what
psychological character evidence provides. Lempert and Sanders
explain that an adequate informational base creates powerful "em-
pathetic pressures" to understand actor-meanings. 9' These pres-
sures can help jurors overcome stereotypes and may even lead
judges to switch mid-trial from their usual use of shallow logics and
demand for speedy case-processing to the employment of genuinely
unique, extended analyses that respect the criminal law's ethic of
individualized justice.9" Indeed, trial lawyers are instinctively aware
both of the dangers of typifications and of the value of psychological
character evidence as a response.
One such trial lawyer, Susan B. Jordan, an attorney who has
used psychological character testimony to support self-defense
claims by women charged with killing their rapists and physical
89. Id. at 352-54, 362.
90. Cf id. at 236-37 (noting that jurors incur no cost from behaving irrationally and
thus should be screened from stale evidence regarding a criminal defendant's prior
criminal acts).




abusers,9" described counsel's job in such cases as follows:
What generally happens in a criminal trial is that the Dis-
trict Attorney puts on trial one instant in time; did the de-
fendant pull the trigger? From the DA's point of view, that
is basically all he or she has to prove, unless he is trying to
prove a case of premeditation, in which case he must show
some planning in that. But he doesn't go much further
back in time to explain how the defendant came to be in
this spot.
But when someone comes to pull a trigger, there are
significant social and psychological reality events which
preceded that. No matter who the person is, something,
often a very complex set of things, preceded the pulling of
that trigger. In my opinion, the defense attorney's job is to
explain to the jury what psychological and social factors
put this person in the defendant's chair .. .
C. Morality and the Principles of Criminal Evidence
Lempert and Sanders's theory of case logics implicitly suggests
an important underlying principle: major differences exist between
the rules of criminal and civil evidence because the former involves
significant ethical precepts that the latter does not. 5 This principle
is a corollary of the notion that criminal liability is justified primarily
by moral values, not economic or political ones,9 6 and that one of
the major functions of criminal punishment is therefore to express
society's moral condemnation.9 7 If the criminal law is to serve this
function well, the substantive rules of criminal liability must require
93. See THE TRIAL MASTERS: A HANDBOOK OF STRATEGIES AND TACTICS THAT WIN
CASES 466-68, 472-78 (Bertram G. Warshaw ed., 1984) (editor's interview with Susan B.
Jordan).
94. Id. at 466-67; see also Brooks, supra note 11, at 23-24 (noting value of psychologi-
cal testimony in countering jurors' normal assumptions).
95. See LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra note 56, at 131 ("[W]hen criminal sanctions are at
issue the adoption of a shallow case logic, which fails to give full consideration to ques-
tions of agency and purpose, threatens the moral foundation on which the law must
rest."); see also A. ZUCKERMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 6 (1989) ("The
law of criminal evidence has an independence of purpose and a cohesion of principle
such that it requires a discrete treatment.").
96. See PACKER, supra note 85, at 116 (discussing the prominent social purposes of
the criminal law).
97. See IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 149-54 (1989) (discussing
the value of moral condemnation); see also KIP SCHLEGEL, JUST DESERTS FOR CORPORATE
CRIMINALS 72-74 (1990) ("Regardless of whether the purpose of punishment is primar-




full moral responsibility, and the criminal law's notions of responsi-
bility in turn must be generally consistent with popular notions of
morality.9" While concerns about efficiency,99 the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes,' 00 and the distribution of social justice, that is,
access to wealth, education, and power,' 0 ' may justify a lesser con-
cern with morality in the law of torts or contracts, and thus some-
thing significantly less than "full" moral responsibility, in the
criminal law nothing less will do.'0 2
As noted earlier, full responsibility requires a concern with both
ability to do otherwise and intentions.0 3 Indeed, a concern with
intentions is demonstrated by the strong trend of the substantive
criminal law in recent years toward increased subjectivity, that is, an
increased commitment to mental states and actor-meanings.10 4
This subjectivity reflects the criminal law's basic concern with
"just deserts": the notion that a criminal should receive the punish-
ment that he "deserves," a punishment that must therefore be pro-
portionate to the crime.' 0 5 Proportionality depends on the degree
of harm inflicted or risked and culpability.' 06 Culpability turns on
mental state, motives, and excuses. 10 7 Thus, greater punishment is
deserved when the same harm proceeds from a more depraved
mental state.10 8
98. See LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra note 56, at 35-36, 38-39 (explaining the relation-
ship between "popular morality" and "fuller-mind responsibility").
99. Id. at 39-40.
100. Id. at 134.
101. Id. at 283-84.
102. See id. at 35-41.
103. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
104. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 432 n.8. Some courts and commentators
have argued that, at least when punishment and moral stigma are severe, the require-
ment of wrongful subjective mental states is constitutionally required. See, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Heck, 491 A.2d 212, 218-28 (Pa. Super. 1985) ("[T]he legislature's power
to eliminate mens rea is not without limitation, and the exercise of that power must
comport with constitutional principles."), aff'd, 535 A.2d 575 (Pa. 1987); James J. Hip-
pard, Sr., The Unconstitutionality of Criminal Liability Without Fault: An Argument for a Consti-
tutional Doctrine of Mens Rea, 10 Hous. L. REV. 1039 (1973) (arguing that strict liability in
the criminal law is unconstitutional).
105. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAw: AN INTRODUCTION
TO JURISPRUDENCE 120-24 (1990) (just deserts); PRIMORATZ, supra note 97, at 12
(proportionality).
106. SCHLEGEL, supra note 97, at 48-49.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 117, 129-33 ("[A defendant] merits descending levels of punishment
(holding harm constant) by virtue of the reduced blame-worthiness associated with the
act."); accord MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 105, at 128 ("Justice demands individua-
tion .... And it seems elemental that there is a significant moral difference between a
person who kills maliciously and one who kills accidentally ... ").
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Similarly, many full or partial excuses, such as provocation and
heat of passion, require a subjective inquiry into the mind of the
accused. '0 9
State power, specifically the power to imprison and to condemn
offenders to society's most extreme moral condemnation and loss of
standing in their local communities sets the law of criminal evidence
apart from that of civil evidence." 0 The fear of state power, com-
bined with notions of just deserts and the moral educative role of
the criminal law, requires that the procedures by which criminal lia-
bility is imposed be perceived as both fair and accurate and that the
risk of convicting the innocent be minimized."' This latter concern
is embodied in the constitutional requirement that guilt be imposed
only if the state meets its burden of establishing the elements of a
109. See PRIMORATZ, supra note 97, at 91-92 (discussing moral bases for mitigation);
DRESSLER, supra note 4, §§ 31.04[c][4], 31.08[A],[C][l]-[2] (discussing subjective com-
ponents of heat of passion and provocation).
There is no need to resolve here the ongoing debate between utilitarians-those
who judge the morality of punishment by its future good consequences, see PRIMORATZ,
supra note 97, at 12-and retributivists-those who judge the morality of punishment by
the past injustice committed, see id. Nor could such a task sensibly be attempted in this
Article, for most now agree that there is no inherent inconsistency between utilitarian-
ism and a concern with proportionate punishments.
Where the respect-based theory of retribution will always have a valuable role,
however, is as an absolute side-constraint on the pursuit of utilitarian deter-
rence. As such it will remind us that, in our zeal to pursue the social safety that
we hope will flow from an effective system of deterrence, we must not be willing
to buy this benefit by treating criminals more harshly than they deserve to be
treated.
MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 105, at 124. Indeed, utilitarian justifications for the
notion of "just deserts" are both possible and logical. See PACKER, supra note 85, at 16,
112-13 (emphasizing utilitarianism's need to balance its traditional concern with crime
deterrence against supposedly "retributive" concerns with impact on human autonomy
and the opportunity for free choice); SCHLEGEL, supra note 97, at 66-67, 74 (arguing that
concept of "just deserts" can be grounded in both utilitarian and retributive concerns).
But cf. PRIMORATZ, supra note 97, at 111-43 (criticizing theories which attempt to incor-
porate both utilitarianism and retributivism). At the very least, most recognize that
these subjective, retributive concerns with mental states, mercy, and excuses serve as
useful and necessary restraints on state power. See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 105,
at 124; PACKER, supra note 74, at 112-13 ("[C]ulpability is an appropriate criterion for
limiting the reach of state intervention."); see also JEFFREY SEDGWICK, LAw ENFORCEMENT
PLANNING: THE LIMITS OF AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 162-63 (1984) (arguing that even the
economic approach to law must recognize that moral, retributive concerns with right
and wrong promote deterrence). But see the argument of Richard Posner, An Economic
Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COL. L. REV. 1193, 1195, 1230-31 (1985), who concludes
that economic efficiency, not morality, is the primary objective of the criminal law, a view
soundly debunked in JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 164-65 (1988).
110. ZUCKERMAN, supra note 95, at 4-6.
111. See id. at 5 ("[N]ot only must the criminal process protect the innocent but it
must also be seen to be doing so.").
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crime beyond a reasonable doubt."'
Unfortunately, the growing formal commitment of the substan-
tive criminal law to notions of just deserts and subjective actor-
meanings-in short, to "individualized justice" '"-has been
checked by a bureauracratized system of prosecution and a focus on
crime control over procedural fairness or minimization of the risk of
error." 4 When the law of criminal evidence fails to move fact-find-
ers toward deep case logics that maximize the likelihood of out-
comes consistent with theories ofjust deserts, the moral basis of the
criminal law is undermined. Lempert and Sanders summarized this
danger well:
[W]hat is ... disturbing to many is the apparent ease with
which lawyers and judges adopt a shallow case logic in the
case of accused criminals. Shallow case logics restrict the
law's commitment to the full humanity of individual ac-
tions. It is true that shallow case logics tend to reduce
transaction costs in the criminal area as they do with torts,
but the savings do not have the same implications, for the
criminal law is not primarily concerned with the allocation
of costs. Bureaucratic adjudication, as Weber feared, un-
dermines the ethical dimension of law embodied in the
concept of desert. In situations where individual desert is
the central concern, we risk important values when we al-
low adjudications to be transformed into a mode of bu-
reaucratic decision making. One solution is to refocus our
concerns and forego moral judgments. With the spread of
insurance and the extension of strict liability, this has been
happening to a large extent in the tort law. If, on the other
hand, we remain interested in judging the morality of behavior, and
this is what the criminal law purports to do, we are, if we take the
task seriously, committed to a deep case logic." 5
What is the consequence, however, of this commitment to a
deep case logic? Such a commitment certainly cannot require the
112. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-64 (1970). See generally ZUCKERMAN, supra
note 95, at 122-34 (discussing role of reasonable doubt requirement in the law of crimi-
nal evidence).
113. See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 105, at 128 ("Justice demands individuation
."); SCHLEGEL, supra note 97, at 75 ("The concept of just deserts is grounded in
notions of individual justice.").
114. See LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra note 56, at 76-78, 129 (noting trend); see also
PACKER, supra note 85, at 153-71 (noting the competition in the modern criminal justice
system between the "Due Process Model" of fairness and accuracy and the "Crime Con-
trol Model" of speedy apprehension and conviction).
115. LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra note 56, at 129 (emphasis added).
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admission of all evidence that tends to promote unique and ex-
tended inquiries. Much evidence of that nature may indeed mislead
or confuse the jury, undermining a fair, open-minded focus on ac-
tor-meanings. In any event, there are competing values, other than
individualized justice, to be served by the law of evidence.' 1 6 How-
ever, the tendency toward typification in criminal cases does require
trial judges to be particularly alert to the impact that evidentiary rul-
ings may have on case logics. The need to promote deeper logics
must be an important value, a moral value, that informs the judge's
weighing process.
Notably, the need for deep logics is not always in the defend-
ant's benefit, for such an inquiry may at times reveal actor-meanings
that support, rather than defeat, his guilt." 7 While the occasional
prosecutorial efforts to deepen case logics are also entitled to an
attentive ear, the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt embodies a judgment that the risk of error regarding
guilt should fall on the prosecution, not the defendant."" In decid-
ing whether to admit or to exclude evidence that may impact upon
case logics, therefore, a judge should resolve her doubts about how
to weigh the impact against other concerns in favor of the defense.
How the courts can adequately consider the role of case logics
and the moral imperatives of the law of criminal evidence in resolv-
ing questions concerning the admissibility of psychological charac-
ter evidence is the subject of much of Part III of this Article. For
now, however, this Article turns to a more modest goal: illustrating
how psychological character evidence can help move juries closer to
the individualized justice that social psychology, moral principles,
and the rules of the substantive criminal law demand.
D. Individualized Justice and the Spectrum of Typification
The theoretical dichotomy suggested thus far between stere-
otypical, "normalized," justice and "individualized" justice is to
some extent a false one. In the "real world" there are many levels
of typification, each varying in the degree to which character evi-
dence seeks to portray the defendant as unique, or special, rather
than typical. All character evidence involves at least an implicit com-
116. See infra text accompanying notes 330-344, 495-497.
117. See LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra note 56, at 65 ("Some actions appear less culpable
when subjected to closer scrutiny, while others may appear more culpable.").
118. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364




parison to a group claimed to be similar to, or different from, the
defendant," 9 so a pure focus on the individual does not reflect real-
ity. Nevertheless, the degree to which the group is emphasized over
the individual may vary.
Group or individual character evidence, the polar opposites of
this emphasis, are two overly simplistic but useful categories for un-
derstanding the ways in which psychological character evidence can
help to achieve more individualized justice. Heavy emphasis on the
group leads to a portrayal of the defendant in a relatively stereotypi-
cal fashion: a "typical" member of a certain group.' 20 On the other
hand, heavy emphasis on the individual leads to the defendant being
viewed as relatively unique, her membership in a group defined
more by her own life experiences, her personal story. Thus, while
these opposites are often utilized, it must be remembered that there
is conceivably an infinite variation in the degree to which one is em-
phasized over the other in practice-that is, there is a spectrum of
typification.
1. The Upper End of the Spectrum: The Group.-"Group character
evidence" is a handy label for testimony in which an explicit com-
parison is made between the personality traits of an individual and
those typical of members of a certain group.' 2 ' The testimony may
be general, the expert merely describing the characteristics of the
group and leaving the individual's membership in that group as a
question for the jury. Alternatively, the testimony may be specific,
with the expert testifying that the defendant displays those qualities
necessary for membership in the group.
119. Glen Weissenberger, Making Sense of Extrinsic Act Evidence: Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b), 70 IowA L. REV. 579, 613 n.93 (1985) ("[T]o have meaning, the concept of pro-
pensity must be dependent upon our collective assumptions as to the repetition of cer-
tain types of human behavior based on the experience of observing persons other than the
accused." (emphasis added)). Cf. David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exot-
ica: A New Approach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal
Cases, 66 ORE. L. REV. 19, 27 (1987) [hereinafter McCord, Profiles] ("All nontraditional
psychological evidence follows this pattern of a comparison of an individual's behavior
with a database consisting of the behavior of others in similar circumstances who have
been studied in the past.").
120. But members of one group may have different qualities from those of another
group or from an "average" person. By focusing on the special qualities of a defend-
ant's particular group, instead of on preconceived or "normalized" notions of the de-
fendant's likely qualities, group character evidence helps to individualize justice.
121. See McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 52 ("A moment's reflection on these cate-
gories of evidence reveals that 'group' character evidence is objectionable for the same
reason as is traditional character evidence: probative value depends upon the jury draw-
ing the forbidden inference that the defendant has a propensity to commit the crime
with which he is charged.").
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Group character evidence is often used in one of two ways: (1)
in a purely probabilistic, predictive fashion or (2) to educate jurors
or correct their misconceptions about a group.
a. Probabilistic Prediction.-An example of a probalistic, predic-
tive use of character evidence is when a defendant argues that he
does not fit the personality "profile" of most rapists and, therefore,
it is less likely that he committed that crime.' 22 A corresponding
prosecution use 12 is the claim that the defendant does indeed fit
the profile, thus raising the likelihood of guilt.' 24 Note that both
uses appeal to stereotypes, either pre-existing ones (e.g., the "nor-
mal male") or ones sought to be newly created in the jurors' minds
(e.g., the "typical" rapist). Moreover, the primary function of this
stereotyping is to prove that the defendant did or did not commit an
act rather than the presence or absence of mens rea.
Probabilistic use raises some obvious concerns. For example,
suppose that a psychiatrist testified that eighty-five percent of all
child sex abusers are passive-dependent personalities, that figure
being offered to prove that the defendant, who is also a passive-
dependent, is guilty. This figure is of little value without a compari-
son to the total population of passive-dependents. If, therefore,
such a comparison revealed that 99.9 percent of passive-dependent
personalities are not child sex abusers, the fact that the defendant
had such a personality would not suggest a propensity for child
abuse. 125
Moreover, explicit probabilistic evidence raises concerns about
overawing the jury with numbers so that it convicts based upon
122. Compare State v. Cavallo, 443 A.2d 1020, 1021-22 (NJ. 1982) (excluding testi-
mony that defendant did not fit rapist profile) with Freeman v. State, 486 P.2d 967, 972-
76 (Alaska 1971) (admitting testimony that defendant was "not a sexual psychopath").
See generally Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Testimony as to Criminal Defendant's Propensity
Toward Sexual Deviation, 42 A.L.R. 4th 937 (1989).
123. Character evidence presented by the prosecution is usually done so on rebuttal,
given the common ban on prosecution's first use of character evidence to prove con-
duct. See FED. R. EVID. 404; infra text accompanying notes 244-265.
124. E.g., State v. Hickman, 337 N.W.2d 512, 516 (Iowa 1983) (utilizing psychiatric
testimony that defendant fit the category of "hatred rapists"). Interestingly, in some
jurisdictions there is an exception to the usual ban on initial prosecution use of propen-
sity evidence when the charge is child sex abuse. E.g., State v. Lachterman, 812 S.W.2d
759, 765-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (admitting evidence of other sex acts with children),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1666 (1992). See generally McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 51-58
(reviewing prosecution use of battering parent, child sex abuser, and rapist profiles).
125. This hypothetical is based on the facts of In re Cheryl H, 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098,




some perceived notion of the statistical likelihood of guilt instead of
the evidence of what happened on the specific occasion in ques-
tion. 126 These concerns about absurd statistics and overawed juries
have either explicitly or implicitly led some courts to reject the
probabilistic use of character evidence as unhelpful to the jury's in-
quiry. 12 7 Additionally, concerns that the jury will believe that pre-
dictions of future human behavior are infallible have led some
courts to reject probabilistic character evidence absent proof of its
''general acceptance" in the relevant scientific community or other
proof of its predictive value.'12
b. Correcting Misconceptions .- The second use of group charac-
ter evidence-to educate jurors or correct their misconceptions
about some group-does not necessarily raise the same concerns as
probabilistic character evidence. For example, a battered child
claiming to have killed his brutal father in self-defense because he
feared for his life might offer evidence that all battered children dis-
play extreme fear in certain situations. It should not matter that
other, non-battered children might display the same symptoms.
The point is that this child displays those symptoms and, therefore,
his story of acting in fear for his life is more plausible. Nevertheless,
some courts have remained skeptical about the value of such evi-
dence in demonstrating fear at the time of the crime absent lay testi-
mony of other events supporting such fear.129
Still other courts have found expert testimony of this nature un-
helpful because lay testimony, for example about an extensive his-
tory of prior beatings of a woman or a child, is sufficient alone to
support the defendant's claim of fear caused by the earlier beat-
ings. 130 These courts fail to appreciate that "extensive" testimony
providing history and context may be insufficient without expert ad-
126. See Robert P. Mosteller, Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Concerning Social Framework Evidence, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 85, 86-87 & n.9 (Au-
tumn 1989) (reviewing briefly the debate over explicitly probabilistic evidence).
127. E.g., State v. Claflin, 690 P.2d 1186, 1190 (Wash. App. 1984) (prosecution ex-
pert's testimony on rebuttal in rape case that 43% of child molestation cases were re-
ported to have been committed by father figures was unduly prejudicial).
128. E.g., State v. Cavallo, 443 A.2d 1020, 1026 (N.J. 1982).
129. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139-40 (Ohio 1981);Jahnke v. State,
682 P.2d 991, 1004-08 (Wyo. 1984). But see Washington v.Janes, 822 P.2d 1238 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1992) (broadly approving the use of expert testimony on battered child's syn-
drome in support of a child's claim of self-defense in killing his father).
130. See, e.g., People v. Powell, 424 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (Tompkins County Ct. 1980)
(holding that expert testimony does not add to defense when the jury heard lay testi-
mony of abuse), aff'd, 442 N.Y.S.2d 645 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). But see Commonwealth
v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 784-85 (Pa. 1989) (holding that failure to call appropriate
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vice to demonstrate the "uniqueness" of the defendant's situation.
Thus, testimony regarding the "cycle of violence" and "learned
helplessness" of battered women (1) may add greater plausibility to
the woman's testimony regarding the perceived degree of the beat-
ings and the predictability of her husband's rage, (2) may explain
why a woman might not leave her husband despite such beatings,
and (3) may reveal why a woman might believe that her husband was
about to kill or maim her, although the basis of her belief may not
be obvious to others.1 3 ' The history of the beatings is simply not
enough.
Another difference between the probabilistic use of expert
character testimony and its use as a "corrective" or "information-
enhancing" device, is that the former usually concerns acts while the
latter concerns mental states. 132 Whether this is a logical distinction
regarding the value of the evidence or not, some courts have sug-
gested that understanding another's mind rather than predicting an-
other's behavior is more properly within a psychologist's expertise
and traditional role in the courtroom. These courts are more likely
to view character testimony offered to prove state of mind as already
within the sphere of "generally accepted" psychological tech-
niques.' 3 3 On the other hand, some courts continue to apply the
traditional screening tests for scientific evidence to all psychological
character testimony, even as to state of mind, examining the scien-
tific bases with somewhat greater scrutiny.134
One other form of the corrective or educational use of psycho-
logical character evidence involves the comparison of an individual
to "normal," not for probabilistic predictive reasons, but to help the
jury understand how normal people react in certain situations. For
example, psychological character testimony may be offered to sup-
port the argument that the defendant's actions were consistent with
those of a "reasonable" person. This use has generally been re-
jected on the theory that jurors already know what is normal and the
expert to rebut "unfounded myths" about battered women was ineffective assistance of
counsel).
131. See Stonehouse, 555 A.2d at 783-85 (describing the use of battered woman syn-
drome in dispelling erroneous myths); Kinports, supra note 47, at 396-408 (detailing the
cycle of violence, learned helplessness, and other features of the battered woman syn-
drome); LENORE WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN 18-31 (1979) (cataloguing the various
myths regarding battered women).
132. See McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 35-58 (summarizing cases).
133. See State v. Cavallo, 443 A.2d 1020, 1027-29 (N.J. 1982).
134. See, e.g.,Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1007-08 (Wyo. 1984).
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testimony is, therefore, unhelpful.'I 5 This approach can be too sim-
plistic in particular instances. For example, jurors may not be aware
of the impact that a combination of particular environmental factors
or "stressors" may have on the degree and nature of a normal per-
son's fear. Thus, psychological expert testimony regarding these
stressors might be admitted to support a defendant's claim that she
killed because of an honest fear that she had to do so to protect a
loved one.
2. The Lower End of the Spectrum: The Individual.-With "individ-
ual character evidence," unlike "group character evidence," the
comparison to a group is either de-emphasized or merely implicit.
The focus is instead on the individual's own history and unique per-
sonality. Less reliance is placed on comparison to systematic, statis-
tical studies and experiments. Rather, emphasis is placed on an
admittedly subjective, clinical judgment by the psychologist based
upon personality tests, clinical experience with other patients, and
interviews with the patient in question. This approach does not nec-
essarily eliminate statistical references or explicit group compari-
sons, but such comparisons are not emphasized and are not the
primary basis for the expert's opinion. Courts sometimes see these
differences as important.
For example, in People v. Stoll,' a child sexual abuse case, the
trial court excluded a psychologist's opinion that the defendant had
a normal personality function, with a low indication of antisocial or
aggressive behavior, thus making it unlikely that he would commit
the charged acts.'" 7 The opinion was based on a combination of
personality tests, interviews with the defendant, and the psycholo-
gist's professional experience. Moreover, the psychologist testified
in court as to the statistical accuracy of the personality tests used,
135. E.g., CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 166 (1989) (noting judges
sometimes exclude battered woman syndrome testimony because it is about "just ordi-
nary fear-specifically the reasonableness of the woman's fear-and fear is a common
human emotion that any juror is familiar with and can understand without help from an
expert"); Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller,Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework
Testimony, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 139 (Autumn 1989) ("A frequently ex-
pressed objection to social framework evidence is that it contributes little or no new
information about human behavior to the pooled experiences of the jurors."). See also
Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1063-64 (Wyo. 1987). Justice Urbigkit, in a persuasive
dissent, argued, however, that the psychology of conflict and fear is a complex subject
on which expert testimony may be especially helpful. Id. at 1075-76 (Urbigkit, J.,
dissenting).
136. 783 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989).
137. Id. at 703-06.
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but noted that the tests were not the sole determinant of his opin-
ion. l1 8 On appeal, the State argued unsuccessfully that the testi-
mony should be admitted only if valid empirical evidence supported
both the existence of a rapist profile and that it was significant that a
defendant did not fit that profile.1 3 9 In reversing, the appellate
court refused to require a probabilistic comparison to a profile,
holding the evidence admissible because the subjective clinical judg-
ment of the psychologist was both relevant and helpful to the
jury. "I The court further held that there was no need to subject the
testimony to the kinds of special tests often applied to screen "scien-
tific" evidence. 141
Stoll is representative of "individual character evidence" in its
purest form because the court rejected the notion that express com-
parison to a group is necessary. Instead, the court approved psy-
chological testimony that was unquestionably based on the expert's
subjective judgments and that sought to depict the defendant as a
truly unique individual, a "universe of one." If such testimony
proved successful on retrial, it would surely have achieved the goal
of overcoming juror tendencies toward trial by typification, myth,
and stereotype.
II. TOOLS OF THE TRADE
Part I of this Article reviewed the moral and psychological roles
that may be played by expert character witnesses in criminal trials.
It also illustrated the wide variety of potential uses for such wit-
nesses in proving the elements of various crimes and defenses and
briefly examined the value placed by the judiciary on such witnesses
at trial. Before turning to a more detailed inquiry into the eviden-
tiary objections to such testimony, however, it is necessary to under-
stand what expert character witnesses do, for only then can it be
judged when, if ever, they may be helpful to a jury.
Part II therefore offers a brief general review of the "tools" of
the psychologist's trade. These tools include: objective and projec-
tive personality tests; clinical interviews; behavioral observations;
reviews of empirical studies of personality types, syndromes, and
profiles; and interviews with third parties. The tools reviewed are
those common to a wide variety of character testimony. No effort is
138. Id. at 705.
139. Id. at 707.
140. Id. at 714-15.
141. Id. at 714.
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made to examine any single tool in depth, although selected types
may be emphasized for illustration.
These tools can be understood only, however, by first examin-
ing what psychologists mean when they speak of "personality," their
equivalent to the legal concept of "character."
A. The Concept of Personality
"Personality" is the central psychological concept concerning
the "type of person" one is. Although different theorists define the
term in slightly different ways, one useful common definition is as
follows: "Personality is a stable set of tendencies and characteristics
that determine those commonalities and differences in people's psy-
chological behavior (thoughts, feelings, and actions) that have con-
tinuity in time and that may not be easily understood as the sole
result of the social and biological pressures of the moment." 142
This definition requires several explanations and qualifications.
First, although the definition includes both cognitive components-
those concerning how information is perceived, retained, trans-
formed, and acted on-and affective ones-emotions, temperament,
and the like-the traditional focus of personality study often empha-
sizes the affective over the cognitive. 143  But the more modem
trend-and the one followed in this Article-has been to include
certain cognitive components in the study of personality. 144
Second, while some theorists include intelligence as a character
trait, 145 it is often treated as a separate subject of study. 1 4 6 More-
over, courts often describe intelligence as not an aspect of character,
at least when it is argued that, because of low intelligence, the ac-
cused lacked the capacity to form a mental state.' 47 This use of in-
telligence is more properly classified as a traditional diminished
142. SALVATORE R. MADDI, PERSONALITY THEORIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 8 (5th
ed. 1989) (emphasis omitted).
143. E.g., LEwIs R. AIKEN, ASSESSMENT OF PERSONALITY 4 (1989) [hereinafter AIKEN,
ASSESSMENT] (defining personality as including both cognitive and affective components
but then focusing "on the assessment of affective characteristics, which encompass the
traditional, albeit somewhat limited, conception of personality variables").
144. See, e.g., B.R. HERGENHAHN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES OF PERSONALrrY 309-
40, 400-26 (3d ed. 1990) (surveying selected cognitive theories of personality); MADDI,
supra note 142, at 155-83 (grouping certain cognitive personality theories as constituting
the "consistency model" of personality theory).
145. See AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 4.
146. See MADDI, supra note 142, at 263 (cautioning against reliance on a particular
study because its "major concern is with intelligence rather than personality").
147. E.g., United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 682 (7th Cir.) (concluding that intelli-
gence is not a "character trait" within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 404),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982).
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capacity defense, not character evidence in the sense used in this
Article. 148
Third, personalities can and do change, 149 although theorists
disagree over the likely speed and magnitude of such change.15 °
Understanding this dynamic nature of personality is an important
insight. Because personality traits are not forever fixed, life events
may cause personality change. Thus rape victims, victims of child
abuse, and battered women may come to display behaviors,
thoughts, and feelings that persist over some significant period of
time, and thus may be considered part of their personality.' 5 ' So
viewed, many of the psychological syndromes and profiles that have
been the focus of much recent legal literature can be seen as aspects
of a single problem, that of using expert psychological character
evidence.
A fuller understanding of personality also requires an examina-
tion of the recent assaults in the academic community on the very
concept of "personality." The best-known assault comes from so-
cial learning theorist Walter Mischel, whose early research sug-
gested that behavior has little consistency across time and
situations, and that the notion of a "stable" set of behavioral ten-
dencies-a personality-thus makes little sense. 152 Indeed, some
recent legal literature has picked up on Mischel's research as a
ground for challenging the value of character evidence generally.153
148. See infra text accompanying notes 575-584.
149. HERGENHAHN, supra note 144, at 178 ("Personality, according to Allport, is never
something that is; rather, it is something that is becoming. Although enough similarity
exists within people to maintain their identity from one experience to another, in a sense
they never are quite the same people they were before a particular experience.").
150. MADDI, supra note 142, at 258-59. See also HERGENHAHN, supra note 144, at 3-6
(discussing generally the theories considering influences that make up personality).
151. The authors of one of the leading texts on law and social science have classified
psychological testimony regarding "personality" as distinct from such testimony regard-
ing "life events." See JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 359, 366 (2d ed. 1990). The distinction is an unhelpful one when
life events are offered primarily to explain personality changes. Both "personality" and
"life events" testimony raise similar psychological issues and both involve the legal con-
cept of "character" evidence. Indeed, the authors expressly recognize the latter point as
to "personality" testimony, id. at 365, and implicitly do so as to "life events" testimony
by selecting cases addressing the "character evidence" question. Id. at 366-67.
152. See THEODORE MILLON, DISORDERS OF PERSONALITY, DSM III: Axis II 20-21
(1981) (summarizing Mischel's early views). See generally WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY
AND ASSESSMENT (1968).
153. E.g., Miguel A. Mendez, California's New Law On Character Evidence: Evidence Code
Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1003, 1052-53
(1984); Robert G. Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Diferent Look at an Interminable Prob-
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Despite the arguments raised in the legal literature, Mischel's
critiques have not led to the abandonment of the concept of person-
ality. 5 4 Much recent research reaches contrary conclusions to Mis-
chel's regarding the predictive value of the personality concept. 55
Still other research concludes that individuals differ in the degree to
which their behaviors display consistency as well as in what charac-
teristics are likely to be consistent;' 56 thus "each of us possesses
particular [personality] traits that are resistant to situational influ-
ence and others that can be readily modified."' 57
Mischel's work has led to a rethinking of how to define basic
personality characteristics. Such an approach may focus on "coher-
ence," that is, on identifying the logical patterns or regularities un-
derlying behavior rather than on the sameness of the behavior
itself.'15  For example, excessive timidity in one context and ex-
treme aggression in another may demonstrate that an individual has
"a strong conflict over aggression.' 59 Even more importantly,
some theorists have recognized that traits need to be defined more
precisely in terms of situations.' 60  Thus, instead of describing
someone as "conscientious," suggesting that the person is conscien-
tious about all things, a person might be described as a "conscien-
km, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 758, 783 (1975) (discussing theories contrary to the notion of
"stability").
154. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
155. See MILLON, supra note 152, at 21-22.
156. See id. at 22-23.
157. Id. at 23.
158. Id. at 21-22. One modern moralist has defined a "moral character trait" as in-
cluding both dispositions to do certain acts and to feel appropriate moral motivations.
This motivational view of character is similar to the psychologist's concept of
"coherence":
[11f we use the broader motivational view of character as our baseline, a far
smaller category of actions will be described as morally "out of character" even
if the person had never acted like that before. If we have a reasonably complete
picture of a person's moral character, most of his moral and immoral future
actions will reflect some enduring moral character trait-even if what we learn
is new information about how that trait motivates behavior under new and unu-
sual circumstances.
Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Character to Our Moral
Culpability Judgments, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 59, 80 n.44 (1990).
159. MILLON, supra note 152, at 22 (quoting P.L. Wachtel, Psychodynamics, Behavior The-
ory and the Implacable Experimenter: An Inquiry into the Consistency of Personality, 82 J. ABNOR-
MAL PSYCHOL. 324 (1973)).
160. See MADDI, supra note 142, at 578 ("There is ample precedent among personality
theorists . . .for a conceptualization of peripheral characteristics as potentialities that




Indeed, Mischel himself has come around to the "interaction-
ist" position, which reformulates the study of behavior as seeking an
answer to this question: "Which personality and situational factors
interact to produce consistent behaviors and which to produce vari-
able behaviors?"'' 62 A battered woman might, therefore, be espe-
cially fearful of violent assaults by her husband but not necessarily
unusually fearful of all people, or even of all men.'66 The need to
link general traits to the specific situation before the jury is there-
fore critical in assessing the value of psychological character
testimony.
B. Objective Personality Tests
1. Creation and Measurement.-"Objective" personality tests are
those that "consist of true-false or multiple choice items that can be
scored objectively."'" Different strategies may be used to design
different tests, although strategies are often combined. 65  One
common strategy, the "rational-theoretical" strategy, deduces ap-
161. See Walter Mischel, Alternatives in the Pursuit of the Predictability and Consistency of
Persons: Stable Data That Yield Unstable Interpretations, 51 J. PERSONALITY 578, 592-93
(1983) (discussing research regarding student conscientiousness). Accord, Steven J.
Sherman & Russell H. Fazio, Parallels Between Attitudes and Traits as Predictors of Behavior, 51
J. PERSONALITY 308, 309 (1983) ("It may be, of course, that Tom is aggressive only at
work or only toward men or that Alan is empathetic only during spring, but this is a
matter of situational specificity of the expression of the trait.").
162. MILLON, supra note 152, at 22 (emphasis added). See generally Sherman & Fazio,
supra note 161 (surveying research regarding the interrelationship between personality
traits, attitudes, and situations).
163. Kinports, supra note 47, at 416 (noting the extreme fear that a battered woman
may have of her husband).
164. AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 192. The objective personality tests de-
scribed in this Article involve the "nomothetic" approach to personality study: the
search for general laws of behavior and personality by relying on group norms and aver-
ages. Id. at 423. An alternative method is the "idiographic approach," in which each
individual "is considered to be a lawful, integrated system to be studied in his or her
own right." Id. Although the idiographic concept has a long history and there has been
some promising recent work in the area, see id. at 423-24, the approach has been chal-
lenged as "unscientific." HERGENHAHN, supra note 144, at 197. But see id. at 245 (noting
B.F. Skinner's support for idiographic research); infra text accompanying notes 385-405,
546-562 (arguing that there is a role for expert "artistry," as well as science, at a criminal
trial). On the other hand, it has also been suggested that single subject research, as
opposed to group research, can aid both in understanding unique individuals and in
better formulating laws of human behavior. MARSHALL EDELSON, HYPOTHESIS AND Evi-
DENCE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 63-69 (1984). In any event, "idiographic" research is rarely
the explicit subject of the relevant case law and is often given inadequate attention in the
standard texts on personality assessment and theory. See, e.g., AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra
note 143; HERGENHAHN, supra note 144. These are oversights that this Article will ad-
dress. See infra text accompanying notes 385-404, 546-562.
165. See AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 194.
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propriate questions from logic and a particular psychological the-
ory. 66 An alternative common strategy is more empirical: the
"criterion-group" method.' 67 This method
begins with a sample with known characteristics, such as a
group of diagnosed schizophrenics. An item pool is then
administered to individuals in the known sample and to a
control group-usually a normal population. The items
that distinguish the known sample from the normal group
are then placed in a scale .... [T]hose items are then used
on another similar sample to determine whether the scale
continues to distinguish between the two groups.' 68
Two concerns guide judgments about the value of a particular
personality test: reliability and validity.' 69 "Reliability" refers to
the consistency of the testing device, that is, its ability to arrive at
the same conclusion from tests given at different times and in differ-
ent situations, assuming that there is no underlying change in the
trait being measured. 170 There are many different ways of measur-
ing reliability, but two notable ones are retesting the same group,
and having different examiners score the same test.17 ' A "correla-
tion coefficient," a statistical measure of reliability, is then
assigned. 172
"Validity" reflects the extent to which the test measures what it
was created to measure. 7-' Here, too, there are different ways to
make this determination. "Criterion-related validity" measures test
scores against an external criterion.' 74 If that external criterion is
measured at the same time as the test is given, that is called "con-
current validity."' 175 For example, does the test classify mental pa-
tients in the same category as do psychiatrists using other
techniques? 76 If the external criterion is measured after the test is
166. Id. at 192-93.
167. Id. at 194.
168. ALBERT B. HOOD & RICHARD W. JOHNSON, ASSESSMENT IN COUNSELING: A GUIDE
TO THE USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES 150 (1991).
169. AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 67.
170. Id. at 73.
171. Id. at 74-77.
172. See JAY ZISKIN & DAVID FAUST, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTIMONY 546 (4th ed. 1988).
173. AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 81.





given, that is called "predictive validity."' 77 For example, does a
measure of violence correspond to later observations of violent
behavior?
Understanding predictive validity requires an attention to "base
rates," the rate of the observed characteristic in the overall popula-
tion. i t ' For instance, it may be that sixty percent of the American
adult population does not commit violent acts. A test resulting in
accurate predictions of nonviolence sixty percent of the time thus
tells us nothing that we did not already know.' 79 Therefore, one
must also consider "incremental validity," that is, whether the test is
a more accurate measurement over an alternative diagnostic tool. 80
Also of importance is "construct validity": whether the test
measures a particular psychological construct, such as anxiety or
achievement motivation.' 8 ' Expertjudgments about whether a test
has such validity, analysis of the test's internal consistency, and
questioning of examinees after tests to reveal mental processes in
deciding to answer questions in a certain way, are all considered in
gauging construct validity.' 8 To have construct validity, a test
should have high correlations with measures of the construct by
other means and low correlations with measures of different
constructs.
8 3
Several further cautions are necessary. First, standard proce-
dures should be followed in administering tests to minimize the ef-
fects of the physical surroundings and the examiner's behavior on
the person examined. 84 Second, "generalization" must be done
cautiously.'8 5 Thus, if a test's validity is based on a sample of all
white, middle-class males, results from administering the test to
members of different racial and age groups may not lead to the same
177. Id. at 82, 473. See also P.E. Vernon, The Concept of Validity in Personality Study, in
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 407, 408 (B. Semeonoff ed., 1966) (mentioning prediction of
"legal offenses"); AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 82-83 (offering additional ex-
amples of predictive validity).
178. AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 84, 465.
179. These figures are a variation on an example offered in ZISKIN & FAUST, supra
note 172, at 548.
180. See AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 84; ZISKIN & FAUST, supra note 172, at
549.
181. AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 85.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 85-86.
184. See id. at 93-102 (outlining procedures and their importance); ZISKIN & FAUST,
supra note 172, at 543-44 (stressing the importance of uniformity in administering tests).
185. See infra notes 186-187, 408-411.
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conclusions.'" 6 Moreover, if a test measures one particular trait, ex-
planations extending that trait to other characteristics and circum-
stances are suspect.18 7 Indeed, concerns about this problem have
led some to advocate the creation of a wide battery of tests, each of
which is highly specific to a characteristic important in a courtroom
setting; early efforts on this score are promising. 88
2. A Brief Comment on the MMPI.-It is worth briefly discussing
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) as an ex-
ample of an objective test, because it is perhaps the most widely
used psychological instrument, especially in court-related set-
tings.'8 9 Over 12,000 research articles and books have been written
about the MMPI since it was developed over 50 years ago.'9 °
The MMPI consists of 566 statements to be classified as true or
mostly true, or false or not usually true.' 9 ' The MMPI includes four
"validity" scales, the primary purpose of which is to detect invalidity
in a particular administration of the exam because the subject may
have answered in such a way as to be perceived in a more or less
favorable light, or been confused or overly critical and defensive in
186. See ZISKIN & FAUST, supra note 172, at 550-51 (discussing the extent to which test
results can be generalized); Lynne B. Rosewater, The Clinical and Courtroom Application of
Battered Women's Personality Assessments, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 87 (DanielJ. Sonkin ed., 1987) (noting that
because control group used in creating MMPI, an objective personality assessment test,
contained no blacks, most experts agree that accurate interpretation of the test had to
take into account the race of the test-taker). However, "it is often reasonable to assume
that if the changes in persons or circumstances are very minor, there is a good chance to
expect generalization." ZISKIN & FAUST, supra note 172, at 550.
187. See ZISKIN & FAUST, supra note 172, at 550 ("A test that may help measure skills
essential to a career in accounting (e.g., mathematical abilities) probably will not help in
the assessment of marital accord.").
188. See Richard I. Lanyon, Psychological Assessment Procedures in Court-Related Settings, 17
PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 260-68 (1986) (discussing move-
ment toward use of issue-specific assessment tools); AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 143,
at 437 (noting special tests for competency, types and strengths of sexually anomalous
behavior, and a child's perception of her parents). In addition to increased research on
issue-specific tests, there has been a growing focus on devising tests to assess the dy-
namic, two-way interaction between persons and environment discussed supra text ac-
companying notes 142-163. See LEWIS AIKEN, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING AND ASSESSMENT
434-36 (7th ed. 1991) [hereinafter AIKEN, TESTING] (summarizing many of the new tests
focusing on this interaction).
189. AIKEN, TESTING, supra note 188, at 433 (stating that the MMPI is perhaps the
"most frequently administered of all psychometric instruments in legal settings");
DANIEL SHUMAN, PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 54 (1986) (stating that the
MMPI is the "premier diagnostic and screening device in clinical psychology").
190. MARC J. ACKERMAN & ANDREW W. KANE, How TO EXAMINE PSYCHOLOGICAL Ex-
PERTS IN DIVORCE AND OTHER CIVIL ACTIONS 196 (1990).
191. AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 231.
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responding.'9 2 The remaining scales are clinical scales from which
traditional psychiatric diagnoses are made and research or supple-
mentary scales designed to measure specific personality characteris-
tics or measure specific problem areas.' 9 3 However, a psychiatric
diagnosis or personality analysis is based not on a single scale score
but on a combination of scores." 9 The scores are interpreted by
comparing the results to norms and to the many published research
findings and by using professional judgment to determine possible
explanations for tendencies shown in the results, based on the sub-
ject's background. 19 The reliability coefficients vary for different
scales, with median coefficients ranging from .7 to .9.96
One critical focus of inquiry in using the MMPI in court is to
examine any available empirical evidence concerning its use for the
particular purpose served in bringing the psychologist to court. For
example, specific research has been done examining the MMPI re-
sults of battered women. 19 7 Unfortunately, such highly specific em-
pirical research is often lacking.
The MMPI has recently been revised, being replaced by the
MMPI-2.' 98 The test was revised because some of the items were
out of date, some were objectionable as sexist or otherwise offen-
sive, some were not scored on useful scales, and there was a need to
expand the item pool to address new problem areas and to develop
192. Id. at 234-35.
193. ACKERMAN & KANE, supra note 190, at 154. See also AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra
note 143, at 233-34 (describing the clinical scales, including the "depression," "psycho-
pathic deviate," "paranoia," and "hypomania" scales).
194. AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 236.
195. ACKERMAN & KANE, supra note 190, at 155.
196. AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 239. The reliability coefficients vary based
on the approach used in computing the coefficient. These relatively high figures were
computed by the method of "internal consistency coefficients." Id. A wider range, from
.58 to .92 has been noted for the clinical scales on the revised MMPI when a different
method, test-retest, is used to compute reliability. AIKEN, TESTING, supra note 188, at
378.
197. See Rosewater, supra note 186, at 89-91. Professor Rosewater found that the
highest scale elevation for battered women was on the scale measuring anger. Id. at 89.
Subscales showed, however, that battered women usually direct their anger inward in-
stead of outward. Id. They also show elevation on the scales measuring confusion and
paranoia or fearfulness. Id. But intactness and ego strength scales were low, a finding
consistent with the theory that battered women suffer from learned helplessness. Id. at
90.
198. E.g., AIKEN, TESTING, supra note 188, at 377 ("To provide a more representative
sample of the U.S. adult population than the original MMPI, MMPI-2 was standardized
on 2,600 U.S. residents aged 18 to 90 ... selected according to statistics provided by the
1980 census on geographic distribution, ethnic and racial composition, age and educa-
tional levels, and marital status."); ACKERMAN & KANE, supra note 190, at 196.
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Projective techniques consist of "relatively unstructured stimuli
that examinees are asked to describe, tell a story about, complete, or
respond to in some other manner."200 Two examples are the Ror-
schach Ink Blot Test and the Thematic Apperception Test.20 ' In
the Rorschach Test, subjects are shown inkblots and asked to de-
scribe what the inkblots suggest to them.20 2 There are various
methods of administration and scoring. 203 In the Thematic Apper-
ception Test, the subject is shown a series of cards, most with
human figures on them, and is asked to make up a story about the
picture. 0 4
Supporters of projective tests maintain that the structure im-
posed on the inkblot or picture reflects fundamental facets of per-
sonality. 20 5 But even these supporters admit that the tests are
highly fakable, are very susceptible to the conditions under which
they are administered, are scored and interpreted differently by dif-
ferent examiners, and have inadequate or unrepresentative norms
or no norms at all.20 6 Indeed, these features limit the value of these
tests as a useful way of communicating information in a courtroom,
and a majority of clinical psychology faculty in universities view the
tests negatively.20 7
D. Observations and Interviews
In "observation," the expert observer simply takes note of and
perhaps records the behaviors displayed by a subject under
199. AIKEN, TESTING, supra note 188, at 377.
200. AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 305.
201. HOOD &JOHNSON, supra note 168, at 166-67.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 167.
204. Id.
205. See AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 306 ("The more unstructured the task,
the more likely the responses are to reveal important facets of personality.").
206. Id.
207. Id. at 307. But see ACKERMAN & KANE, supra note 190, at 234-37, 241-45 (arguing
that Rorschach has greater reliability and validity than is commonly suggested and that
both the Rorschach and the Thematic Apperception Test are useful as interviewing aids
to be combined with other techniques); E. JERRY PHARES, CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY: CON-
CEvrs, METHODS, AND PROFESSION 224 (4th ed. 1992) (suggesting that the Rorschach
may be a useful instrument when an adequate theoretical or empirical basis exists for
making specific predictions).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
study. 08 Observations can be uncontrolled but systematic, as
where specific, critical behaviors are identified for the observer to
record.2 °9 In controlled observations, on the other hand, the sub-
jects are placed in prearranged or contrived situations with the goal
of observing how they behave in those circumstances.2 1 0 The accu-
racy of observation can be improved by requiring immediate record-
ing of what is observed, multiple observers, videotaping, and careful
training of observers regarding what to watch for and how to mini-
mize the impact of the observer's own biases, expectancies, person-
ality, attitudes, or desires.21 '
With interviews, instead of merely observing, the psychologist
asks questions and records answers. Interviews can be unstruc-
tured, with the interviewer free to ask what seems appropriate, or
structured, with a series of specific, standard questions to be
asked. 12 Answers from the latter type of interview can sometimes
be quantified. 213 Interviews may cover such topics as physical ap-
pearance; behavior; family, medical, educational, marriage, and em-
ployment history; interests and attitudes; and current problems.214
Carefully planned, structured, and specific interviews conducted by
specially trained interviewers are more likely to be valid.215 Validity
may also be improved by using multiple evaluators, which can be
facilitated by the use of videotapes.2 16 In addition, some experts
recommend lengthy, multiple interviews performed by different in-
terviewers in different settings.21 7
Forensic psychologists also seek out sources other than the de-
fendant concerning the offense, previous antisocial behavior, gen-
eral historical information, and the relevant psychiatric
information. 28  This helps to verify the defendant's "story" and
208. AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 128.
209. Id. at 128-29.
210. Id. at 129.
211. Id. at 132-33.
212. See id. at 140-41 (describing when to use structured and unstructured
interviews).
213. Id. at 141.
214. Id. at 141-42.
215. Id. at 150.
216. See infra text accompanying notes 384-404.
217. E.g., Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 505. See also Roberta K. Thyfault et al.,
When Battered Women Kill: Evaluation and Expert Witness Testimony Techniques, in DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 71,
75-80 (Daniel J. Sonkin ed., 1987) (recommending at least one intensive, all-day inter-
view and a shorter, follow-up interview, in combination with MMPI testing and other
factors, before deciding whether a subject fits the battered woman syndrome).
218. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 508.
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provides the therapist with information that the defendant may not
have. 219 This may require interviewing many people who play an
important role in the defendant's life.
E. Diagnoses and DSM-III-R
The revised third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-III-R)220 provides
a means of classifying psychological and psychiatric disorders. 22'
The DSM-III-R may improve the reliability of psychological diagno-
sis by making diagnostic criteria more concrete, behavioral, and ob-
servable than had been true in the past.222  Videotaping of
interviews to train clinicians to use the system uniformly has also
helped to increase reliability.223 Diagnoses using the DSM-III-R are
"probabilistic" in that patients with a given disorder can have quite
different signs and symptoms because, for example, a patient can
qualify for the same diagnosis by having any three symptoms from
Group A, any two from Group B, and none from Group C.22' Diag-
noses are accepted or rejected after combining the observed symp-
toms according to a prescribed formula. 225 The diagnosis is applied
if the critical number of symptoms in an acceptable combination is
reached.226
DSM-III-R diagnoses may be of greater importance in psychiat-
ric testimony requiring that the defendant suffer from a mental dis-
ease or defect, as is true with the insanity defense and diminished
capacity, because the diagnosis supports the argument that the de-
219. Id. at 508-09.
220. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-III-R) (3d ed. rev. 1987).
221. HOOD &JOHNSON, supra note 168, at 179.
222. SHUMAN, supra note 189, at 30. But see Nancy Cantor, "Everyday" Versus Normative
Models of Clinical and Social Judgment, in INTEGRATIONS OF CLINICAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
oGY 27 (Gifford Weary & Herbert L. Mirels eds., 1982) (critiquing the traditional
method of psychiatric diagnosis and suggesting an alternative approach that more
closely mirrors the way in which real clinicians behave).
223. SHUMAN, supra note 189, at 30.
224. PAUL R. McHUGH & PHILLIP R. SLAVNEY, THE PERSPECTIVES OF PSYCHIATRY 30
(1986). Although doctors McHugh and Slavney's description was under DSM-III, the
predecessor to DSM-III-R, this probabilistic feature has not changed in the revised man-
ual. See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DESK REFERENCE TO THE DIAGNOSTIC
CRITERIA FROM DSM-III-R 49 (1987) (describing "autistic disorder" as requiring the
presence of at least eight of sixteen listed items, "to include at least two items from
Group A, one from Group B, and one from Group C").




fendant indeed suffers from a mental disease. 2 7 For psychological
character evidence, however, a DSM-III-R diagnosis may be help-
ful22. but is not essential, because it is not necessary that the de-
fendant suffer from an illness or disorder at all. 229
F. Profiles, Syndromes, and Typologies
A psychologist may also rely on empirical studies regarding
common traits of members of certain groups. The characteristics of
group members are often described as "syndromes," "profiles," or
"typologies," terms among which, for purposes of this Article, there
are no real distinctions. 2 3 0 These profiles may differ in the extent to
which there is supporting empirical research and agreement regard-
ing their validity among the scientific community. For example,
many psychologists agree that there is significant support for the
battered woman syndrome. 231 But there may be less agreement on
whether there are rapist typologies.23 2 Beyond this, some psycholo-
gists have suggested that reasonable working "hypotheses" can be
formulated regarding the "type" of person who would commit a
particular crime, based on specific personality characteristics re-
quired to commit the crime. 33 For example, sustained fraud gener-
ally requires high intelligence. 234 Regardless of the source of the
profile, it must be compared to the results of the clinician's other
investigations regarding the patient to determine whether the indi-
227. See infra text accompanying notes 575-583.
228. McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 99 (noting that the availability of "clear diag-
nostic criteria" bolsters the "plausibility" of proffered psychological evidence).
229. See infra text accompanying notes 403-404, 575-583.
230. See, e.g., McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 24 n.14 (defining syndromes and
profiles); HANS TOCH, VIOLENT MEN: AN INQUIRY INTO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VIOLENCE
175-77, 214 (1969) (suggesting a "typology" of the violence-prone person but question-
ing its validity).
231. See, e.g., Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 135, at 150-51. But see David Faigman,
Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619 passim
(1986) [hereinafter Faigman, Note] (criticizing scientific merit of a leading researcher's
work on the battered woman syndrome).
232. Compare Samuel Roll & William E. Foote, The Inconsistent Personality Defence, in Psy-
CHOLOGY AND LAw: TOPICS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 125, 128-30 (DavidJ.
Miiller et al. eds., 1984) (favoring use of "rapist typologies" to support a defendant's
argument that his personality was "inconsistent" with rape) with Lanyon, supra note 188,
at 265 (noting that some reviews have shown that "sex offenders in general do not have
backgrounds and personality characteristics that make them reliably distinguishable").
233. See Roll & Foote, supra note 232, at 126-27 ("[C]ertain crimes (e.g., sustained
fraud) directly point to some aspects of the person (capacity to plan, moderately high to
high intelligence)."). Roll and Foote are thus among those theorists who view intelli-
gence as an aspect of personality. See supra text accompanying notes 145-148.
234. See Roll & Foote, supra note 232, at 126-27.
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vidual fits the profile.2" 5
G. Case Studies and Life Stoies
These interviews, observations, and other investigations are
combined with the personality tests and reviews of the empirical
literature to produce a "case study."' 6 The case study seeks to cre-
ate an overall picture of the individual, relying upon multiple
sources of information and the consistencies or inconsistencies be-
tween those sources.2 3 7 Case studies inevitably include some sub-
jective factors, but the extent to which these factors result in biases
can be reduced by carefully training clinicians to avoid potential
sources of bias.2 8 Additionally, careful recording of all "objective"
data forming the basis for the clinician's opinion is necessary. 23 9
Ways to improve the quality of case studies and their usefulness to a
jury are discussed in greater detail below.2 40
The point of the case study, of course, is to tell the individual
patient's life story.24 ' To be useful to the jury, it must be built upon
as much objective data and empirical research as possible. But it
also must be a story that is unquestionably based to a large degree
on the experience and judgment of the clinician, for much of what
psychologists rely on in their daily practice has not yet been ade-
quately empirically validated.242  Psychological opinions should,
235. See, e.g., LENORE WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND
How SOCIETY RESPONDS 178-87 (1989) (describing diagnostic criteria for battered wo-
man syndrome and applying the criteria to an illustrative case).
236. See AIKEN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 105.
237. Id. at 106.
238. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 512-14 (summarizing potential sources
of bias and suggestions for bias reduction).
239. See Jay Ziskin, The Importance of Hard Data to Software Techniques, in SCIENTIFIC AND
EXPERT EVIDENCE 1097, 1103-14 (Edward J. Imwinkelried ed., 2d ed. 1981) (summariz-
ing types of objective or "hard" data to which the clinician should pay close attention).
240. See infra text accompanying notes 384-422.
241. "Life story," as used in this Article, means simply the total picture painted for
the jury based upon the data collected by the clinician and the clinician's diagnoses and
opinions. Some clinicians do, however, work with their patients to develop a "life story"
that rings true for the patient. E.g., MCHUGH & SLAVNEY, supra note 224, at 130-33. The
story is neither objectively true nor false but merely a tool for better understanding the
individual and persuading her to change her thoughts and behaviors. See id. at 132.
242. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 461. While admitting that many psycho-
logical concepts have not been scientifically validated, the authors emphasize their con-
clusion that clinical "probability" judgments based on experience and the empirical
knowledge that is available can be quite useful. See id. at 461-62, 466. Additionally, even
critics admit that there are some scientifically valid empirical studies available. See, e.g.,
Faigman, Note, supra note 231, at 643-45 (taking the often-contradicted view that the
battered woman syndrome is not supported by valid empirical evidence but admitting
1993]
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therefore, be viewed as containing both scientific and "artistic"
components.2 43 It is this dual nature of psychological evidence that
makes for particularly thorny questions of admissibility in criminal
trials-questions to which this Article now turns.
III. EVIDENTIARY ANALYSIS
The analysis thus far has focused on two broad themes: (1) that
there are both moral and social psychological reasons favoring the
admissibility of psychological character evidence to promote indi-
vidualized justice in criminal prosecutions; and (2) that the scientific
and artistic bases for such evidence, and an understanding of pre-
cisely what expert character witnesses do, are essential for making
admissibility decisions in particular instances. These themes will
guide much of the evidentiary analysis of pragmatic relevancy to be
addressed below. That analysis must begin by examining Federal
Rule of Evidence 404 and the related special rules governing the
admissibility of character evidence, rules that were crafted to stand-
ardize practices and address concerns about the probative worth
and prejudicial impact of character evidence, that is, about its prag-
matic relevancy.
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 404
The law of evidence demonstrates a fundamental distrust of
much character evidence. 244 That distrust is embodied in Federal
Rule of Evidence 404, which declares in part that "[e]vidence of a
person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion. ' 245 However, the rule creates certain exceptions, the
most important of which has been called the "mercy rule," which
permits an accused in a criminal case to offer evidence of a "perti-
nent" trait of character for exculpatory or mitigation purposes; the
that valid studies using other theories regarding the problems of battered women are
available).
243. See, e.g., LESTON HAVENS, APPROACHES TO THE MIND: MOVEMENT OF THE PSYCHI-
ATRIC SCHOOLS FROM SECTS TOWARD SCIENCE 322 (1987) ("[Plsychiatry is a practical art
with scientific aspirations. ... )  But see generally EDELSON, supra note 164 (rejecting
claims that psychoanalysis is not a science and suggesting ways to improve its scientific
standing).
244. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 16, § 186 (stating that while character
evidence "almost always has some probative value, in many situations, the probative
value is slight and the potential for prejudice large"); ZUCKERMAN, supra note 95, at 234-
37, 241-46.
245. FED. R. EvID. 404(a).
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prosecution would then be permitted to offer character evidence in
rebuttal. 46 If there is reason to distrust character evidence, how-
ever, why should it be treated differently when first offered by the
accused instead of the prosecution? This Article has suggested one
plausible justification: it promotes, in furtherance of moral and so-
cial psychological concerns, the reality and the perception of indi-
vidualized justice, even when there are reasons to be concerned
about the value and impact of the evidence. 47
The more difficult question is when would prosecution-prof-
fered evidence be considered evidence "of a person's character"
within the meaning of Rule 404. It is clear that Rule 404's bar is
directed, at most, against the circumstantial use of character evi-
dence-the argument that because a person has a particular trait,
that person was more (or less) likely than someone without that trait
to act or think in a particular way. 248 That Rule 404 does not seek to
bar direct use of character evidence-that is, proving character
when it is itself an element of a crime-is apparent from Rule 405,
which permits proof of character when character is indeed an "es-
246. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1); WEISSENBERGER, supra note 18, § 404.6 (noting that
admissibility of good character evidence for the defense embodies a "mercy principle").
Rule 404 also makes exceptions for certain evidence as to the character of the victim,
FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2), but this Article addresses only evidence of the defendant's char-
acter. Rule 404 makes a further exception for evidence of the character of a witness as
to truthfulness or untruthfulness as permitted by Rules 607-09. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3),
607-09. While a defendant may be a witness, the special problems of a witness's charac-
ter for truthfulness or untruthfulness have been addressed effectively elsewhere and
need not be repeated here. See, e.g., McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 44-48, 76-79;
Mosteller, supra note 126, at 105-09. Much of the discussion here, however, regarding
how to measure the value of any expert character witness would, of course, also apply to
analyzing psychological character testimony as to a witness's truthfulness.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 83-118 and infra text accompanying notes 330-
344. Cf ZUCKERMAN, supra note 95, at 22-23, 235-36 (suggesting that the "mercy princi-
ple" may result in acquittal based upon a jury's assessment of a defendant's moral wor-
thiness). Prosecution-proffered character evidence may sometimes help to individualize
justice as well, see supra text accompanying note 117 and infra note 664; but for reasons
discussed below, defense claims to individualized justice are entitled to greater weight.
See infra text accompanying notes 336-343. Differential treatment of prosecution and
defense thus makes sense. Nevertheless, because prosecution evidence may sometimes
individualize justice and will not necessarily prejudice the jury, it is debatable whether
prosecution first-use of expert character evidence should flatly be barred in all cases. See
infra note 664. Another justification for differential treatment is that a defendant's use
of evidence of good character is thought to be less prejudicial to the jury and may have
fewer social costs (creating a reasonable doubt as to guilt) than prosecution-offered evi-
dence of a defendant's bad character. See MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 16, § 191.
248. See Imwinkelried, supra note 19, at 575-80 (discussing two potential circumstan-
tial uses for character evidence).
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sential element of a charge, claim, or defense. ' 24 9 Such proof is di-
rect, not circumstantial, and thus not barred by Rule 404.250
The currently prevailing view, however, is that Federal Rule of
Evidence 404 does not reach as far in barring circumstantial uses of
character evidence as the rule might logically permit. Instead, the
rule is viewed as barring prosecutorial use of character evidence
only when it would be used circumstantially to prove a defendant's
identity or behavior, but not when it would be used to prove a de-
fendant's mental state.25 Such an interpretation is indeed consis-
tent with the plain meaning of the rule, which bars the use of
character to prove " 'action in conformity therewith.' "252 Yet such a
narrow conception makes little sense, for both types of circumstan-
tial use, to prove behavior and to prove mental state, raise similar
dangers.25 3
Circumstantial use of psychological character evidence to prove
behavior involves the following inferential chain: (1) the psycholo-
gist offers her opinion, and perhaps supporting data and theories,
that the defendant has a certain personality trait; (2) that opinion
supports the inference that the defendant indeed has that trait; and
(3) someone with that trait is more likely than someone without it to
commit the evil deed.254
Proving mental state circumstantially by using character testi-
mony involves substantially the same inferential chain. The only
difference is that the third step involves an inference that the trait
makes it more likely than otherwise that a defendant had a certain
state of mind, not that a defendant performed a certain deed.255 As
with direct use of character evidence, both circumstantial uses raise
concerns that juries will convict defendants solely for who they are,
not for what they have done,256 and that psychologists' opinions
249. FED. R. EvID. 405(b). For example, under a subjective theory of entrapment,
defendants must prove that the government induced them to commit a crime that they
were not otherwise predisposed to commit. WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 280 (2d ed. 1992). Arguably, entrapment requires proof of a
character trait-the absence of a "predisposition" to commit the crime-as an element
of the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 516 (3d Cir. 1981).
250. See United States v. Rippy, 606 F.2d 1150, 1155 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 578 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 404(b)).
253. Id. at 582-83.
254. Cf id. at 576-579 (tracing similar inferential chains to those discussed here, but
using specific acts, instead of expert opinion, as the type of character evidence offered).
255. See id. at 579.
256. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 449 (noting that a prosecutor's argument that
Devitt, an accused rapist, was an "immoral, law-breaking person" creates a "grave risk
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that defendants have the noted trait are unreliable.257 Both circum-
stantial uses raise one additional concern: a jury may give too much
weight to the existence of a personality trait as a predictor of a de-
fendant's actions or thoughts in any particular instance.258 These
similar policy concerns suggest that both types of evidence should
be subject to a Rule 404-type bar when offered by the prosecu-
tion.259 Most courts, however, do not automatically bar character
evidence to prove mental state.260
Several consequences flow from these observations. First, Rule
404 alone will not, in the view of most courts, bar admission of char-
acter evidence when used to prove mental state, even though the
character evidence raises many of the policy concerns toward which
Rule 404 is directed.2 6' Consequently, defense counsel must be
prepared to attack prosecution use of such evidence on other
grounds, the most promising of which relate to pragmatic
relevancy. 62
Second, some courts seem to view the mercy rule as effectively
creating an automatic defense right to use expert character evi-
dence.263 The mercy rule does permit defense use of character evi-
dence under Rule 404, and Rule 405 permits proof of character by
reputation or opinion. Moreover, the comments to Rule 405 specif-
ically recognize that the drafters contemplated the admissibility of
of a decision on an improper basis-that is, the jury's belief that Devitt is such an antiso-
cial character that he belongs behind bars even if he happens to be innocent of the rape with
which he is now charged") (emphasis added).
257. See infra text accompanying notes 293-310.
258. See Imwinkelried, supra note 19, at 580-84. This last concern is not present with
direct use of character evidence, because then the sole concern is proving that the de-
fendant exhibits a specific character trait. Once the trait is proven, the inquiry is at an
end. An analysis of whether that trait made it more or less likely that a defendant would
behave in a particular way would be irrelevant.
259. On the other hand, despite these similar policy concerns, there is an argument
that with respect to psychological character evidence, a flat bar is inappropriate. See infra
note 664 and accompanying text.
260. Imwinkelried, supra note 19, at 579.
261. Id. at 582-83.
262. See infra notes 347-350 and accompanying text.
263. See State v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 580, 582-84 (Ariz. 1981) (en banc) (holding
that the lower court erred in excluding expert psychiatric testimony to establish that the
defendant had the character trait of impulsiveness from which the jury could have con-
cluded that he did not premeditate the murder); United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512,
516-17 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that expert testimony to prove that the defendant was
not predisposed to commit the crime and therefore was entrapped is admissible under
Rules 702 and 703); State v. Rives, 407 So. 2d 1195, 1198-99 (La. 1981) (expressing
concern over the trial court's refusal to admit character evidence to establish good repu-
tation as to pertinent traits).
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expert character opinion. 2" Some courts, however, have seen these
two rules, or their state law analogues, as creating a presumptive
right for the defense to submit expert character evidence, with little
real inquiry into the value or jury impact of that evidence. 65
There may indeed be strong reasons to weigh the pragmatic
relevancy balancing in favor of defense-offered character evidence;
there is little justification, however, for ignoring an inquiry into the
accuracy and impact of that evidence, and nothing in any traditional
evidentiary doctrine justifies such an approach. This is also true for
the prosecution, which must be able to articulate clear arguments
based on the probative value and potential prejudicial impact of ex-
pert character testimony.
B. The Frye Rule
The classic test for the admissibility of scientific evidence was
articulated in Frye v. United States:266
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is diffi-
cult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the eviden-
tial force of the principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony de-
duced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discov-
ery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs.267
Over the years, there has been much dispute over the validity of
the Frye test.2 68 Many jurisdictions nevertheless continue to apply
264. If character is defined as the kind of person one is, then account must be
taken of varying ways of arriving at the estimate. These may range from the
opinion of the employer who has found the man honest to the opinion of the
psychiatrist based upon examination and testing.
FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
265. See Christensen, 628 P.2d at 582; Rives, 407 So. 2d at 1198. Cf. United States v.
Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 1977) (suggesting that FED. R. EvID. 404 alone
creates a right to admit pertinent defense-proffered psychological character evidence);
State v. Treadaway, 568 P.2d 1061, 1066 (Ariz. 1977) (suggesting FED. R. EvID. 405
creates a presumptive right to the admission of defense character evidence, whether or
not the witness has any special psychological expertise).
266. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
267. Id. at 1014.
268. E.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Frye v. United States: Background Paper Prepared for the
National Conference of Lawyers and Science, 99 F.R.D. 189, 191-92 (1983) ("Notwithstanding
its widespread judicial adoption, the general acceptance test remains controversial. A
number of courts have rejected it and commentators have labeled it 'archaic,' 'a sport,'
'infamous,' and 'antiquated on the day of its pronouncement.'" (footnotes omitted)).
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Frye as a potential obstacle to admissibility.269 Even in jurisdictions
recognizing Frye, however, the test should properly be understood
to apply only to evidence that is both "novel" and "scientific," two
limitations often forgotten or inadequately addressed. 270 Two of
the leading decisions on the question of whether Frye applies to psy-
chological character evidence illustrate the strengths and weak-
nesses of the courts' handling of Frye in this area.
In the first of these cases, State v. Cavallo,2 7 ' the trial judge in a
rape case barred the testimony of Cavallo's psychiatrist, who would
have testified that Cavallo did not have the psychological traits of a
rapist.272 The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the state's
Frye equivalent 278 was applicable and had not been met.2 74 The
court applied the Frye test for one primary reason: the court feared
that jurors would be so impressed by the testimony that they would
give it undue weight, despite its lack of general acceptance among
other experts in the field. 275 This distrust of the jury was fundamen-
tal to the decision. Merely labeling testimony "expert," the court
believed, would deeply and unduly impress the jury.276 Moreover,
according to the court, in so "subjective a field as psychiatry," a
See also Rules for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: A Project Sponsored by Section of Science and
Technology of American Bar Association, 115 F.R.D. 79 (1986) (compiling proposals for im-
proving the Frye test). The United States Supreme Court has recently accepted certio-
rari in a case that raises the question whether Frye survived the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128
(9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
269. Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 601
(1988) (noting that Frye is followed in most jurisdictions).
270. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of the Dog Scent
Lineup, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 15, 61-62 (1990).
271. 443 A.2d 1020 (N.J. 1982).
272. Id. at 1022. The psychiatrist also would have testified about Cavallo's individual
qualities, as opposed to whether his qualities matched those of another group. Specifi-
cally, he would have testified that Cavallo was a "well-meaning individual, he would not
wilfully do a wrong, he recognizes the force and violence of rape are wrongful acts, [and]
he is a non-violent, non-aggressive person." Id. at 1021-22. Nevertheless, the focus of
concern in the court's opinion was on the overt group comparison, namely that Cavallo
lacked the characteristics typical of the group labeled "rapists." See id. at 1027.
273. State v. Cary, 230 A.2d 384 (NJ. 1967).
274. See Cavallo, 443 A.2d at 1022, 1026. The court concluded that the proffered tes-
timony was "expert character testimony," permissible under New Jersey's character evi-
dence rules, which are similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 1023.
Nevertheless, the court emphasized that a proper foundation first must be laid to
demonstrate that the testimony was proper expert evidence; thus, the court essentially
applied the Frye test. Id. at 1023-24. The court suggested that New Jersey's standard
was in some undefined way different from the Frye standard but seemingly followed a
standard Frye analysis. See id. at 1026.
275. See id. at 1024.
276. Id.
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"battle of the experts ' 27 7 would surely confuse the jury and divert
its attention from the central question of whether the defendant
committed the rape. The court concluded that juries, unlike expert
bodies such as parole boards, would be unable to judge and evalu-
ate this dispute among experts fairly. 278 Althoughjuries were previ-
ously permitted to hear psychiatric testimony regarding mental
illness or state of mind, the court saw the question of whether a
psychiatrist could predict behavior as a novel use of psychiatric evi-
dence that, given the potential adverse impact on the jury, required
the safeguards provided by Frye.2 7 9
Unlike the appellate court in Cavallo, the Supreme Court of Cal-
ifornia in People v. Stoll2 80 expressed greater faith in the capacities of
jurors and in the usefulness of psychological expertise in proving or
disproving criminal acts. Stoll involved four defendants tried for
lewd and lascivious conduct involving seven young boys.28 ' One of
the defendants, Grafton, sought to call a psychologist to testify that
she: (1) showed no indication of sexual or other deviancy, (2) had a
low indication of antisocial or aggressive behavior, and (3) was un-
likely to have been involved in the events for which she was
charged.282 The bases for the proffered testimony were two objec-
tive personality tests (one of which was the MMPI), interviews with
Grafton, and the psychologist's experience with similar individuals.
The psychologist admitted, however, that the MMPI had only about
a seventy percent chance of being right when administered to "nor-
mal" persons; he also acknowledged that the test was not valid when
given to disturbed or psychotic individuals, and conceded, further,
277. Id.
278. See id. at 1029.
279. See id. at 1027-29. The court's opinion is not quite as clear as the text suggests.
First, in the portion of its opinion addressing whether the Frye standard was met, i.e.,
whether the technique involved had been generally accepted, the court emphasized the
way in which Cavallo's use of the evidence was different from other accepted uses of
psychological evidence. Id. But that analysis is the same as saying that the application of
the technique in the case before the court was "novel." This would be pertinent only to
whether a Frye question arises, not, as the court was doing, to whether Frye was met
under Cavallo's unique application.
Second, part of the court's analysis concerning the jury's competence to handle the
proffered evidence, an inquiry again relevant only to whether Frye applies at all, ap-
peared instead in the portion of the court's opinion addressing general acceptance. Id.
at 1025. Despite this confusion, the court seemed to recognize the need for, and engage
in, the two distinct inquiries-novelty and jury impact-that govern whether the Frye
limitation should apply.
280. 783 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989).
281. Id. at 700.
282. Id. at 704-05.
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that one of his own patients, who was an "admitted" child molester,
had nevertheless tested within normal limits on the MMPI. 283 He
went on to explain, moreover, that the objective personality tests
were only factors in his "subjectivejudgmrent," which was not "an abso-
lute cut and dried scientific approach."'284 The trial court excluded the
psychologist's opinion under the California equivalent of Frye.285
The appellate court reversed, engaging, as did the court in
Cavallo, in an inquiry into the jury's ability to handle the testimony
to be presented before it. 286 Unlike Cavallo, however, the Stoll court
saw no special feature of the proffered testimony that "effectively
blindside[d] the jury. '2 87 While the witness had faith in the objec-
tive test results and described the MMPI's "validity scales," these
facts did not make the tests appear foolproof, for the acknowledged
weaknesses in the test's statistical accuracy and its proven fallibility
in the psychologist's own practice were to be brought to the jury's
attention.288 Moreover, the psychologist's explanation that the ob-
jective tests were merely the springboard for a diagnosis relying on
other, more "subjective" sources, such as patient interviews and
case history, made it clear that the process was more a professional
art than a science. 289 The court rejected the argument that using
objective personality tests to prove that a defendant did not commit
an act, rather than to prove that she did not harbor a requisite
mental state, was "revolutionary. ' 290 The court saw "no legal or
logical basis" '29 for treating testimony regarding behavior any dif-
ferently from psychological testimony regarding mental state-in-
cluding standardized personality tests-that had been permitted in
the past.
The contrasting approaches of the courts in Cavallo and Stoll
raise four distinct problems, addressed below.
1. Is Expert Character Testimony "Scientifc "?-The general ap-
proach apparently followed by both the Cavallo and Stoll courts-
evaluating the likely impact of the proffered evidence on the jury-is
consistent with Frye's main purpose: "to screen out expert evidence
283. Id. at 705.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 706. See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
286. Stoll, 783 P.2d at 712, 715.
287. Id. at 710.






that the jury cannot properly evaluate. '2 92 This inability usually re-
sults from a jury's tendency to be "overawed" by certain types of
experts.293 Under Frye, therefore, expert evidence that "overawes"
will be admitted only if there is an independent guarantee of the
evidence's trustworthiness. Fye provides that guarantee by ensur-
ing that the only expert testimony admitted results from techniques
whose accuracy has been reviewed and accepted by a "minimal re-
serve [of] unbiased experts"-that is, by those experts constituting a
substantial portion of the relevant scientific community.2 94 Any ex-
pert evidence likely to have a strong impact on the jury should be
deemed "scientific" within the meaning of Frye and be subjected to
its admissibility test.
While both courts used the correct test to determine whether
expert testimony is "scientific," neither applied the test effectively.
Both courts failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into the likely ef-
fects of the evidence on the jury. Such an inquiry would have first
asked whether psychological research was available concerning the
likely impact of the proffered evidence--or similar evidence-on the
2951tjury. While that inquiry alone would not have provided a defini-
tive answer regarding jury impact, well-respected research studies
also support the notion that jurors are not unduly impressed by, and
292. Taslitz, supra note 270, at 55. See also Steven M. Egesdal, Note, The Frye Doctrine
and Relevancy Approach Controversy: An Empirical Evaluation, 74 GEO. LJ. 1769, 1774 n.26
(1986) (noting that advocates of the Frye doctrine are concerned about the weight juries
will place on scientific testimony); Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the
Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV.
43, 53 (1986) ("[T]he test provides a preliminary screening to protect against a jury's
natural inclination to give too much weight to scientific techniques .... "). Frye, properly
understood, also involves the court in matters other than jury impact, such as the quality
and quantity of experimental support for the technique used. See Taslitz, supra note 270,
at 64. But before such inquiries can be undertaken a court must decide whether Frye
should apply in the first place, for Frye does not control all expert evidence. See id. at 54.
Whether the jury can properly evaluate the expert evidence is the most sensible test for
making this decision. Id. at 55-56, 59-61.
293. See Taslitz, supra note 270, at 55. See also United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,
744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[S]cientific proof may in some instances assume a posture of
mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen .... "); United States v. Amaral, 488
F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (noting that the Frye test is needed because of the "aura
of special reliability and trustworthiness" that surrounds scientific testimony); People v.
Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Cal. 1976) ("Lay jurors tend to give considerable weight to
'scientific' evidence when presented by 'experts' with impressive credentials.").
294. See Taslitz, supra note 270, at 56.
295. See David McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complainants in Sexual
Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray Into the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 77 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 44-53 (1986) [hereinafter McCord, Child Abuse] (effectively analyzing




can effectively evaluate, expert character testimony. 9 6 Such studies
validate Stoll's holding and weaken Cavallo's, but the Stoll court is
still to be faulted for not even making the inquiry. Nor did either
court inquire into historical, philosophical, or cultural sources to di-
vine popular attitudes toward the proffered evidence. These types
of inquiries can often prove useful in gauging the likely jury impact
of certain evidence. 297 Given that the charges involved in Cavallo
and Stoll-rape and child sexual abuse-are subjects about which
strong popular feelings and misconceptions exist, a more careful de-
termination of jury impact may have been particularly beneficial. 298
The Cavallo court's failure to evaluate evidence regarding jury
impact was particularly egregious. That court failed to distinguish
between "expert" testimony, to which Frye does not necessarily ap-
ply, and "scientific" testimony, to which Frye does apply. It con-
cluded that merely labeling testimony "expert" might overawe the
jury.299 The court offered no support for this extreme conclusion, a
conclusion directly contrary to the way in which Frye is generally
understood. 0 0 Moreover, the Cavallo court's broad condemnation
of all psychological evidence as so "subjective" as to ensure a con-
fusing "battle of experts,"3 0 ' was misplaced. 0 2 Such generaliza-
tions are unwise because different types of evidence, even within a
single class, may have very different effects. Therefore, the Cavallo
court should have examined the particular category of psychological
testimony involved to determine its likely jury impact.
The Stoll court did recognize the importance of this distinction
among categories of psychological testimony. It warned that
although the psychological evidence before the court would be un-
296. See infra text accompanying notes 632-640.
297. See Taslitz, supra note 270, at 22 & n.33 (explaining importance of popular cul-
ture as a guide to likely jury perceptions).
298. See, e.g., McCord, Child Abuse, supra note 295, at 41-68; Toni Massaro, Experts,
Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome and Its Implications for Expert
Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395, 402-10 (1985) (discussing the mythology of
rape and the impact of that mythology on evidentiary matters within judicial decision
making).
299. See State v. Cavallo, 443 A.2d 1020, 1025 (N.J. 1982).
300. See supra notes 274-279 and accompanying text.
301. Cavallo, 443 A.2d at 1025. See also supra text accompanying note 277.
302. Professor McCord made a similar error but reached the opposite conclusion, ar-
guing that all psychological testimony is unlikely to have an unfair jury impact because
jurors will naturally be skeptical about psychological testimony. See McCord, Profiles,
supra note 119, at 85-86 ("[M]ost jurors do not conceive of psychological research as
very, if at all, 'scientific.'. . . In short, the jury most likely has the ability to fairly and
intelligently weigh the strengths and weaknesses of psychological evidence without be-
ing overwhelmed or overawed by it.").
19931
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likely to have an improper jury impact, other psychological evi-
dence, notably the "post-hypnotic" testimony of a rape victim, may
carry with it an "undeserved aura of certainty" requiring the appli-
cation of Frye.s03
Stoll's focus on the impact of a particular class of evidence on
the jury is not, however, the case's most interesting facet. The Stoll
court also inquired into the manner in which the expert would testify
and the quantity and quality of the information that the expert would
provide in a particular case to determine whether the expert's testi-
mony would have an inappropriate impact. The court focused on
the expert's admissions that the MMPI had a seventy-percent accu-
racy rate, that it had proven to be wrong in at least one case in the
expert's own clinical practice, and that his approach was a "subjec-
tive, not strictly scientific" approach to the questions before him.s
Under these circumstances-specifically, when the expert disclosed
weaknesses in the technique's accuracy-those techniques seemed
to be more art than science, subject to error, instead of being
presented as a "foolproof" or "infallible truth. '3 0 -5 It is perhaps
this aspect of Stoll that is most important, for it recognizes the cru-
cial role that the law of evidence can play in maximizing the availa-
bility of information useful to the jury's decision.30 6
The question ofjury impact can also be illuminated by contrast-
ing Cavallo and Stoll, both of which involved attempts to disprove
criminal acts, with the use of expert character testimony to prove or
disprove a particular mental state. When mental state is at issue,
psychological character testimony may sometimes be offered for the
purpose of rebutting certain "myths" or preconceptions harbored
by a jury.30 7 In such situations, there is less reason to fear that the
303. People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698, 710 (Cal. 1989). Indeed, the Supreme Court of
California had earlier barred post-hypnotic testimony under Frye. See People v. Shirley,
723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982). While some recent psychological research questions
whether hypnotically refreshed testimony does indeed create an aura of certainty, see
Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 135, at 169, it is at least arguable that "[tihe public has
been barraged with misinformation concerning hypnosis and has resultantly been led to
incorrectly believe that it provides a panacea for lost memory." People v. Zayas, 546
N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ill. 1989).
304. See Stoll, 783 P.2d at 705, 712.
305. Id. at 712.
306. See id. (noting that the prosecution is free to rebut a defendant's psychological
character evidence through its own expert).
307. See Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 785 (Pa. 1989) ("Thus, trial
counsel was ineffective, and the absence of such expert testimony [on the battered wo-
man syndrome] was prejudicial to appellant in that the jury was permitted, on the basis of
unfounded myths, to assess appellant's claim that she had a reasonable belief that she faced
a life-threatening situation when she fired her gun at Welsh." (emphasis added)); Mc-
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psychological evidence will "overawe" a jury, for the evidence is of-
fered precisely to correct for the jury's potential misuse of other
"evidence" arising either from jury ignorance or a jury's strongly, if
irrationally, held beliefs.308
The court must, of course, make a preliminary factual finding
that a particular myth or preconception exists. It must also deter-
mine that the character testimony's impact in "correcting" for this
myth or preconception is not outweighed by the "undue" impact of
the character testimony.309 But if the court makes this finding, there
is little justification for applying the Frye standard, designed primar-
ily to screen out potentially flawed expert evidence to which a jury
might give undue weight. If the court has already made that finding,
Frye would serve no purpose.' ° Moreover, even when no specific
myth or preconception is proven, the jury's tendency toward stere-
otyping and shallow case logics suggests that any expert character
testimony that focuses on what makes the defendant unusual or
unique has a "correcting" function to play: forcing a jury toward
the deep case logics required by the substantive law.
Cord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 96 (discussing the "correcting" function served by non-
traditional psychological evidence).
308. See McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 95-96 (reviewing roles of psychological
evidence in curing jury ignorance and correcting jury prejudice).
309. An interesting case on this point is People v. Leon, 263 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1989), in
which a prosecutor in a child abuse case called a psychologist, who testified, among
other things, that there are certain social myths regarding child sexual abuse. Id. at 83-
84. The court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial partly because no evi-
dence was offered under Frye that the relevant scientific community generally agreed
that these myths existed. See id. at 84. The court did not address, however, whether
testimony regarding "myths" was "scientific," thus requiring Frye's application. See id. at
9 1-92 (Woods, J., dissenting, making this very point). The case is also interesting, how-
ever, for two other reasons.
First, the case highlights an important distinction: a court might, although the Leon
court did not, look to sources other than expert testimony (e.g., literature, philosophy,
case law, history) to find that a myth exists and that testimony is necessary to respond to
that myth, but the court can do so without alerting the jury to the myth's existence, thus
eliminating Frye concerns regarding "mythology." See Taslitz, supra note 270, at 20-22,
123-25 (detailing role of mythology in the law of evidence).
Second, the prosecution's argument was offered to rebut myths that might lead a
jury to believe that someone like the defendant could not commit the criminal act. See
Leon, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 83-87. The case is unusual, however, because most expert char-
acter testimony regarding myths is offered when a defendant's state of mind is in ques-
tion. See McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 35-63 (reviewing many of the uses for
nontraditional psychological evidence, the vast majority of which concern mental state);
supra text accompanying notes 129-135.
310. See supra notes 292-293 and accompanying text.
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2. Is Expert Character Testimony "Novel"?-Although the Stoll
court properly recognized that "scientific" evidence is governed by
Frye only if the technique in question is "new" or "novel," the court
erred in seeing no real distinction between proving mental state or
mental illness-"old," previously accepted, uses of psychological
evidence in California's courts3t '-and proving conduct-a logically
"new" use. Justice Lucas, in dissent, made this point, emphasizing,
without clearly explaining, that the use of objective personality tests
"to formulate a psychiatric diagnosis of the defendant's mental state
is far different than using them to exclude defendant from the relevant class
of offenders .... "312
The Cavallo majority took a position similar to that of Justice
Lucas, declaring that
the other areas in which psychiatric or psychological testi-
mony is generally admitted in evidence are inapposite be-
cause such evidence there is admitted for different
purposes .... Insanity or incapacity to stand trial, for ex-
ample, represent conclusions about the state of mind of a per-
son . . . This is much different from asking experts to
ascertain what characteristics non-rapists possess and to
testify as to whether defendants have those
characteristics. 31 3
While neither Justice Lucas in his Stoll dissent nor the Cavallo
majority clearly explained why the difference should matter, matter
it does. The novelty requirement, properly understood, serves to
"bar relitigation of scientific reliability questions unless new evi-
dence sheds a different light on the inquiry. 31 4 But scientific relia-
bility does not exist in a vacuum; a scientific technique may be
311. See, e.g., People v. McCowan, 227 Cal. Rptr. 23, 30, (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
that the trial court properly allowed "psychiatric testimony regarding [the defendant's]
mental condition" while excluding testimony on the defendant's capacity to form the
requisite mental state).
312. People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698, 718 (Cal. 1989) (Lucas, J., dissenting).
313. State v. Cavallo, 443 A.2d 1020, 1028-29 (N.J. 1982) (emphasis added). The
court made a similar point earlier in its opinion in slightly different language: "[T]he
evidence in this case purports to state the characteristics common to persons who commit
certain acts, rather than suffer from certain illnesses ... ." Id. at 1028.
314. See Taslitz, supra note 270, at 61 n.295. This purpose for the "novelty" require-
ment was advanced in light of criticism by Professor Starrs. See James E. Starrs, Frye v.
United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26
JURIMETRICS J. 252-53 (1986) (arguing that the "novelty" requirement could lead to




trustworthy for one purpose but not another.3 1i Consequently,
even if a court has judged certain psychological techniques as valua-
ble in examining a defendant's mental state, that does not necessar-
ily mean that the techniques are equally valuable in predicting
behavior. Psychological research supports the notion that behavior
may often be controlled as much by situational factors as by one's
essential "nature" or one's thoughts and feelings.31 6
Moreover, even if the techniques used in Stoll and Cavallo were
shown to be valuable in predicting some nonsexual behavior, that
does not necessarily mean that the techniques would be of the same
value in predicting violent sexual behavior.3 '7 If, therefore, the evi-
dence in either of the cases was "scientific," as the Cavallo court in-
correctly concluded, the novelty requirement demanded that Frye be
applied.
3. Are "Overt" and "Covert" Group Comparisons the Same?-A
third significant matter in the two cases is that in Cavallo there was
an overt group comparison while in Stoll the psychologist more
heavily emphasized the clinical analysis of his patient as an individual.
As noted earlier, the prosecutor in Stoll indeed argued, albeit unsuc-
cessfully on appeal, that the defense had to prove the general ac-
ceptance in the scientific community of a child molester "profile,"
and that "a person who does not fit the profile has not actually mo-
lested children."3 ' Only then, argued the prosecutor, could the de-
fense psychiatrist testify that the defendant showed no "possibility
for sexual deviancy in her personality profile." ' 9 The prosecution
apparently argued as well that such a profile had in effect entered
into the psychologist's opinion and that such profiles make evidence
315. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC Evi-
DENCE § 4-8 (1982) ("To satisfy Frye your opponent must demonstrate general accept-
ance of the particular application of the instrument involved in your case."); Starrs, supra
note 314, at 258 ("Scientific validity for one purpose is not thereby automatically scien-
tific validity for other, unrelated purposes.").
316. See supra text accompanying notes 142-163. Indeed, common experience teaches
us that our behavior does not always match our thoughts; thus a normally kind child in a
school yard may feel sorry for the shy classmate being beaten by older children; but,
despite feelings of compassion, the kind child may join in the beating to gain peer
approval.
317. This is but one application of the concept of "external validity," that is, the need
to inquire regarding the extent to which one can generalize the results of an experiment
to other situations. See generally DAVID W. MARTIN, DOING PSYCHOLOGY EXPERIMENTS 118
(3d ed. 1991).




"seem" scientific to a jury, triggering the Frye test. 20 The appellate
court, however, rejected the prosecutor's reading of the record of
the psychologist's testimony, concluding instead that "no psycho-
logical 'profile' entered into his diagnosis. "321 While the court,
therefore, rejected the claim that there was an explicit group com-
parison in the form of a profile that would overawe the jury, the
court nevertheless noted in dicta, "[w]e are not persuaded that ju-
ries are incapable of evaluating properly presented references to
psychological 'profiles' and 'syndromes.' "322
The Cavallo court, in contrast, repeatedly stressed that one of
the questions before it was "whether psychiatrists agree that rapists
share particular mental characteristics. "32" The assumption that
they do, of course, was implicit in the proffered testimony that rap-
ists are aggressive, violent people-a "mold" into which the psychi-
atrist would testify the defendant did not fit.3 24 The court worried
that this explicit reference to a rapist "mold" would turn the issue in
the jury's mind from whether the defendant committed the crime to
whether he manifested the "characteristics of a 'rapist.' "P325
Both courts were wrong, albeit for slightly different reasons. As
discussed above, 26 most expert character evidence requires com-
parison to a group, even if that comparison is implicit rather than explicit.
Thus, the expert's opinion in Stoll was based partly on the MMPI,
which in turn was based on experience with the behavior of groups
of people receiving particular scores or score patterns on the test.
Moreover, to argue, as the defense did in Stoll, that the defendant
had essentially a "normal" personality function and was, therefore,
less likely to commit a sex crime than those who are not "normal,"
involves at least two group comparisons: to "normal" people (who
are not likely to commit the crime) and to "abnormal" people (who
are more likely to commit the crime). The logical process that the
jury should undertake in Stoll was thus, at least partly the same as in
320. The dissent better articulated the prosecution's apparent position, noting that
testimony regarding the MMPI "validity scales" supposedly assured that no intentional
concealment of deviancy could occur, thus making the technique appear to be "a 'per-
sonality print,' i.e., a supposedly foolproof scientific method of matching a suspect's
personality traits with the offense in question, much in the same way that voiceprints,
fingerprints, blood or semen samples, are used to match or exclude a suspect." Id. at
718-19 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
321. Id. at 708.
322. Id. at 714 n.22.
323. State v. Cavallo, 443 A.2d 1020, 1027 (N.J. 1982).
324. See id. at 1021-22.
325. Id. at 1025.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 121-135.
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Cavallo: to determine whether members of the group of child sex
abusers share some common features that identify them as more
likely to commit a sex crime than is true for members of the group
of those who do not abuse children.
This does not mean, however, that there is no distinction be-
tween the two cases. The overt use of probabilistic evidence for
group comparison arguably might create precisely the kind of im-
pression of scientific precision with which Frye is concerned. For ex-
ample, testimony that seventy percent of all child sex abusers
receive a particular score on the MMPI might so impress jurors that
they will assume that the defendant cannot be guilty of child sex
abuse if his test does not reflect the necessary score. This fear that
juries will be highly impressed with numbers and yet not really un-
derstand their significance has indeed been a concern of many
courts and evidence scholars.3 27 But this concern, voiced in the
Cavallo opinion, is unwarranted because the empirical research on
jury behavior strongly suggests that, at least under certain condi-
tions, juries do not overvalue explicitly mathematical or probabilis-
tic testimony; indeed, they may sometimes undervalue it.3 28 While
the Stoll court was therefore wrong to conclude that profiles and
more "individualized" clinical assessments are fundamentally differ-
ent-they are not 32 9-the court's dicta expressing faith in the jury's
ability to handle profiles is probably well taken. It should be
remembered, however, that even if juries may generally be capable
of handling profile testimony, a trial judge should nevertheless con-
duct a particularized assessment of the impact of the type of profile
evidence offered and of the manner in which that evidence is offered
in each case.33 °
327. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971); infra note 328.
328. David McCord, A Primer for the Nonmathematically Inclined on Mathematical Evidence in
Criminal Cases, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 741 (1990) [hereinafter McCord, Nonmathemati-
cally Inclined] (summarizing much of the research in this area and specifying the condi-
tions under which statistical evidence is unlikely to unduly influence the jury); David
Faigman & AJ. Baglioni, Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process: Instructing Jurors on the Value of
Statistical Evidence, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 16 (1988) ("[Our results ... suggest, con-
trary to Tribe's assertion, that an expert's Bayesian formulation will not overwhelm the
average trier of fact. Courts, it seems, should be less concerned with jurors being over-
whelmed by the complexity of statistical techniques and more concerned with im-
pressing upon jurors the relevance of those techniques.").
329. There is, however, one important distinction between profiles and more individ-
ualized assessments: the latter turn to a greater degree on the clinical "arts" than on
science. See infra text accompanying notes 546-573. This distinction is, however, more
important for purposes of Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 702 than for Frye. See id.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 293-309.
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4. Is the "Cathartic Function" Served by Frye?-Despite the em-
phasis thus far on a case-by-case judgment of whether Frye should
apply to psychological character evidence testimony, there is a
strong argument that the Frye standard should never govern expert
character evidence offered by the defense in criminal trials. This
argument flows from an understanding that the law of evidence
serves goals other than truth-seeking, among which is what Profes-
sor Leonard has called the "cathartic function." ''
Understanding the "cathartic function" begins with a recogni-
tion that, in addition to being a search for "the truth," trials serve to
give parties a formal opportunity to vent their feelings before a
group of average citizens able to understand the justice of the par-
ties' positions; trials also serve to satisfy the community that order
prevails and that justice is being done."3 2 " 'Catharsis,' in the con-
text of trials can therefore be defined as a vital point of satisfaction
that must be experienced both by the litigants in any particular case
and by society in general as it develops its impressions about the
processes of the law." '33 3 Professor Leonard argues that character
evidence serves this cathartic function. 3 4 Consequently, he pro-
poses a balancing approach for character evidence in civil cases,
rather than a per se bar, so that a trial judge can weigh the dangers
of the testimony against its benefits, including the testimony's value
in serving the cathartic function.335
In criminal cases, Professor Leonard would go further and
grant defendants an absolute right to offer character evidence, ap-
parently on a theory of the overriding importance of the cathartic
function in criminal cases.3 36 Professor Leonard offers little justifi-
cation for this theory. He does discuss, however, the fact that the
prosecution must not have the same right as the defense to free ad-
missibility of character evidence. 337 This is because the cathartic
value of allowing the prosecution to offer evidence regarding a de-
331. See David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis
in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1986-1987) (coining the term "cathar-
tic function").
332. Id. at 39.
333. Id. Professor Leonard thus redefines the notion of truth-seeking in a trial:
"[W]e also share an idea of truth as representing a point of intuitive, even emotional
satisfaction with results reached by the trial." Id. at 32.
334. Professor Leonard does not fully explain why this is so, other than to argue that,
given the often-low probative value of lay character testimony, only catharsis can explain
why we still, at times, permit character evidence. See id. at 54-61.
335. See id.
336. See id. at 56-58.
337. See id. at 50 n.254.
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fendant's character is limited in that (1) society's sense of loss from
a single guilty person's going free is not as great or as immediate as
that suffered by a convicted defendant who is not permitted to offer
good character evidence, and (2) there is a significant chance that a
jury hearing evidence of "bad" character will be unduly moved by
passion and prejudice, an outcome less likely when a jury hears
"good" character evidence from the defense. 3 8
Social psychological theory provides strong support both for
the concept of a cathartic function and for the argument that this
cathartic function has an especially strong role to play in criminal
cases. First, a long line of research suggests that when disputants
have greater control over the procedures by which they are judged,
including the admissibility of evidence, they perceive the verdicts as
fairer and are therefore more accepting of even unfavorable ver-
dicts.33 9 Indeed, the perceived fairness of the procedures is a signif-
icant factor increasing the likelihood that parties involved in a
dispute will obey the law in the future.3 40 The perceived fairness of
procedures also improves society's satisfaction with the legal system
generally and public support for the courts specifically.34' The
cathartic function may therefore play at least some role in reducing
338. Id. While Professor Leonard would, once a defendant has "opened the door,"
permit the prosecution to offer character evidence, he would allow this solely for im-
peachment purposes. He deems this limitation essential to "protect the defendant's ba-
sic right to be tried according to the facts of the case and not according to her general
character." Id. at 57.
339. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 30-40, 93-118 (1988) (summarizing and explaining the significance of research
conducted or inspired byJohn Thibault and Laurens Walker, who pioneered the psycho-
logical study of procedural justice).
340. See id. at 76-81.
341. See id. at 64-76. But cf. Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law,
1983 Wis. L. REV. 379. Professor Hyde argued that people obey the law primarily be-
cause of a fear of punishment and other factors, but not because the law promotes "le-
gitimacy." Id. at 385-86, 426 (More precisely, he argued that there is inadequate
empirical evidence that legitimacy plays a role.). Without engaging in an extended cri-
tique of Professor Hyde's argument or the meaning of legitimacy, it is sufficient to note
this: psychological research published since Hyde's article suggests that the perception
of fair procedures is indeed a factor promoting compliance with, and public support for,
the law. See ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 42-56, 62-68, 178 (1990) (find-
ing a connection among perceptions of fair procedures, legitimacy, and compliance with
law). Indeed, the importance of procedural justice grows as the stakes grow. See id. at
105 (discussing empirical data regarding the importance of fair procedures in felony
trials). A critical question in promoting respect for and compliance with the law is,
therefore, whether citizens believe they have been, or will be, treated fairly by the crimi-
nal justice system. See id. at 104-12 (discussing the relationship between experience with
the authorities and public support for the law).
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both civil and criminal wrongs and improving respect for both the
civil and criminal justice systems.
Second, the substantive rules of criminal law generally reflect
society's highest judgments of morality. 42 Procedures that are in-
consistent with these judgments are likely to be perceived as partic-
ularly unfair, thus magnifying the individual and social impact of
procedural injustice. In particular, when criminal punishment is im-
posed on the basis of an individualized inquiry into a defendant's
thoughts, feelings, or actions, that defendant will particularly resent
a conviction if denied an opportunity to present her version. Corre-
spondingly, society has less reason to be comfortable that it is visit-
ing its moral judgments only upon the truly guilty when those
judgments demand individualized justice, but the accused is offered no
opportunity to argue based upon the full uniqueness of her situa-
tion. Rephrased, the cathartic function is disserved when rules of
evidence bar testimony that would move the jury toward the deep
case logics demanded both by popular morality and substantive
rules of criminal law, leaving a defendant to be judged by shallow
case logics inconsistent with an individualized approach.
What does any of this have to do with the Ftye rule? The answer
is that in certain contexts, as Professor Leonard wisely argues, there
must be a balancing approach that weighs the "truth-seeking func-
tion" of character evidence against its cathartic function. 43 Be-
cause Professor Leonard addresses expert character testimony only
in passing, he does not address the implications of Frye in any
depth. 44 But the implications are clear: if the Frye rule applies to
342. See supra Part I.C.
343. In criminal cases, as noted above, Professor Leonard argues for a per se rule of
admissibility for defense-proffered lay character testimony. See supra text accompanying
notes 336-338. Whatever sense that rule may have for lay testimony-a debatable
point-it makes no sense for expert testimony because there would then be no safe-
guards against admitting confusing, unreliable, and misleading expert evidence. See in-
fra text accompanying notes 642-652.
344. Professor Leonard states in a footnote, however, that if Frye applied to expert
character evidence, the appropriate inquiry should not be whether the techniques used
are generally accepted in the relevant scientific community but rather, whether that com-
munity generally accepts that expert character testimony is more reliable than lay char-
acter testimony. See Leonard, supra note 331, at 48 n.249. He later suggests that expert
character evidence would indeed be more reliable than lay character testimony. See id. at
52. This Article will argue in greater depth that expert character testimony is certainly
more "helpful" (a term not identical with "reliable") than similar lay testimony. How-
ever, it is not clear that if Frye were applied in the way Professor Leonard suggests, the
relevant scientific community would generally agree that expert character testimony is
more "reliable" than lay character testimony. See, e.g., RICHARD E. NISBETr & LEE Ross,
HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIALJUDGMENT 93-101 (1980)
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expert character testimony, there is no opportunity to weigh cathar-
sis against truth, for techniques that are not generally accepted will
automatically be excluded from evidence. This per se bar is unwise
in criminal cases where the cathartic function deserves special
attention. 345
The central point is that neither the impact on truth nor the
impact on the cathartic function can be considered if Frye applies to
expert character evidence offered by the defense. For the reasons
articulated by Professor Leonard, however, the cathartic function
has less force when applied to evidence offered by the prosecution
and the primacy of the truth-seeking function may therefore de-
mand Frye's application to prosecution-generated expert character
testimony despite the resulting asymmetry.346
C. Pragmatic Relevancy and Psychological Character Testimony
The primary alternative to Frye-the "pragmatic relevancy ap-
proach" 34 7-would permit a broader truth-related inquiry and a
weighing of truth-related values against process-related ones ("ca-
thartic" values) that Frye prohibits.3 48 This alternative approach
treats scientific evidence like all other evidence-and all evidence
must survive Federal Rule of Evidence 403's balancing of probative
(summarizing some similar inferential errors regarding human behavior that are often
made by both lay persons and clinicians). But see infra text accompanying notes 385- 405,
575-616 (arguing for ways to improve expert "reliability" and for the superior value of
expert character evidence to the jury).
345. Permitting a defendant to decide whether to offer expert character evidence may
advance truth as well as catharsis; giving a defendant this control increases the likeli-
hood that she will produce evidence of individualized circumstances, thus helping to
overcome jury tendencies toward trial by stereotype. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 339,
at 38 (noting that parties to a dispute are more likely to produce individualized informa-
tion than uninvolved decision-makers).
346. See supra notes 336-338 andaccompanying text.
347. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Centuty Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1235-39 (1980). Professor Gian-
nelli and other commentators have used the term "relevancy," rather than "pragmatic
relevancy," to describe this approach. However, as discussed earlier, the term "prag-
matic relevancy," coined by Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick, is clearer. It distin-
guishes the pragmatic balancing of the favorable and unfavorable qualities of evidence
that are at the heart of this approach from the narrower inquiry that characterizes simple
"logical relevancy." See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
348. See Leonard, supra note 331, at 53-60 (explaining that the "guided discretion"
accorded to the court under Federal Rule of Evidence 403-the source of authority for
the pragmatic relevancy approach, see infra note 349- includes the discretion to balance
cathartic against truth-related values).
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value against countervailing considerations.3 49 Various commenta-
tors have identified an array of factors that should be considered in
weighing this balance .3 " This Article focuses on three broad fac-
tors identified by Professor McCord as specifically useful in engag-
ing in relevancy-balancing for "non-traditional" psychological
evidence: reliability, necessity, and understandability.3 ' Reliability
is concerned with the accuracy of the technique, that is, whether it
correctly diagnoses what it purports to diagnose (corresponding to
the scientist's concept of "validity") and how consistent the tech-
nique is, that is, how often experts in the field agree on the diagno-
sis (corresponding to the scientist's definition of "reliability"). 3 52
Necessity asks whether the testimony is necessary in the context of
the case, and, if so, how necessary?3 5 3  Understandability asks
whether jurors can understand the testimony and give it proper
weight.3
54
1. Reliability.-Reliability requires an inquiry into psychologi-
cal character evidence's accuracy and consistency as a predictor of
thoughts and behavior and the qualifications of the experts who tes-
349. See PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE 31
(1986) ("The principal alternative approach to the Frye test is to treat scientific evidence
in the same way as other evidence, weighing its probative value against countervailing dan-
gers and considerations." (emphasis added)). One source of this weighing is Federal
Rule of Evidence 403: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403. A second source is
Rule 702, which permits an expert to testify only if "scientific, technical, or other spe-
cialized knowledge will assist the trier offact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue .... " FED. R. EvID. 702 (emphasis added). Obviously, evidence cannot
"assist the trier of fact" if the evidence's probative value is outweighed by prejudice,
confusion, or the like.
350. See, e.g., Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibil-
ity, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 911-12 (1982) (advocating an I I-factor test); 3J. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702 [03], at 702-41 to 702-43 (1988) (ad-
vocating a test that would consider several factors).
351. McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 94-101. Professor McCord labels his ap-
proach a "will assist the jury" approach but recognizes that it is but a variant of the
"relevancy" approach modified for the "softer" science involved in nontraditional psy-
chological evidence. Id. at 93-94.
352. Id. at 95.
353. Id. at 98-99.
354. Id. at 100. Professor McCord identifies one additional key factor: "importance,"
which asks how crucial to the resolution of the case is the testimony being offered. Id. at
101. This Article concludes that the "importance" factor is not helpful in understanding
expert character testimony. See infra text accompanying notes 642-667.
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tify in that area. 55 The former inquiry requires a comparison be-
tween the relative worth of experimental data and clinical judgment
as bases for character opinions and a separate examination of the
probative value of "negative inferences," arguments of relevancy
based on proving the absence of a particular trait.
a. The Predictive Power of Traits.-To assess the probative value
of expert psychological evidence-its tendency to make a fact of
consequence more probably true than would be so without the evi-
dence 5'-requires an evaluation of how well the "personality trait"
concept predicts human thoughts and behaviors.3 57 Two major
challenges have been made to the predictive power of traits. First,
the correlation between any specific measure of a trait and the be-
havior being predicted is generally quite low. 3 58 This suggests that
"traits"-roughly defined as stable cross-situational individual pre-
dispositions35 9-have little real existence and little predictive
value.36 0 Second, even the staunchest defenders of the idea that
traits do exist and can be useful concede that psychologists cannot
predict any individual instance of behavior with any degree of confi-
dence based on knowledge of the "trait" in question.3 6'
355. See McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 98-99. Professor McCord also identified
general acceptance as a relevant factor in determining the reliability of nontraditional
psychological evidence. Id. at 99. It is important to remember, however, that under a
relevancy approach, general acceptance is merely a factor and is not determinative of the
admissibility question, in sharp contrast to the Frye approach. Because the acceptance
level of a technique involves a factual determination to be made as to each particular
technique-and this Article does not focus on any single such technique-no further
discussion of this factor is necessary here.
356. See MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 16, § 185, at 541 (defining probative value).
357. See Giannelli, supra note 347, at 1235-39 ("The probative value of scientific evi-
dence.., is connected inextricably to its reliability."). The inquiry as to the degree of
probative value is, therefore, also related to the question: "How good a predictor is this
evidence?"
358. See infra text accompanying notes 363-374.
359. See supra text accompanying note 142.
360. See Susan M. Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Rele-
vancy, 27 CRIM. L. BuLL. 504, 514 (1991) (declaring that critics of trait theory "effectively
denied the existence of stable personality traits .. "); Teree E. Foster, Rule 609(a) in the
Civil Context: A Recommendation for Reform, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 27-37 (1988) (stating
that a majority of psychologists agree that the "trait-oriented approach" does not shape
future behavior); Leonard, supra note 331, at 25-31 (concluding that studies regarding
the poor predictive power of character traits demonstrate that much character evidence
entirely lacks probative value).
361. See Davies, supra note 360, at 517 ("Contemporary trait theorists willingly con-
cede that they are unable to predict a single instance of behavior on a particular occa-
sion with confidence.").
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The first of these challenges is based, however, on the failure to
"aggregate," a methodological flaw in measuring traits. The second
challenge ignores the important truth that knowledge of "average"
behavior can be highly relevant, even though averages do not per-
mit precise predictions of individual instances of behavior.3 62 More-
over, both challenges ignore the various ways in which the
predictive power of trait-related concepts can be improved or
supplemented.
i. The Principle of Aggregation.-The principle of aggregation, ig-
nored by many critics of trait theory, can be understood only by
considering the meaning and nature of "correlation" and of "corre-
lation coefficients." Correlation describes "the degree to which two
sets of measures, such as intelligence and academic achievement,
are related.,1 63 The most common type of correlation coefficient is
a numerical index ranging from minus 1-a perfect inverse relation-
ship-to plus 1-a perfect direct relationship. 3  The average cor-
relation between different purported behavioral measures of the
same personality trait is typically in a range between. 1 and .2.365 In
lay terms, this means that there is almost no gain in accuracy of pre-
diction about a later situation by virtue of knowing how someone
behaved in an earlier situation."6
Correlations between scores on paper-and-pencil measures of
personality ("personality tests") and individual observations of a be-
havior demonstrating the existence of the measured trait (for exam-
ple, between measuring high on a "friendliness" score on a
personality test and actually being observed as friendly in a particu-
lar situation) do little better, rarely exceeding the .2 to .3 range.
Indeed, virtually no coefficients, either between individual pairs of
362. See infra text accompanying notes 363-384; Davies, supra note 360, at 513-18
(1991) (discussing the usefulness of traits to accurately predict average behavior and
noting that relevancy does not equate to sufficiency of evidence); Seymour Epstein, The
Stability of Behavior: L On Predicting Most of the People Much of the Time, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1097, 1102 (1979) [hereinafter Epstein, Most People] ("A trait is a genera-
lized tendency for a person to behave in a certain manner over a sufficient sample of
events and does not imply that he or she will exhibit trait-relevant behavior in all situa-
tions or even on all occasions in the same situation.").
363. AIKEN, TESTING, supra note 188, at 26.
364. Id.
365. LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETr, THE PERSON AND THE SrruATION: PERSPECTIVES
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 95 (1991).
366. For example, a .16 correlation between being friendly in situation 1 and proving
indeed to be friendly in situation 2 increases the likelihood of friendliness in the latter
situation to only 55%, compared to a 50% likelihood absent a correlation study but
given only two choices: friendly or unfriendly. Id.
[VOL. 52:1
PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE
behavioral measures or between a personality test and an individual
behavioral measure, exceed .3.s67 This data suggests to some that
cross-situational traits either do not exist or are not a useful
concept.
3 6
But these correlations are misleading because, as Epstein
demonstrated, they overlook the benefits of "aggregation. "369 Indi-
vidual responses, like single items on a test of any kind, are usually
highly unreliable and reflect the impact of many systematic and ran-
dom factors other than the one being studied.3 70 Thus even an ex-
cellent student may get individual exam questions wrong or have an
off day and get a poor grade on a particular test.37 ' But what marks
the good student apart from lesser students is that, on average, the
good student scores much better than poorer students.3 72 Averages
in turn are obtained by aggregating scores, that is, combining multi-
ple measures of scholastic ability and averaging them. 7 3 Similarly,
if traits exist, the average of multiple behavioral observations should
lead to much larger correlation coefficients. Indeed, this has proven
to be the case. For example, if twenty-five independent behavioral
measures of a subject's extroversion are averaged and that average
correlated with the average of another twenty-five independent be-
havioral observations of the subject's extroversion, the correlation
coefficient rises to .83, a very impressive coefficient.3 74
ii. Average Behavior.-While aggregation demonstrates, there-
fore, that cross-situational dispositions do exist,3 75 it must be
remembered that aggregation is required precisely because there is
much variability in individual instances of behavior for each person.
367. See id.
368. Id. at 95-96 (noting that Walter Mischel, one of the first psychologists to summa-
rize the literature in this area and point out its significance, "challenged us to entertain
the possibility that those low correlations might be capturing an important truth about
human behavior, that is, that cross-situational consistency might be the exception and
behavioral specificity the rule").
369. See Seymour Epstein, The Stability of Behavior Across Time and Situations, in PERSON-
ALI AND THE PREDICTION OF BEHAVIOR 209, 221-65 (Robert A. Zucker et al. eds., 1984)
[hereinafter Epstein, Stability] (reviewing some studies on aggregation, the underlying
methodology, and its significance).




374. See id. at 107-08.
375. See Epstein, Stability, supra note 369, at 263 ("The following statements are all
true: (1) behavior is situationally specific, (2) behavior is general across situations, and
(3) people have broad cross-situational response dispositions." (emphasis added)).
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Indeed, what modem social psychologists have realized is that all
individuals will show a wide range of responses and all will make
responses close to the overall population average more often than
they will make responses that are extreme.376 This variability and
clustering around the population average means that it is difficult to
predict behavior in a particular situation based upon a cross-situa-
tional trait derived from aggregation, 77 just as it is difficult to pre-
dict behavior based on only an individual, "unaggregated" score.
But this does not mean that correlation coefficients derived from
aggregating, or even those not so derived, are logically irrelevant if
the concept of "relative likelihood" is understood. Assume, for ex-
ample, based on a single, randomly sampled measure for each of
two individuals, Paula and Jane, that the likelihood of Paula's engag-
ing in a particular extreme behavior, for example, extroversion, is
4.5 percent, while the likelihood of Jane's doing so is an even
smaller .9 percent.3 7 8 While the extreme behavior is thus highly un-
likely for both individuals, Paula is nevertheless five times more likely
than Jane (5 x .9 = 4.5) to display the extreme behavior. 79
This difference in "relative likelihood" is unquestionably "rele-
vant." Evidence is relevant if it makes a fact of consequence more
or less probable than would be true without the evidence. 80 In an
assault case, knowing that Paula is five times more likely than Jane to
engage in violent behavior, a variation on the above example, obvi-
ously makes it more likely than otherwise that, as between Paula and
Jane, Paula is the one who committed the assault.
Similarly, the relative likelihood of Paula's being violent might
be compared to the likelihood of a "typical" person's doing so, that
is, a person who scores precisely at the population mean, thus in-
forming the jury that Paula is X number of times more-or less-
likely to be violent than is the average person. A related concept is
comparing Paula's rate of violence with the population base rates,
that is, the proportion of people in the general population who
manifest the behavior of interest.38' For example, comparison of
Paula's rate of violence with those who display a smaller rate of vio-
lence, and those who display a higher rate, can place Paula's relative
376. See Ross & NISBETr, supra note 365, at 110-11.
377. See id. at 107-15.
378. Id. at 116.
379. See id.
380. See GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 401.3, at 59 (1987).
381. AIKEN, TESTING, supra note 188, at 110.
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violence in the context of the general population.382
Moreover, if we aggregate data (which the above examples did
not), we enhance the statements of relative likelihood dramatically,
so that we might be able to improve the confidence of our estimates
in the cases of Paula and Jane to say that Paula is 100 times more
likely than Jane to be violent.38 3 Additionally, these same relative
likelihood data can be mathematically manipulated to enable us to
use past extreme behavior to calculate the probability of an individ-
ual's engaging in that same behavior across a certain specified
number of future observations. Thus, if Paula scored in the ninety-
eighth percentile on the basis of a single past observation of a be-
havior, mathematical formulae enable us to estimate that there will
be a thirty-four percent chance that she will engage in another ex-
treme behavior, in the top two percent of the population, at least
once in the next ten observations. 384 This, too, helps to increase the
likelihood that she committed an assault if that extreme behavior is
assaultive violence.
iii. Improving Predictive Power.-Several further observations
must be made about ways to increase the predictive power of expert
character evidence. First, as noted earlier, virtually all psychologists
now agree that much of behavior is accounted for by situational fac-
tors, not merely by an individual's different traits.38 5 Thus, traits
defined in more situationally specific terms are more likely to be ac-
curate predictors of behavior. 8 6 In any event, even if broader
cross-situational traits are used, predictions cannot be of much
value without consideration of the likely impact of the situation, par-
382. See Ross & NISBETr, supra note 365, at 138-39 (concluding that cross-situational
trait-based predictions can be made with good prospects for accuracy if certain circum-
stances exist, including: (1) the prediction is based on a large, diverse sample of past
observations, (2) the prediction addresses the relative likelihood of extreme outcomes
or events, when the actors have in the past shown themselves to be extreme relative to
others, and (3) the predictions are mindful of population base rates). Ross and Nisbett fur-
ther note that when these conditions are met, "trait information can in theory predict
even to novel situations," id. at 139, an important point given that many crimes are
indeed first-time "novel" experiences as, for example, when a wife kills her husband.
383. See id. at 117.
384. See id.
385. See Davies, supra note 360, at 518 ("The trait-versus-situation controversy in the
field of personality and social psychology has produced widespread agreement that be-
havior is simultaneously a function of disposition and situation, and their mutual
interaction.").
386. See, e.g., Ross & NiSBE-rr, supra note 365, at 138 (noting that individual difference
information can be invaluable "where one has base rate information for the particular
individual for the particular situation. Thus your prediction thatJack will talk a lot at the
lunch table today, as in the past, is bankable.").
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ticularly when there is supporting experimental data as to the per-
formance of people under certain situations.38 7
For expert character testimony to be most useful, therefore, a
witness must discuss not only the subject's relevant "traits," but the
likely impact of the situation at issue, and the interaction between
those traits and those situations. Only then can a fact-finder truly
come to understand a defendant's thoughts and behavior. This may
need to be a wide-ranging inquiry, because many factors beyond the
most obvious ones play into the "situation," including the social
roles played by the participants, their cultural background, and the
nature of the "audience" before whom a defendant is "playing. '38 8
Second, even given a particular trait and a particular situation, a
person may react differently depending on how that person subjec-
tively construes the situation.38 9 For example, two subjects might
share the trait of displaying anger toward those who do not like
them. However, one subject might perceive person A as disliking
that subject, leading to anger, while the other subject may construe
the same behavior by A as showing that A indeed likes the subject,
thus avoiding anger. But how people construe situations often dif-
fers dramatically and even the same individual may display unpre-
dictable changes in construal39g On the other hand, differences in
construal may themselves "reflect longer term, more idiosyncratic
differences in personal history and temperament."' 39' Studying "idi-
osyncratic" differences and unique ways of construing a situation in
turn requires a more "idiographic" approach to the study of person-
ality,392 an approach that demands some unavoidable measure of
clinical judgment. Judgments based at least in part on clinician ob-
servations will be necessary because the idiographic approach re-
quires a willingness to observe the individual actor in a substantial
387. See Davies, supra note 360, at 519 ("The ultimate question to be resolved by the
forensic fact finder is most analogous to that of concern to the interactionist, that is, how
this person (for example, a witness) would behave in a particular situation (such as,
when giving testimony at this trial).").
388. See Ross & NISBETr, supra note 365, at 150-54, 156-58, 169-88 (discussing the
various factors in the predictability of behavior).
389. See id. at 67-89, 165-66 (discussing the concept of construal and establishing its
importance in predicting behavior).
390. Id. at 68-69.
391. Id. at 165.
392. See id. at 163 ("The approach that is called for .. must be idiographic in spirit
.... That is, we will need to know different things about different people in order to appreciate
the distinctiveness and coherence in their behavior and in order to anticipate when, and
how, their behavior will prove consistent and predictable." (emphasis added)). See also




sample of situations.3 93 It also requires a review of the actor's per-
sonal history, needs, goals, and the like, in an attempt to divine
behavorial consistencies."' In this way the particular and unique
set of situations in which the actor will manifest her particular dispo-
sitions can be anticipated. 95
Such an idiographic approach also requires that attention be
paid to individual goals and preferences, for understanding what
they are and how important they are to a particular person may ex-
plain the true consistency in that person's behavior.3 96 Competen-
cies and capacities, that is, abilities to achieve personal goals and
satisfy personal standards, are also important. 97 One person may,
for example, know how to get along with peers while another does
not. Differences in attributional styles and perceptions of self-effi-
cacy-that is, whether individuals feel in control of their life and re-
sponsible for their happiness, or instead feel like helpless pawns-
can dramatically affect behavior.39 '
Furthermore, people have different "self-schematas," that is,
different generalized understandings of the self.399 Some people
substantially organize their behavior around the concept of depen-
dence, others around the notion of independence, and still others
consider either concept irrelevant. 400 Those who are schematic for
dependence or independence will provide "more evidence when
asked to defend assertions that they are dependent or independent,
and they are highly resistant to information that seems to contradict
their self-schemas. ' '4 ° ' A related concept, "self-monitoring," re-
flects the notion that different people monitor themselves along dif-
ferent dimensions in different situations.4 °2 But there are also
differences in the extent to which people engage in self-monitoring
393. See Ross & NisBETr, supra note 365, at 103.
394. See id.
395. See id.
396. See id. at 163-64. One preference that illustrates the important interaction be-
tween personal goals and situations is our preference to place ourselves in particular
situations. While the situation may be a powerful determinant of our behavior, there
may be underlying consistencies regarding the situations in which we choose to place
ourselves, and thus regarding the behavior that we prefer those situations to elicit from
us. See id. at 154-56.
397. See id. at 164-65 (noting that competence and capacity may predict a person's
ability to achieve goals).
398. See id. at 166 (noting that the conception of the self guides behavior and inter-




402. Id. at 167.
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of their behavior or its impact on others that can be measured with a
pencil-and-paper test.
40 3
Finally, it should be noted that, while the presence of mental
"illness" or the existence of a personality "disorder" is not neces-
sary to validate expert character opinions, such diagnoses may im-
prove the predictive power of character evidence for a very simple
reason: disorders by definition involve a certain "rigidity" in think-
ing or behavior, an unwillingness or inability to think or act differ-
ently in different circumstances. 40 4  "Rigid" behaviors are by
definition quite consistent, thus improving the confidence with
which a clinician can predict the patient's behavior.40 5
b. Experimental Data versus Clinical Judgment.-While individual
differences in the predisposition to think or act in a certain way are
real and should, in theory, be measurable, the value of a mental
health expert's opinion in a particular case turns on more than this
truth. It turns, in addition to matters already discussed, on two fur-
ther factors: (1) the adequacy of any supporting experimental or
quasi-experimental data; and (2) the value of "clinical judgment."
i. Experimental Data.-Experimental data is most important at
the group level of analysis. As an illustration, assume that a defend-
ant, a child brutally abused by his father, argues that abused chil-
dren become abnormally fearful of their abusing parent. The
defendant claims that, because he was such a child, he honestly be-
lieved that his father's actions endangered his life; he therefore
killed his father in what he believed to be self-defense, even though
the killing was prearranged.40 6 But the validity of this argument
should turn at least partly on whether there is experimental data to
support the defendant's claim that such an abnormal fear exists
among abused children.
That inquiry may reveal that the claim has never been subjected
to experimental challenge. More interestingly, the inquiry may in-
403. See id. (noting that the pencil-and-paper test to measure self-monitoring reveals
differences in self-monitoring across many behavioral dimensions and social contexts).
404. Interview with Ellen McDaniel, M.D., a well-known forensic psychiatrist, in
Washington, D.C. (July 26, 1991) (describing the reduced plasticity of behavior in differ-
ing situations as a distinguishing characteristic of personality and other psychological
disorders); IRA D. TURKAT, THE PERSONALITY DISORDERS: A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH
TO CLINICAL MANAGEMENT 11-12 (1990) (noting that DSM-III-R classifies personality
traits as "disorders" only when the traits are inflexible and maladaptive and "cause either
significant impairment in social or occupational functioning or subjective distress").
405. McDaniel interview, supra note 404.
406. This hypothetical is based onJahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 995-96 (Wyo. 1984).
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stead reveal that existing data is inadequate. judging the adequacy
of experimental research is not difficult for lawyers, particularly
when the lawyer is aided by a qualified expert witness.4 °7 Professor
Faigman has indeed identified five common errors made by social
scientists that can easily be watched for by courts and attorneys.
First, samples are often unrepresentative of the larger group
about which conclusions are to be drawn, or are too small to justify
such conclusions.4 °8 For example, in studying jury behavior, it
would be unwise to generalize based upon a small sample of college
sophomores, whose reactions may not represent those of the
broader population. Another common concern about the fairness
of generally applying the results of a study40 9 is that laboratory stud-
ies may ignore some factors at play in the real world and may thus
require confirmation by field studies, even though such studies raise
their own problems of "internal validity." 41 0
407. See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to
the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY LJ. 1005, 1080 (1989) [hereinafter Faigman, Social
Science and Policy] ("Even the most difficult concepts used by social scientists are no more
difficult than the more esoteric concepts lawyers employ regularly. The proper question
is whether lawmakers have the inclination or motivation to devote the time necessary to
learn the methods of social science."). See generally McCord, Child Abuse, supra note 295
(illustrating a lawyer's effective use of social science research to analyze a difficult legal
issue).
408. See Faigman, Social Science and Policy, supra note 407, at 1059 (noting that small
samples decrease the chances that the observed behavior represents the behaviors of the
large and complex population and that unrepresentative samples bear little resemblance
to the actual population of interest).
409. This is what scientists call "external validity." See MARTIN, supra note 317, at 118
(defining external validity as how causal relationships fare when there are changes in
persons, settings, or times).
410. "Internal validity" is the extent to which the variable of interest, rather than
some other factor, caused the result studied. See id. at 117. See Faigman, Social Science
and Policy, supra note 407, at 1060 n.201 ("Sound theory testing in the social sciences
invariably involves some amount of laboratory testing which ... may not be generaliz-
able to the legal setting without further field tests. However, both laboratory tests and
field tests have limitations, the former involving external validity (generalizability) and
the latter involving internal validity .... Yet together, laboratory and field research can
provide valuable--and valid-information."). Cook and Campbell in their classic text
identify the following seven factors as substantial threats to internal validity:
[History] is a threat when an observed effect might be due to an event
which takes place between the pretest and the posttest, when this event is not
the treatment of research interest ....
[Maturation] is a threat when an observed effect might be due to the re-
spondent's growing older, wiser, stronger, more experienced, and the like be-
tween pretest and posttest and when this maturation is not the treatment of
research interest.
[Testing] is a threat when an effect might be due to the number of times
particular responses are measured. In particular, familiarity with a test can
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Second, studies may lack comparison or "control" groups. Ide-
ally, there will be two identical groups, one being subjected to the
variable being studied, the other not being so subjected. Thus, any
differences between the two groups beyond chance variation can be
attributed to the variable manipulated.4 '
Third, even differences between a subject group and a control
group may be due to chance rather than changes in the independent
variable. 12 Statistical formulae must thus be used to determine the
statistical significance of any observed differences,4 I s that is, a mea-
sure of the likelihood that an observed difference in samples was not
due to chance but to the effect of changes in the manipulated
variable. 41 4
Fourth, efforts must be made in the experiments to control for
"experimenter expectancies," that is, the effect that a researcher's
awareness of the hypothesis being tested can have on what and how
data is collected. 4 5 This problem arises when data contrary to a
hypothesis are ignored or when records "reflect what the researcher
sometimes enhance performance because items and error responses are more
likely to be remembered at later testing sessions.
[Instrumentation] is a threat when an effect might be due to a change in
the measuring instrument between pretest and posttest and not to the treat-
ment's differential impact at each time interval ....
[Statistical regression] is a threat when an effect might be due to respon-
dents' being classified into experimental groups at, say, the pretest on the basis
of pretest scores or correlates of pretest scores. When this happens and meas-
ures are unreliable, high pretest scorers will score relatively lower at the post-
test and low pretest scorers will score higher. It would be wrong to attribute
such differential "change" to a treatment because it might be due to statistical
regression ..'..
[Selection] is a threat when an effect may be due to the difference between
the kinds of people in one experimental group as opposed to another ....
[Mortality] is a threat when an effect may be due to the different kinds of
persons who dropped out of a particular treatment group during the course of
an experiment. This results in a selection artifact, since the experimental
groups are then composed of different kinds of persons at the posttest.
T. COOK & DONALD CAMPBELL, QUASI-ExPERIMENTATION: DESIGN & ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR
FIELD SETTINGS 51-53 (1979).
411. See Faigman, Social Science and Policy, supra note 407, at 1060-61.
412. Id. at 1061.
413. See id. at 1061-62 ("[Failing to] calculate any measure of statistical significance is
a substantial violation of a basic tenet of empirical inquiry.").
414. See MARTIN, supra note 317, at 152 (suggesting that for a result to be significant,
the likelihood of obtaining the observed differences due to chance should be less than
one in twenty). Most psychologists require a .05 level of significance, meaning that
there is a 57o likelihood that any observed difference in samples is due purely to chance
rather than to the experimental treatment condition, while others choose a .01 level of
significance. See id.
415. See Faigman, Social Science and Policy, supra note 407, at 1062.
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expects to hear, rather than what the subjects actually said."4 1 6
Fifth, what is being measured and its meaning to the researcher
must be clearly understood, for sometimes what is studied does not
in any real sense test the variable that is of concern to the law.4 17
One important qualification must be noted about these five
guidelines. In a true experiment, all variables other than the one to
be studied are "controlled," that is, they are equal for all subjects,
or their effects are cancelled out by randomly assigning participants
to the various treatment conditions.41 8 To some degree, random
assignment can assure that the findings result from the factor that
the researcher wishes to study, not from pre-existing differences be-
tween the groups.4 19 True experiments are often impossible in so-
cial science research, however, because it is either impossible to
control for all variables other than the one being studied or it would
be unethical to introduce the independent variable under controlled
circumstances. For example, raising twenty children in an identical
fashion except that ten are subjected to regular, brutal beatings,
would be morally unacceptable.42 °
When true experiments are impossible, social scientists aim to
get as close as possible to the ideal by minimizing threats to internal
validity or creating situations where those threats can fairly be as-
sessed.421 A procedure in which there is such partial, but not com-
plete, control over the scheduling of experimental stimuli is called a
"quasi-experiment. , '422 Because a quasi-experiment is by definition
a flawed experiment, the above guidelines are particularly important
in assessing the value of particular quasi-experimental designs.
Finally, when general acceptance of a technique based on scien-
tific experimentation is not the determinative factor for admissibil-
ity, as in a pragmatic relevancy jurisdiction, it is nevertheless a factor
416. Id. at 1062-63.
417. See id. at 1063 (noting that in some cases, the measures selected do not reflect the
legal concerns or the legal concern is "effectively untestable").
418. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Es-
tablishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 505 (1986).
419. Id.
420. Cf. E. JERRY PHARES, CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY: CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND PROFES-
SION 113 (4th ed. 1992) ("[W]ould it really be ethical to subject such people [depres-
sives] to a strong, significant failure experience and thereby risk plunging them even
deeper into depression Uust to study the impact of failure on such people]?").
421. See DONALD T. CAMPBELL &JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERI-




in weighing probative value.423 This makes sense, for scientists rec-
ognize that "[t]he trustworthiness of a study increases as independ-
ent investigators arrive at a common conclusion. The more often a
study is confirmed by subsequent research, the less likely it is that
chance fluctuations in the data accounted for the results of the origi-
nal research. 4 24
This checklist is meant simply to convey the flavor of the enter-
prise in an individual case and to suggest the ways in which the
hallmarks of good social science can easily be applied by courts and
practicing attorneys.425 Many useful studies will have some of these
flaws;426 weaknesses detected based upon these and other standards
should not, therefore, result automatically in exclusion of the evi-
dence. Rather, the goal is to identify that research which is so inade-
quate that it will mislead, rather than assist, a jury when weighed
against other factors.427 Equally important, however, is that even
flawed or as-yet-uncorroborated research may be of some eviden-
tiary value, but a jury can accurately gauge that value only if fully
informed of both the strengths and weaknesses of the research.
i. Clinical Judgment.Evidence that a certain group behaves in
a certain way is generally not helpful unless it is further established
that the defendant does or does not fit within the group being stud-
ied.42' Expert opinion offered on this latter question is not, how-
ever, subject to experimental or quasi-experimental testing but
rather turns on the "clinical judgment" of a relevant mental health
professional. Moreover, expert character testimony that is more in-
dividualized, emphasizing what is special or unique about a defend-
ant rather than what she shares in common with a group, also
requires clinical judgment.
423. See McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 99 (noting that the greater the acceptance
of the accuracy of the diagnosis, the greater chance the diagnosis before the court will be
trusted as reliable).
424. Monahan & Walker, supra note 418, at 508.
425. See id. at 508-12, in which the authors agree that even a "crude screening de-
vice," such as "a simple checklist of threats to validity" and of ways to neutralize those
threats, "can go far in reducing a court's reliance on inadequate empirical data." Id. at
509. They also emphasize, however, that ease of application will vary with the judge and
with the case, and, in some instances, expert consultation will be essential to assist the
court. Id. at 509-12.
426. See Faigman, Social Science and Policy, supra note 407, at 1065 (noting that most
social science research has some flaws).
427. See id.
428. See supra text accompanying notes 325-330.
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"Clinical judgment" is the application of the judgment of a
trained mental health professional to an individual case, based on a
weighing of data from various sources.429 That judgment is used
primarily for diagnosis, prediction, and designing a treatment plan.
The quality of clinical judgment turns on the skill of the clinician (1)
in collecting data, for example, in asking the right questions and in
promoting responses during interviews, (2) in categorizing and
weighing that data, and (3) in drawing reasonable inferences from
the data. Moreover, collected data is used to generate hypotheses,
which guide the clinician in collecting more data and in revising ini-
tial hypotheses until a conclusion is reached.43 ° Clinical judgment is
thus as much art as science.
The value of clinical judgment has, therefore, often been chal-
lenged because it is subject to distorting influences by the clinician
and necessarily involves a great deal of scientifically questionable
speculation.43  Although actuarial judgments often prove superior
to clinical judgments in predicting behavior,43 2 clinical judgment is
often all that we have.43 s Moreover, it can offer much of value to the
jury by increasing the pool of data and fostering the jury's willing-
ness to consider plausible alternatives. 4  This section seeks, there-
fore, to serve two purposes: to offer general guidelines for
improving-and, in a particular case, for examining-the quality of
clinical judgment, and to offer suggestions for improving the acces-
sibility of that judgment to a jury.
429. See PHARES, supra note 420, at 262.
430. See BARRY NURCOMBE & ROLLIN M. GALLAGHER, THE CLINICAL PROCESS IN PSY-
CHIATRY: DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT PLANNING 616-17 (1986) (describing sequentially
the components of the clinical reasoning process).
431. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 433-34, 514 (noting that skeptics would
likely deny either exculpatory or mitigating significance to claims that psychological
forces caused a defendant not to refrain from criminal behavior and that the legal system
attempts to avoid bias through its fact-finding and law-applying processes).
432. See PHARES, supra note 420, at 267-68. On the other hand, even critics of clinical
methodology concede that in the subset of cases for which clinicians express a high
degree of confidence in their predictions, clinical predictions may be more accurate than
actuarial ones. See JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF
CLINICAL TECHNIQUES 120 (1981). Furthermore, clinical prediction may be more accu-
rate than actuarial prediction when dealing with rare factors not taken into account by
actuarial formulae. See id. at 119-20. For example, an actuarial formula might predict a
90% likelihood that a professor will attend a movie tonight. But a clinician who knew
that the professor had broken her leg would be more accurate in predicting that there
was close to a 0% chance of the professor's showing up at that movie. Id. at 119.
433. See infra text accompanying notes 547-563.
434. See infra text accompanying notes 514-534.
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In collecting data, it is important that a clinician personally in-
terview the defendant; no courtroom opinion should be offered
when this has not been done.43 5 As noted earlier, there should be
multiple interviews over several days and in different settings to off-
set the distorting effect of atmosphere and of a restricted sample of
personally observed behavior.43 6 Moreover, the interviews should
cover information regarding the defendant's behavior in a wide
range of settings, and some interviews should be done by other cli-
nicians to avoid the distorting effects of a specific interviewer's per-
sonality.4 7 Additionally, the clinician must be aware of the ways in
which her own behavior can influence a defendant-"examiner ef-
fects"-and must be trained to minimize these effects.43 s Multiple
observers can also help to minimize examiner distortion.43 9
On the oiher hand, no opinion should be based solely on what
a defendant says.440 The accuracy of a defendant's recounting of
her history and thoughts is especially critical because those data will
form much of the basis for the expert's opinion regarding that de-
fendant's character. 44' Thus, to the extent possible, the clinician
should act as a detective, interviewing other sources of information
to confirm, disconfirm, and expand on the information provided by
the defendant.442 Written data, such as personnel records, should
be examined as well. 4
43
Apart from interviewing others, there are further steps that can
be taken to test the veracity of a defendant's self-reports, including:
435. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 496.
436. Id. at 505.
437. Id.
438. See id. at 512-14 (suggesting further ways to reduce such effects); STANLEY L.
BRODSKY, TESTIFYING IN COURT: GUIDELINES AND MAXIMS FOR THE EXPERT WITNESS 79-
83 (1991) (defining the term "examiner effects" and suggesting ways to minimize them).
439. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 513 (suggesting the use of one-way
mirrors).
440. Id. at 508.
441. See id. Because this Article focuses on pragmatic relevancy, the hearsay-related
issues involved when an expert relies on out-of-court statements made by others, espe-
cially those arising under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, are not addressed here. See
FED. R. EVID. 703.
442. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 508-09 (discussing the need to rely on
sources other than the defendant and the legal implications of doing so); Ziskin, supra
note 239, at 1115 (concluding that a mental health expert must gather and evaluate as
much evidence as possible before forming an opinion). Cf WILLIAM M. RUNYAN, LIFE
HISTORIES AND PSYCHOBIOGRAPHY: EXPLORATIONS IN THEORY AND METHOD 44 (1984)
(discussing, in the context of explanatory conjecture, how multiple explanations of be-
havior may provide more data to reach a "good" explanation).
443. Ziskin, supra note 239, at 1105.
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(1) using the "validity scales" of the MMPI,444 (2) comparing multi-
ple observations of and interviews with a defendant in a search for
consistency, and (3) after establishing initial client rapport, adopt-
ing-at least in situations where a client has not been as forthcom-
ing as is necessary-a somewhat more confrontational style than is
generally used by therapists.445 It is important to emphasize, how-
ever, that a clinician does not opine about the truthfulness of a de-
fendant's version of the crime. Rather, a clinician only explains why,
based upon all her interviews and investigations, she accepted cer-
tain data as accurate for purposes of offering an opinion regarding a
defendant's character.446
A clinician must also keep detailed records that note observa-
tions in concrete terms, not merely as conclusions or generalities, so
that a jury can draw its own conclusions from the data.4 4 7 Indeed,
videotaping portions of an investigation, such as interviews, might
be an even better way to enable a jury to determine the fairness and
accuracy of a clinician's investigation.448 Opinions offered by a cli-
nician, moreover, should be framed so that psychological observa-
tions and judgments are not confused with legal or moral ones. 4 49
444. See supra text accompanying notes 189-199.
445. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 505-09. See also BRODSKY, supra note 438, at
36-38 (discussing clients' motives to "fake" their own evaluations). Other potential
"truth-testing" techniques, such as sodium amytal, hypnosis, and the polygraph, raise
complex evidentiary questions in their own right, see id. at 506, but are beyond the scope
of this Article.
446. For a discussion of the special problems created when an expert offers an opin-
ion about the truthfulness of a witness or an accused, see McCord, Profiles, supra note
119, at 44-48.
447. See Ziskin, supra note 239, at 1104.
448. See id. at 1105-06. This last suggestion raises problems of its own, however, such
as whether the videotaping may itself alter a defendant's behavior, the potential need for
defense consent to such a procedure, id., and Fifth Amendment concerns in the absence
of such consent. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 497-503, 507-08 n.238 (noting
that the most powerful disincentive to full disclosure is the fear that such information
may be used against the defendant and the related notion that the use of a videotape as
evidence may run afoul of a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights). See also SHUMAN, supra
note 189, at 282-84, 1990 Supp. at 52-54 (discussing the Fifth Amendment's limitation
on a psychiatrist's opinion generally and the use of videotaping specifically). Neverthe-
less, there is significant support for videotaping, see, e.g., RUNYAN, supra note 442, at 157
(discussing the usefulness of videotaping interviews), such that it should be available as a
potential aid when a defendant consents. See SHUMAN, supra note 189, at 238.
449. DAVID L. BAZELON, QUESTIONING AUTHORITY: JUsTICE AND CRIMINAL LAw 59
(1987) ("In practice ... psychiatrists have continued to make moral and legal judgments
beyond the proper scope of their professional expertise."). See also Smith v. Schlesinger,
513 F.2d 460, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[P]sychiatricjudgments may disguise, wittingly or
unwittingly, political or social biases of the psychiatrists.").
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Wherever possible, clinicians also should make use of whatever
actuarial formulae are available, should be sensitive to relevant base
rates, and should be sensitive to the apparent effects of differing sit-
uations on a defendant's behavior.4 50 Ideally, a prediction should
indicate in what situations, for example, a defendant is most likely to
be violent and why.45 ' The clinician must further be sensitive to,
and look for, data that may disconfirm her working hypotheses.452
Such attention allows the clinician to make judgments in part based
on an "objective" comparison of the defendant to others, while en-
abling her to defend those judgments by recognizing and rebutting
factors that may undermine confidence in them. As a matter of
practice, the level of confidence a jury should place on the opinion
should be stated as part of the opinion; for example, "it is more
likely than not that the defendant will be violent if returned to situa-
tion X. ' 453
Additionally, the data collection and interpretation process
should be an ongoing one, constantly subject to review and to cri-
tique by other clinicians.454 This means that all hypotheses should
be tentative and that a group approach is preferred over the use of a
single clinician. Multiple viewpoints make it more likely that weak-
nesses will be uncovered, missing data will be collected, and coher-
encies will be found.4 5 5 Videotape, again, may help to permit
multiple interpretations of the same data.456
Furthermore, concerns may be raised because of "fallacious
prediction principles"-failures to recognize the application of sim-
ple rules for good statistical reasoning-made by laypersons and cli-
nicians alike. One example would be the tendency to judge a
450. See MONAHAN, supra note 432, at 49, 121-27, 129-41, 160. Monahan attacks the
particularly thorny problem of predicting dangerous behavior, an area in which he con-
cedes psychologists have an abysmal record. See id. at 27-28. However, he argues that
the poor record has resulted partly from inadequate procedures and methods and sug-
gests appropriate methods for this challenging task. See id. at 19, 37, 143-69.
451. See id. at 157-58 (describing a prediction model the clinician should use to deter-
mine the probability of violent behavior).
452. See id. at 160 (emphasizing the need to corroborate evidence).
453. See, e.g., id. at 34, 168.
454. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 512-22 (describing a detailed team ap-
proach to quality control for clinical assessments, based upon the model used at the
University of Virginia's Forensic Psychiatry Clinic); RUNYAN, supra note 442, at 157 (sug-
gesting that multiple viewpoints of various clinicians can serve as a way of checking and
rechecking initial clinical descriptions and interpretations).
455. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 516-17 (noting that the segments of a
team interview provide additional viewpoints on the data, increasing the likelihood that
all facts and theories will be considered).
456. RUNYAN, supra note 442, at 157-58.
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person by a single instance of extreme behavior rather than by a
broader and fairer sample of behavior.45 7 A thorough clinician must
be aware of such errors, carefully guard against them, and stand
ready to explain to a jury the method by which the investigation was
conducted and conclusions were drawn.
These guidelines are offered to help courts determine when a
particular exercise of clinical judgment-particular psychological
character evidence-is so defective as to require exclusion. When
such expert testimony is admitted, these guidelines may aid in en-
suring full disclosure to the jury of the significant strengths and
weaknesses of the character evidence.
c. Witness Qualifications.-Forensic psychiatry and psychology
are best viewed as specialties requiring appropriate education and
training. There are a growing number of routes available for formal
classroom and clinical training in this area,458 but forensics-special-
ist programs are often not very rigorous or complete.4 59 While
awaiting improvements in the formal university training programs,
courts must be sensitive to the special type of forensic training that
is necessary to testify as a specialist.
Absent such training, many clinicians are simply not fit for the
courtroom. Commentators suggest that "their training encourages
them to err in the direction of diagnosing illness .... to speculate
wildly about unconscious determinants of behavior," and to ignore
the limitations of their own disciplines. 46' To be able to provide
juries with useful and relevant information, a forensics expert must
have some basic knowledge of the relevant substantive and proce-
dural law, including the rules of evidence, enabling them to appreci-
ate the differences between psychological and legal reasoning. The
forensics expert ought to be skilled in careful, thorough, concrete,
and precise record-keeping that offers particularized support for
457. See PHARES, supra note 420, at 270, 272 (describing such clinician prediction
fallacies).
458. See id. at 484 (discussing the availability of joint degree programs in law and
psychology, Ph.D. programs offering specialization in law and psychology, and univer-
sity and forensic mental health programs offering postdoctoral training opportunities).
459. While a 1973 survey of 83 university medical centers indicated that 90% of these
schools had some type of combined law and psychiatry program, "very few postgraduate
or post-residency fellows were being trained .... most courses used informal notes and
case materials rather than a standard text, and ... little field work was required." Bon-
nie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 457-58 n.103.
460. Id. at 457.
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461opinions they will offer in court. Moreover, because an expert's
task is not to cure but to evaluate in terms of legal standards, he
must be familiar with the different procedures necessary for con-
ducting a quality forensic evaluation, most notably the need to en-
gage in extensive inquiries of third parties to confirm, disconfirm, or
supplement a defendant's tale. Experts also must be trained in how
to respond appropriately to cross-examination and, while being per-
suasive, must learn not to be more than a "mild advocate, ' 46 2 able
to defend a position without letting the lawyer's need to win affect
their professional judgment. Significant experience in a clinical set-
ting will obviously enhance an expert's qualifications.463 Of course,
individual jurisdictions will require at least minimal credentials as
well, generally either board-eligibility as a psychiatrist or a Ph.D. in
clinical psychology.46
Beyond the requirements for recognition as a forensics expert,
an expert must also have the necessary theoretical and experiential
training in the particular subject on which he will testify.465
Whether the subject is the battered woman syndrome, child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome, or a more individualized inquiry
based on the MMPI and theories of individual schemata, an expert
must be thoroughly versed in the relevant literature, aware of the
strengths and weaknesses of the data, and practiced in applying that
data to real-world situations. Finally, an expert must demonstrate
knowledge of the necessary steps in a thorough evaluation proce-
dure in the particular area and show an ability to explain why, in that
case, he did or did not engage in any of the steps that might be part
461. These suggested qualities for forensics experts are adapted from a well-known
psychiatrist's list of qualities for the courtroom-wise witness. See BRODSKY, supra note
438, at 134-35. Others have suggested that forensic training must ensure a "familiarity
with legal tests and concepts, proper assessment, knowledge of relevant literature, and
an orientation to the courtroom." PHARES, supra note 420, at 484. Minimal training
should, therefore, include an introductory survey course in forensic psychology, topical
seminars in the area, and a field placement in a forensic setting. Id.
462. BRODSKY, supra note 438, at 135.
463. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 458 n.104.
464. Id. at 457 n. 103. The courts' greater willingness to qualify psychiatrists over psy-
chologists for issues related to the mental state of a defendant is unjustified unless so-
matic conditions are at issue. See id. at 458-59 n.105. Professors Bonnie and Slobogin
also suggest that a psychiatric social worker with a master's degree in social work or a
master's level psychologist or psychiatric nurse "will ordinarily have sufficient clinical-
behavioral training to be helpful in some legal contexts, such as competency assess-
ments, so long as other qualifications are established." See id. at 457 n.103.
465. See, e.g., MONAHAN, supra note 432, at 146 (noting several ways to determine if an
expert has the necessary training to predict the probability of future violence).
[VOL. 52:1
1993] PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE 83
of an "ideal" examination.466 An expert's aptitude for conveying
such an explanation is a strong indication of whether he will be able
to fully inform a jury of the facts and relevant arguments that should
affect its deliberations.
d. Negative Inferences.-Expert character testimony is often of-
fered to support a "negative inference"-an inference derived from
proving the absence, rather than the presence, of a certain trait or
quality.4 67 This proof of a negative may be challenged as having
little or no probative value.
Even a brief foray into daily newspaper stories, however, dem-
onstrates the weakness of this challenge. The much-publicized alle-
gations of Anita Hill at the confirmation hearings ofJustice Clarence
Thomas provide a good example.46 s
Despite the presence of corroborating witnesses, 469 many were
simply unwilling to believe Professor Hill's story. But if her story
was untrue, the only explanation was that she was either lying or
emotionally disturbed.4 7 ° Some inferred that she "must" have been
a "spumed woman," eager for revenge against a man who slighted
466. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 460 ("Because the reliability and useful-
ness of an otherwise qualified expert's testimony depends largely on the quality of his
evaluation procedure, courts also should pay special attention to this subject. Ideally,
courts should make this assessment before qualifying the witness .... ").
467. Professor Saltzburg has defined a "negative inference" as an inference "drawn
by factfinders from the absence of one or more pieces of evidence that they expect to be
presented." Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative Infer-
ences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1011 (1978). While Pro-
fessor Saltzburg's definition and examples differ slightly from those offered here, both
Professor Saltzburg and I share a common concern: thatjurors may draw inappropriate
inferences based on assumptions that can be countered, if at all, only by admitting evi-
dence specifically intended to prove those assumptions incorrect. See id. at 1060.
468. Anita Hill, a well-spoken, intelligent law professor at the University of Oklahoma
testified that while she was supervised by Clarence Thomas at the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, he engaged in a series of bawdy conversations with her that
she later characterized as sexual harassment. See CLARENCE THOMAS, CLARENCE
THOMAS: CONFRONING THE FUTURE 59 (L. Gordon Crovitz ed., 1992) (describing spe-
cific allegations Hill levied against Thomas); Ruth Marcus, Hill Describes Details of Alleged
Harassment; Thomas Categorically Denies All Her Charges; Court Nominee Calls Ordeal "Lynching
for Uppity Blacks, "WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1991, at AI (describing Hill's allegations of sex-
ual harassment).
469. Michael Wines, Compelling Evidence on Both Sides, But Only One Can Be Telling the
Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1991, at A20 (noting that several witnesses testified that Hill
told them of Thomas's inappropriate advances many years before his nomination).
470. The arguments recounted here about the respective credibility of now-Justice
Thomas and Professor Hill, including the arguments about what "must have" motivated
Professor Hill, were made by students, faculty, and friends to this author during the
course of the hearings. I suspect that these discussions were typical of those taking
place throughout the nation. See also sources cited infra notes 471-473.
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her. These inferences, made even though no evidence supported
them,47' could have been countered, at least to some degree, by evi-
dence that the assumed facts-being "spurned" or being "emotion-
ally disturbed"-did not exist.47 2 In particular, a psychologist might
have testified that Professor Hill displayed neither emotional insta-
bility nor unusual personality traits to suggest that she would lie or
fantasize about the events to which she testified.473
If such evidence had been offered, the outcome would not nec-
essarily have been different. 47 4 Nevertheless, evidence of the ab-
sence of emotional instability, if believed, would have made further
speculation difficult and might have changed a few minds. If a simi-
lar dispute arose in the context of a criminal trial, however, chang-
ing a few minds could make the difference between conviction and
acquittal.
In the context of lay character testimony, one recent case recog-
nized the importance of negative inferences. In Barlow v. Common-
wealth,475 the defendant was convicted of murder for fatally shooting
his father. Barlow claimed self-defense and argued on appeal that
the trial court erred by excluding lay testimony that he "ha[d] no
reputation for violent behavior in the community. ' 476 The state ar-
gued that the absence of a reputation for violence is not the same as
affirmative testimony of a good reputation for peacefulness, and that
47 1. "Did she [Professor Hill] fantasize about Judge Thomas and then was furious
because she felt deserted by him? Is she a militant feminist determined to sacrifice truth
in the overall fight against sexual harassment? No evidence has surfaced to indicate such mo-
tives." As the Tragedy Continues, HARTFORD COURAT, Oct. 13, 1991, at D2 (emphasis
added).
472. Several witnesses in Justice Thomas's favor did speculate as to the existence of
some of the assumed facts, but the press noted that such speculation was little proof,
even in a Senate hearing. See Adam Clymer, The Thomas Nomination; Parade of Witnesses
Support Hill's Story, Thomas's Integrity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1991, at All (noting that Phyl-
lis Berry, a witness forJustice Thomas, expressed the view that Anita Hill had a crush on
Thomas, but was unable to point to any specific reasons for believing this). These
"facts" remained assumptions and nothing more.
473. The closest thing to psychological testimony in the hearings was Professor Hill's
report that she had passed a lie detector test, although it was also reported that Republi-
cans contacted Park Dietz, a psychiatrist, to question him about delusions and false alle-
gations of sexual misconduct. See Clymer, supra note 472 (discussing Professor Hill's
lawyers' comments that the polygraph illustrated Hill's truthfulness about Justice
Thomas's conduct toward her and the Republicans' contact with Dr. Dietz).
474. It is important to remember that the fact-finder in the Thomas-Hill dispute was a
United States Senate committee and not a traditional jury. The hearings, as discussed
here, are meant to be merely illustrative of the probative value of psychological testi-
mony and negative inferences.
475. 297 S.E.2d 645 (Va. 1982).
476. Id. at 645-46.
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only the latter should be admissible.477 Moreover, argued the state,
character evidence was irrelevant because Barlow had admitted
shooting his father.478
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected both prosecution argu-
ments and ordered a new trial. 479 The court described the distinc-
tion between the absence of a reputation for violence and the
presence of a reputation for peacefulness as merely semantic.48 °
The court also emphasized that, although there was no dispute that
the son killed his father, the character evidence might negate the
necessary mental state for the crime.48 '
The Barlow court thus recognized that a jury might be aided by
evidence of a defendant's lack of a reputation for violence, if indeed
he had not displayed violent tendencies in the past. Without this
exculpatory or mitigatory evidence, a jury might conclude that the
defendant "must" have a violent character, and therefore the neces-
sary mental state, because "normal" sons do not shoot their fathers.
Absent evidence to the contrary, no other explanation may arise to
contradict the jury's usual assumptions. Moreover, jurors might
even be more reluctant to believe the son's self-defense claim be-
cause, for some, it is hard to believe that a father would seriously
threaten his son. Without character evidence illustrating the absence
of a reputation for violence, the jury might draw inferences not well-
supported by the evidence, and conjure up its own facts to "fill in
the blanks" and create a believable "story. "482
An expert character witness might, for similar reasons, offer tes-
timony of even greater probative value than that offered by lay wit-
nesses. How much probative value, of course, depends upon the
details of the testimony. If it were possible, for example, for an ex-
pert to testify that, with rare exceptions, only persons fitting a "rap-
ist profile" commit rapes, and the defendant did not fit such a
profile, such testimony should be of significant probative value.4 "
But the more common situation will be one in which such unequivo-
cal testimony is unavailable. Nevertheless, more equivocal testi-
477. Id. at 646.
478. Id. at 646-47.
479. Id. at 647.
480. Id. at 646.
481. Id. at 647.
482. See infra notes 535-546 and accompanying text (discussing role of stories in jury
deliberations).
483. See State v. Cavallo, 443 A.2d 1020, 1023, 1030 (N.J. 1982) (noting that psychia-
trist's testimony that a defendant lacked the psychological traits of a rapist was logically
relevant, although the testimony was properly excluded on other grounds).
1993]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
mony-for example, that there is nothing abnormal in the
defendant's personality profile-may be relevant for a different rea-
son: without testimony that jurors expect or want to hear, they will
draw inferences that should not fairly be drawn from the evidence,
or they may give fair inferences undue weight.
For example, an adult male who enjoys babysitting and spend-
ing time with children might be accused of sexual abuse. Because
many people may find it unusual for an adult to enjoy spending so
much time with children, jurors might speculate that he is a sexual
psychopath or a pervert, making it more likely that they will convict.
But expert testimony explaining that the defendant displays no
signs of unusual behavior or unusual thinking concerning sex gener-
ally-and children specifically-may help to counter such common
inferences.48 4 If the testimony further includes a healthy, relatively
"normal" explanation based on the defendant's background for why
he enjoys babysitting, that may go even further to legitimately raise
a reasonable doubt. Such testimony will be relevant even if many or
most people who commit child sexual abuse are indeed not perverts
or psychopaths, because it helps to counter inferences that the jury
has little right to draw.
2. Necessity.-"Necessity" directs courts to consider the need
for proffered testimony in the context of a specific trial.4" 5 The
need for expert psychological character testimony turns on an un-
derstanding of the political role of the jury, the role of suppositional
science and storytelling in leading jurors to consider plausible alter-
natives to normal, the value of the clinical arts as opposed to sci-
ence, and the absence of less objectionable alternatives.48 6
a. The Political Role of the Jury.-The jury is an inherently polit-
ical institution, in that it serves important values connected with the
role and legitimacy of government in the American democratic sys-
484. Cf. People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698, 715 (Cal. 1989) (holding that psychologist's
opinion that defendants displayed no signs of "deviance" or "abnormality" should have
been admitted as relevant to defense claim that charged acts of child abuse did not
occur).
485. McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 95.
486. The last of these factors is expressly articulated by Professor McCord, and sev-
eral of the other factors follow logically from his explanation of "necessity." See id. at
95-98. The remaining factors were not suggested by Professor McCord because they
follow from an understanding of the cathartic function and the moral and social psycho-
logical bases for the law of criminal evidence, matters not considered in his article.
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tem. 48 7 There are at least three primary political values connected
with the jury's role that can be promoted by carefully crafting rules
of evidence: (1) operational accuracy, (2) the independence of the
trier of fact from governmental control, and (3) fairness between the
parties. The need to serve these political values should be an in-
tegral part of the "necessity" determination under a relevancy
approach.
The first of these values-"operational accuracy"-is rooted in
the following assumption: rarely, if ever, can we verify in some ob-
jective fashion what the "truth" is in a specific case and, therefore,
whether we have achieved an "accurate" result.4 9 Because we can-
not determine whether a judgment is indeed accurate, the best we
can do is maximize the likelihood of an accurate result by improving
the trier's ability to apply its own general knowledge and experience
to an individual case.490 To do so, the fact-finder must have broad
access to relevant information. Operational accuracy can be
achieved, therefore, by adopting procedures and evidentiary rules
that will enhance the trier's function by increasing the quantity and
quality of "foundation facts"-those facts that better enable the
trier to judge the trustworthiness of other evidence.491
Professor Swift advocates achieving operational accuracy
through modification of the hearsay rules. Instead of general rules
that prejudge the accuracy of certain classes of hearsay evidence in
most cases, she argues for rules designed to promote the availability
to the jury of adequate information regarding the foundation
facts.492 This would enable the jury to determine a hearsay declar-
ant's opportunity to observe, remember, tell the truth, and commu-
nicate the testimony effectively.
487. See ALExiS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 127 (Richard D. Heffner
ed., Mentor Paperback 1956) (1835) ("The jury is, above all, a political institution, and it
must be regarded in this light in order to be duly appreciated."); JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES
AND POLITICS 20 (1992) ("Trials are more than fact-finding exercises; they entail con-
flicts of values, interests, and ideologies. The jury, from this perspective, is an inher-
ently political institution.").
488. See Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1339,
1342-43 (1987). Professor Swift, who first identified the notion of "operational accu-
racy," describes it as a value related to the "political role of the factfinder," id. at 1367,
but does not expressly describe all the remaining values as inherently "political" ones;
that is nevertheless what they are. See supra note 487 and accompanying text (defining
"political").
489. See Swift, supra note 488, at 1342.
490. See id. at 1362-63.
491. See id. at 1355-56, 1361-67.
492. Id. at 1361-67.
1993]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Professor Swift wrote of the value of promoting operational ac-
curacy in the fact-finder generally.49 3 That value, however, is even
greater when the fact-finder is a jury rather than a judge. Human
experience, not legal training, is the most necessary training in mak-
ing the credibility judgments required in trials.494 Moreover, a
group ofjurors is more likely collectively to remember the details of
testimony, and a pooling of opinions in a collaborative decision-
making process provides a way to test ideas and distinguish sense
from nonsense.4 95 Perhaps most importantly, the lack of an objec-
tive truth and the often-vague legal standards applicable to the facts
inevitably require a fact-finder to bring values to bear in resolving
complex questions of fact.496 Jurors as a group offer a wider wealth
of experience than an individual judge, and it is the jury who best
represents community values.497 This is especially important in
criminal cases where the mens rea requirement ultimately impels ju-
rors to determine moral culpability.498 Thus, in criminal cases the
value of "operational accuracy" deserves special weight.
A second political value promoted through the rules of evi-
dence is the independence of the trier of fact from government con-
trol. General governmental rules applicable to trials are based on a
host of considerations, many of them bureaucratic ones, that are un-
connected with an individualized assessment of the case before the
fact-finder.49 9 The independence of the jury from this government
control promotes more individualized justice and is an important
political value engendered in the role of the jury.
493. Id. at 1361-62.
494. See LEVINE, supra note 487, at 182. Professor Swift makes a similar point but is
more willing to trust the judge's as well as the jury's "distillation of experience." Swift,
supra note 488, at 1362-63.
495. LEVINE, supra note 487, at 182.
496. See id. at 11-17 (noting sources of jury discretion); see also HARRY KALVEN, JR. &
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 165 (1966) (describing the "liberation hypothesis":
"The closeness of the evidence makes it possible for the jury to respond to sentiment by
liberating it from the discipline of the evidence").
497. See LEVINE, supra note 487, at 17 ("[Tlhe jury to a considerable extent mirrors
popular values and sentiments .... [Ilt is a means for the expression of majoritarian
sentiment."). See also Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), in whichJustice Blackmun
concisely expressed this idea in addressing whether the size of criminal juries may be
smaller than six members:
Because juries frequently face complex problems laden with value choices, the
benefits [of the larger group] are important and should be retained. In particu-
lar the counterbalancing of various biases is critical to the accurate application
of the common sense of the community to the facts of any given case.
Id. at 233-34.
498. LEVINE, supra note 487, at 12, 82.
499. Swift, supra note 488, at 1363.
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Independence of the jury is furthered by the concept of nonac-
countable decision making and the use of general, nonprecedential
knowledge. 500 Nonaccountability furthers independence because it
permits the fact-finder to function efficiently without accounting for
how its inferences were made, thus preventing judicial review of the
generalizations applied by the jury.50 ' Such review would engender
disagreement about those generalizations and create a risk that
judges would substitute their own generalizations for the jury's.502
Uncertainties about judicial second-guessing would also undermine
the willingness of juries to engage in independent behavior.50 3
"Nonprecedential generalizations" are based on general knowl-
edge from jurors' experience,50 4 rather than on prior similar cases.
They allow for jury independence and promote individualized jus-
tice in ways that prior, judge-imposed generalizations cannot. This
is because the latter must give great weight to government interests
or other established policies beyond the specific case. 50 5 Because
juries take into account only their own limited knowledge of the
wider impact of legal rules, they are more likely than a judge to fo-
cus only on what is before them-to individualize the trial. 50 6 As
discussed throughout this Article, however, there are strong forces
at work in criminal cases-specifically, limited resources, stereo-
types, and social myths-that promote bureaucratic decision making
by both judges and juries. Nonetheless, the logic and underlying
moral assumptions of the substantive criminal law demand individu-
alized justice.50 7 To the extent expert character evidence aids in
protecting a jury's independence, the two forces of nonaccountable
decision making and nonprecedential generalization will act to-
gether to promote individualized justice. This is a clear justification
for admitting expert psychological character evidence.
500. Id. at 1367. Nonaccountability is the idea that the jury is not required to account
for, and is generally not negatively affected by, its reliance on particular sources of
knowledge or its evaluation of credibility. Id.
501. Id. at 1367-68.




506. Professor Swift argues, to the contrary, that it makes "no difference" to this anal-
ysis whether the judge or jury is the fact-finder, for ajudge in a bench trial is expected to
act as a lay fact-finder. Id. at 1369. Relative to ajury, however, it is unlikely that a judge
can ignore the impact of her decisions on the wider legal system-even if the resulting
effect on her decisions is a subconscious one-for systemic considerations are part of
her daily training and experience.
507. See supra notes 56-118 and accompanying text.
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The third value-achieving fairness through trial-access to
proof-is important for several reasons. Fairness between the par-
ties legitimizes trial outcomes in an adversary system.5 8 Addition-
ally, "[t]he proponents' fairness claim is to be allowed to perform
their trial function-proving their own cases and enforcing the sub-
stantive law, with the freedom to use the widest range of accessible
evidence. The opponents' fairness claim is to have access to the
proponent's sources of proof at trial."' 5 9 These fairness concerns
are greatest in criminal trials, where so much is at stake and where
moral opprobrium attaches to a conviction. In the specific case of
expert character evidence, encouraging the fullest possible presen-
tation of evidence by the proponent, and the fullest availability to
the opponent of the proponent's sources of proof, is especially criti-
cal. The parties have a need to leave the trial feeling that they had a
real opportunity to present an individualized picture of what hap-
pened, and to be judged by a jury fully informed of the defendant's
character and particular circumstances.5 10 This cathartic function51 '
is thus best served by increasing the availability of character infor-
mation to the jury.
An approach to crafting relevant evidentiary rules that requires
the proponent to come forth with as much information as is reason-
ably possible regarding the value of the psychological character evi-
dence to be presented is, therefore, preferred over one that errs on
the side of categorically excluding much of the expert character evi-
dence. This approach also suggests that fair disclosure between the
parties, preferably pretrial, 512 is required if the exploration of the
value of psychological character evidence at trial is to be meaning-
ful. This will also serve the related notion that adequate disclosure
in and of itself is an aspect of fairness.5 l3
In short, each of these political values suggests that the eviden-
tiary analysis used to determine the admissibility of expert psycho-
logical character evidence should promote the availability of such
evidence, both in quantity and quality. In addition, information rel-
evant to estimating the value of the testimony must be available to a
jury. The need to serve these political values must be given special
weight in the balancing of probative value against countervailing
508. See Swift, supra note 488, at 1369.
509. Id. at 1369-70.
510. See supra notes 56-118 and accompanying text.
511. See supra text accompanying notes 331-345 (defining the "cathartic function").
512. See infra text accompanying notes 642-648.
513. Swift, supra note 488, at 1374.
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considerations required by a relevancy analysis of expert character
evidence.
b. Suppositional Science, Plausible Alternatives, and Stoytelling.-
i. Suppositional Science as a Way of Suggesting Plausible Alternatives
to Normal.-Professor David Faigman argues that "suppositional sci-
ence"-scientific theory based on untested or inadequately tested
empirical data5 '4-should never be admitted for consideration by a
jury. He also argues, conversely, that suppositional science should
often be used by legislators and judges in crafting legal rules.51 5 He
points out that judges often use data that is not falsifiable, such as
historical data, in creating law; to interpret the data, however, courts
can choose among disputed theories based upon which one best fits
all the available data and thus has more persuasive force. 51 6 Profes-
sor Faigman further argues that when theories are subject to legiti-
mate dispute, lawmakers should give the underlying hypotheses due
consideration because they can provide helpful insights that
lawmakers might otherwise miss, and because they are at least as
valid as a lawmaker's best guess.5 1 7 While values may also come
into play in choosing among competing but inadequately proven
theories, Professor Faigman believes this is appropriate, because
making choices among competing values is part of a lawmaker's
job.51 Finally, while there is a danger that lawmakers will misun-
derstand and thus misuse suppositional science, Professor Faigman
argues that any such prejudice can be cured by educating them
about its strengths, weaknesses, and limitations.5 19
514. Faigman, Social Science and Policy, supra note 407, at 1052. Professor Faigman
states, specifically, that suppositional science refers to findings that "on their face are
untestable or have not been tested in any fashion whatsoever; and.. . those that assume
the veneer of science (i.e., are forwarded as fully tested propositions) but have yet to be
tested adequately." This is a description that fits much clinical psychological testimony.
See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 430 (acknowledging the particular imprecision
of assessing the "range of variables influencing human behavior").
515. Faigman, Social Science and Policy, supra note 407, at 1078-79 ("[L]awmakers
should have the benefit of a variety of views, both objectively scientific as well as subjec-
tively persistent. The juror's role, in contrast, is limited strictly to that of applying the
law to the facts as they are determined to exist.").
516. Id. at 1069; see also infra notes 547-574 and accompanying text.
517. Faigman, Social Science and Policy, supra note 407, at 1070.
518. Thus Professor Faigman warns that while the suppositional scientist's own value
judgments are entitled to "respect," the ultimate weight of those values is for the
lawmaker, who must make an "independent legal judgment of the force of these values."
Id. at 1070-71.
519. Id. at 1071.
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Rephrased, Faigman suggests that suppositional science has
value to lawmakers because it suggests plausible alternatives that
might not otherwise be considered. Properly presented, it also edu-
cates them effectively in a way that better enables them to bring
their values to bear on an uncertain world, to make the best choice
among competing alternatives. But expert character evidence, some
of which is indeed "suppositional science," can play a similar role
for the jury.521 Such evidence suggests plausible alternative inter-
pretations to the "normal" ones that are likely to occur to the jury,
and provides jurors with information that better enables them to
choose among competing alternatives.52' It is true that jurors' val-
ues will come into play, but a true understanding of the role of the
jury must acknowledge that when jurors have any discretion-and
discretion is greatest in cases with conflicting evidence-their values
will inevitably affect their decisions. 522 Judges sitting as fact-finders
will likewise bring their values to bear in interpreting ambiguous
facts, yet a jury's verdict is more likely to reflect fairly the commu-
nity's values rather than those of an individual judge.52 ' Admit-
tedly, some values that we do not deem appropriate for juries to
consider-values based on prejudices, stereotypes, and myths-may
lead to the misuse of expert character evidence, but as with
lawmakers, jurors can be effectively educated to reduce the likeli-
hood of such misuse.524 Indeed, one major purpose of expert char-
acter evidence in the first place is to prevent juror misuse of
discredited "quasi-evidence," using educational character evidence
to overcome pre-existing biases that endanger individualized
justice. 5 25
Professor Faigman also unfortunately casts his net too widely-
seeking to apply his approach to civil and criminal cases alike-and
ignores the special functions unrelated to truth-seeking that rules of
evidence can sometimes serve, especially in the criminal context. As
noted throughout this Article, expert character evidence can serve a
"cathartic function," rooted in the moral dictates of the criminal law
and in moral psychology, and can serve certain political values other
520. See supra text accompanying notes 485-513; infra text accompanying notes 535-
563.
521. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 485 (noting that clinical testimony on
mens rea provides a plausible alternative to "normal" assumptions about conscious
motivation).
522. See supra text accompanying notes 487-513.
523. See supra text accompanying notes 493-498.
524. See infra text accompanying notes 616-647.
525. See supra text accompanying notes 11-94.
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than truth-seeking.526 Moreover, even when expert character evi-
dence is based on "suppositional science," as long as the alterna-
tives suggested by the evidence are plausible, truth-seeking is
promoted when the testimony helps to overcome preconceptions
that might otherwise prevent a fair consideration of all plausible in-
terpretations of the evidence. When there is a strong need for evi-
dence and little danger of "overawing" '527 the jury-and when fears
of prejudice can be adequately addressed by jury education-there
is little justification for flatly excluding even suppositional science
from the jury's decision-making process.
Professor Faigman considers most clinical decision making to
be suppositional science.528 Much expert character evidence, it
should be recalled, involves classifying a defendant as a member of a
group whose members are more likely than nonmembers to engage
in certain thoughts or behaviors. The classification process is ac-
complished by the kind of clinical decision making that Professor
Faigman abhors. While Professor Faigman would admit valid-that
is, nonsuppositional-data regarding group behavior, he would
generally exclude the mental health professional's opinion that a de-
fendant is indeed a member of that group.529 He would also allow
the clinician to testify about actual observations of a defendant's be-
havior.53 0 Professor Faigman asserts, however, that no evidence
supports the idea that clinicians are any better than laypeople at
classifying particular individuals, so we should let the jury decide for
itself.5 3 1
Assuming that Professor Faigman is correct about the absence
of proof regarding the special abilities of clinicians, his argument is
flawed for several reasons. First, studies strongly suggest that ab-
stract, general testimony that is not linked to the defendant will
526. See supra text accompanying notes 94-108, 486-512.
527. See supra text accompanying notes 293-309.
528. See Faigman, Social Science and Policy, supra note 407, at 1072-78.
529. Id. at 1076.
530. In so allowing, Professor Faigman is apparently accepting Professor Morse's ar-
gument that clinicians are better observers than lay people because relevant data collec-
tion of this sort is what clinicians do every day. Id. at 1076 n.265; see Richard Morse,
Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV.
527, 601, 611 (1978) (acknowledging the role of hard scientific data and observations of
behavior in the clinician's assessment of whether a defendant is crazy, but arguing that
such a clinical diagnosis fails to convey accurate and specific information about the de-
fendant's behavior).
531. See Faigman, Social Science and Policy, supra note 407, at 1076 ("There is no reason
to believe that triers of fact, when provided with relevant studies, cannot assess the par-
ticular defendant's dangerousness as well as an expert.").
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barely be noticed by the jury; therefore, for evidence to have a sig-
nificant impact on jury deliberation, testimony about group behav-
ior must be linked to the specific case.53 2 There is no reason to
exclude this if, as clearly may be supposed, clinicians are no worse at
this task than are laypeople. Second, Professor Morse, upon whom
Professor Faigman in part relies, concedes that descriptions of "rea-
soning and control processes, 5 5 33 which apparently include such
character traits as "impulsiveness" and "suspiciousness,- 534 can be
among the "observations" that mental health professionals are bet-
ter able to make than laypersons. Third, mental health profession-
als and their theories can help to organize data in ways that offer
jurors new insights that they might not draw on their own. This last
point can best be understood by exploring the conception of how
jurors reason that is embodied in "storytelling theory."
Ii. Storytelling Theoty.-"Storytelling theory," which is sup-
ported by a significant body of empirical data s53 holds that juries
deliberate by constructing stories based on the evidence presented
to them at trial.53 6 Walter Fisher's theory of narrative rationality is
the most useful version of storytelling theory for present pur-
poses.53 7 Drawing from Fisher, Professors Rieke and Stutman main-
tain that the story of a case must be told in such a way as to satisfy a
jury's need for "narrative coherence" and "narrative fidelity. 53
"Narrative coherence" concerns whether the story "hangs to-
gether," a question that is assessed by whether the story has argu-
mentative or structural coherence; material coherence, which
involves comparing and contrasting with other stories with which
the jurors are familiar, in a search for problems, counter-arguments,
and missed issues; and characterological coherence, which ad-
dresses "the central feature of all stories, character. ' 539 A jury is
532. See sources cited supra note 328.
533. Morse, supra note 530, at 616.
534. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 455 (interpreting Professor Morse's article).
535. See SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON JURY COMPREHENSION, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION,
JURY COMPREHENSION IN COMPLEX CASES app. 10, at 18-19 (Dec. 1989) (hereinafter
ABA, JURY COMPREHENSION) (citing authorities).
536. See id. For an interesting explanation of how storytelling shapes our memories
and is intricately tied up with how we reason, see generally ROGER C. SCHANK, TELL ME A
STORY: A NEW LOOK AT REAL AND ARTIFICIAL MEMORY (1990).
537. See generally WALTER R. FISHER, HUMAN COMMUNICATION AS NARRATION: TOWARD
A PHILOSOPHY OF REASON, VALUE, AND ACTION (1987).
538. RICHARD D. RIEKE & RANDALL K. STUTMAN, COMMUNICATION IN LEGAL ADVOCACY
94-95 (1990). The authors also effectively summarize some of the leading alternative
storytelling theories. See id. at 98-102.
539. Id. at 94.
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most likely to doubt character if a person's actional tendencies are
contradictory or change significantly from one point of the story to
another.54 °
"Narrative fidelity" is demonstrated through the logic of "good
reasons." 54 I Good reasons are the means by which jurors decide if
the story of a case is accurate, in terms of conformity to the jurors'
sense of reality. Good reasons fuse logic and values. Thus, narra-
tive fidelity may involve: (1) whether relevant facts have been omit-
ted or distorted, and the nature of the values implied by the facts in
a case, (2) whether the connections of facts to conclusions are rea-
sonable, and whether jurors can accept that purported rationality
without violating their own sense of self, (3) whether the reasoning
implied in connecting facts to conclusions is all that should be con-
sidered in a case, and whether the values implied are confirmed by
the jurors' own experience, and (4) whether the story addresses the
"real" issues in the case, and whether the values involved constitute
the ideal basis for human conduct.542
An example offered by Professors Bonnie and Slobogin in a dif-
ferent context illustrates the application of these principles to
expert character evidence.543 Ms. B was charged with knowingly
possessing nine stolen welfare checks. The prosecution's undis-
puted evidence showed that six checks, made out to different pay-
ees, were given to Ms. B by her boyfriend's good friend, Scott. Ms.
B deposited the checks, which supposedly had been endorsed to
Scott, into her account. One check was returned unpaid and her
account charged accordingly, but Scott made good her loss. He
subsequently deposited three more checks. The prosecution's the-
ory is that Ms. B "must have known" that the checks were stolen, but
Ms. B testified that she did not in fact believe that the checks were
stolen; she believed Scott's story that the checks had been given to
him in payment for a debt, and he needed her assistance because he
had no bank account of his own.
Standing alone, this evidence would probably lead ajury to re-
ject Ms. B's story and convict her as charged. Her story lacks narra-
tive coherence because it is inconsistent with jurors' preexisting
540. Id.
541. See FISHER, supra note 537, at 105-10; see also RIEKE & STUTMAN, supra note 538, at
95.
542. See FISHER, supra note 537, at 108; RIEKE & STUTMAN, supra note 538, at 95.
543. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 477-79. The example is embellished a
bit for clarity, and, more importantly, the example is analyzed using the framework of
storytelling theory, a framework not used by Professors Bonnie and Slobogin.
1993]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
stories drawn from their own experiences. It seems implausible that
Ms. B would believe Scott when one of his checks previously
bounced, all the checks were made out to different payees, and he
claimed that he lacked his own bank account. In the stories that
jurors hear and experience, honest people do not behave like Scott.
Narrative fidelity is also weak because facts are clearly missing;
surely there must have been conversations between Ms. B and her
boyfriend about Scott's request that should have been brought to
light. Moreover, most jurors will assume that Scott is dishonest, and
associating with such people violates fundamental social values
favoring honest behavior. That Ms. B is the kind of person who
would associate with Scott suggests that Ms. B is also dishonest, a
defect of character, thus reflecting back on narrative coherence. Ms.
B is, therefore, not someone to be believed.
An expert character witness-a psychiatrist-might testify, how-
ever, that Ms. B's personality is characterized by an unusually high
degree of passivity and dependency. These conclusions would be
supported by the psychiatrist by recounting relevant portions of Ms.
B's life history, interviews, tests, and other data collected during her
evaluation. Because Ms. B is dependent on others to satisfy her
emotional needs, the psychiatrist would opine, she is compliant and
generally avoids conflicts that threaten the stability of her emotional
attachments. Consequently, in situations like this one, her depen-
dence on her boyfriend and desire to please him would likely lead
her to want to please her boyfriend's good friend, Scott. As is char-
acteristic of those with her personality traits, Ms. B would rely on
denial and repression to keep out of her consciousness any anxiety-
provoking thoughts that might threaten her emotional connection
to her boyfriend. Thus, doubts about Scott's honesty and, by impli-
cation, about her boyfriend's character, would be repressed. Her
unusual gullibility in situations of this kind would therefore explain
her behavior.544
544. Professors Bonnie and Slobogin say in a footnote that they are "not sanguine"
about the admissibility of expert character testimony. Id. at 481-82 n. 162. They cannot
literally mean what they say because much of their article is devoted to the contrary
proposition: defending the admissibility of much testimony that meets this Article's def-
inition of "expert character testimony" (for example, they defend use of expert testi-
mony regarding the personality of Ms. B. See id. at 477-79.). Consequently, although
their discussion on this point is unclear, they seem instead to be suggesting two things.
First, general testimony about a defendant's "character" that is not related to the rele-
vant events at the time of the crime-i.e., that is unrelated to the "situation"-is un-
helpful. Second, expert opinions must address what the defendant's mental state was,
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The psychiatrist's testimony seeks to improve the narrative co-
herence and narrative fidelity of the defendant's testimony. Narra-
tive coherence is improved by suggesting an alternative story line
that may make sense when placed in light of the defendant's life
experiences: she did what she did because her life story molded her
into someone especially eager to please and to believe in those she
loved. Although her reaction may seem extreme, jurors' own stories
likely include actions motivated by the desire to help those close to
them and the refusal to believe bad things about such people.
Moreover, Ms. B can then be seen not as dishonest but rather as a
sad dupe of her loved ones, and those associated with her loved
ones, who have taken advantage of her.
Narrative fidelity is also improved by adding this type of infor-
mation. The jury need not wonder whether there are missing facts,
such as conversations between Ms. B and her boyfriend, for the jury
is presented with other facts to fill the gap: facts regarding the ex-
periences, feelings, and motivations of Ms. B that help to explain
her behavior in a way that does not require the jury to condone dis-
honesty. While extraordinary gullibility may not be a trait to be ad-
mired, it is one that, unlike dishonesty, is more likely to evoke
compassion and a greater willingness of the jury to judge her not by
a "normal" standard of gullibility but rather as the abnormally gulli-
ble person that she is. Without the psychiatrist's evaluation, how-
ever, it is unlikely that the jury would give Ms. B's full story even
passing consideration.
While storytelling theory, and the notion of "plausible alterna-
tives to normal," thus help to illustrate the value of even "supposi-
tional science," one more matter must be considered to craft a
complete response to Professor Faigman's assault on the use of
clinical testimony. That matter is this: Professor Faigman's position
turns on the assumption that only "science" can be of value in the
courtroom.545 But even accepting his characterization of clinical
not merely what kind of person he was, to ensure that we try "the case and not the
man." See id. at 482 n.162 (quoting Thompson v. Church, 1 Root 312 (Conn. 1791)).
As to the first point, they are clearly correct. This Article has repeatedly empha-
sized the importance of the relationship between the person and her situation. As to the
second point, however, they are mistaken. Expert character testimony is best under-
stood as the use of knowledge of the interaction between personality and particular situ-
ations to estimate the probabilities that a defendant had a necessary mental state, not to
opine what that mental state actually was. Claiming more of such testimony would mis-
lead a jury about the testimony's value.
545. Faigman's criterion for scientific knowledge requires repeated attempts to deter-
mine the "falsifiability" of testable statements. Faigman, Social Science and Policy, supra
note 407, at 1014-15.
1993]
98 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 52:1
testimony as "non-science"-as mere "art" 546 -he is wrong, for
there is great need for "art" in the courtroom, and juries are well
equipped, when properly educated, to judge the quality of art as
well as science.
c. Art versus Science.-
i. Why Art is Helpful.-The assault by a portion of the academic
community on the forensic use of clinical judgment reflects what
Professor Donald Sch6n has criticized as the single-minded empha-
sis of professional education on the "science" rather than the "art"
of professionalism.547 Professor Schon bemoans this emphasis be-
cause he believes that artistry has much to offer that science cannot.
Science, Professor Schon argues, reasons from standardized,
general principles to the particular case." 4 Selective inattention is
therefore paid to that which does not fit within the general rules.5 4 9
Art, on the other hand, recognizes that much of what we know,
we know implicitly from the way in which we solve individual
problems; useful knowledge need not, therefore, be limited to ap-
plying general principles governing generalized situations.550 In-
deed, this implicit knowledge can be studied and used by the artist
to solve novel problems arising in individual cases.55i Such studies
show us that professionals-as-artists thus approach each case-or
clinicians each patient-as a "universe of one";552 hypotheses are
articulated by the artist and tested for usefulness. What works is
what is chosen and followed, allowing for growth, change, consider-
546. See id. at 1085 (deriding Freudian psychologists as no better than would be "Dos-
toevskean psychologist(s]").
547. See SCH6N, supra note 8, at vii ("[Educational] institutions [are] committed, for
the most part, to a particular epistemology, a view of knowledge that fosters selective
inattention to practical competence and professional artistry.").
548. Id. at 21-24. Professor Sch6n describes the model that reveres science over art as
the model of "Technical Rationality," a phrase that connotes a cold, mechanical, nar-
rowly focused approach to problem solving. Such an approach seems to be the opposite
of what legal decision making should embody. See supra text accompanying notes 487-
513.
549. SCHON, supra note 8, at 44-45.
550. See id. at 140 ("Reflection-in-action in a unique case may be generalized to other
cases, not by giving rise to general principles, but by contributing to the practitioner's
repertoire of exemplary themes from which, in the subsequent cases of his practice, he
may compose new variations.").
551. See id. at 49, 68 (discussing "tacit knowing" and noting that one who reflects on
such knowledge is "not dependent on the categories of established theory and tech-
nique, but constructs a new theoy of the unique case" (emphasis added)).
552. See id. at 105-28 (chapter entitled, "Psychotherapy: The Patient as a Universe of
One.").
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ation of otherwise overlooked options, and increased effectiveness
in ways that a wholly scientific approach would not.553
The distaste of professional schools for the artistry that, in Pro-
fessor Sch6n's view, should be at the heart of their endeavor,55 4 car-
ries over to the rationalist critiques, like that of Professor Faigman,
which seek to impose the standards of science in the courtroom.
Despite its pretensions to the contrary,55 law is not a science but
rather deals with the need for relatively quick, practical decision
making in individual cases because judgments cannot be postponed
while awaiting scientific confirmation. 55 6 These decisions are made
in a value-laden world of uncertainty. Thus, verdicts, being a practi-
cal project, do not and should not seek solely "truth," in some abso-
lute, scientific sense of that term, but rather acceptability and
stability, given the constraints and varying goals facing the decision-
maker.557
Therefore, while science is not irrelevant-and, indeed, can do
much to inform the legal process when truth is one of the competing
goals-sometimes art can do in an acceptable fashion in the individ-
ual case what science cannot. This is especially true when there are
powerful concerns other than truth, such as the political, moral, and
cathartic goals of a criminal trial. 558 We may, therefore, turn to art,
in this instance, to clinical judgment with its uncertain scientific sup-
port, because the artistry serves cathartic goals or because, in our
search for truth, artistry is the best means available. Indeed, the
553. See id. at 128-67 (comparing the experimental method with the professional art-
ist's method, which latter method Sch6n describes as "reflection-in-action").
554. Id. at vii.
555. See id. at 28-29 (noting that despite law's "dubious basis in science," the domi-
nant case-method of teaching fits the professional view of law as a "science").
556. See Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of
Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521, 529-30 & n.26 (1986) ("[W]e ask juries to come to con-
clusions without insisting on or waiting for scientific demonstration.").
557. Id. at 521 ("An outcome is 'probable' if it best accomplishes a just and acceptable
resolution of the dispute. Probability, as a legal concept in the law of proof, suggests
wisdom, probity, and approbation-not favorable betting odds.").
558. SCH6N, supra note 8, at 50 ("It is [the] ... process of reflection-in-action which is
central to the 'art' by which practitioners sometimes deal well with situations of uncer-
tainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict."). Lest I be accused of inconsistency, I
must acknowledge that in an earlier article I argued precisely that the courts had failed
by ignoring the scientific bases of one particular type of evidence: dog-scenting evi-
dence. See Taslitz, supra note 270, at 19. However, prosecution use of dog-scenting
evidence to identify who committed a crime raises purely truth-based concerns-"Do we
have the right culprit?"-and does not raise the moral and process-based concerns in-
volved with expert character evidence. Moreover, I argue here that science does indeed
have an important role to play in analyzing expert character evidence, but not the sole
role in determining the question of admissibility.
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professional psychological literature recognizes both the limitations
and advantages of clinical artistry.559
Thus, the literature recommends a purely actuarial approach
when the outcome to be predicted is objective and specific, and in-
terest in the individual case is minimal.560 On the other hand,
clinical judgment is recommended when (1) information is needed
about areas or events for which no adequate tests are available, (2)
rare, unusual events of a highly individualized nature are to be pre-
dicted or judged, or (3) the clinical judgments involve instances for
which no statistical equations have been developed. 561 These are
precisely the situations likely to arise in criminal trials.
Even when actuarial formulae exist, their application may turn
on the accurate collection and categorization of data by a clinician.
Thus, certain characteristics of a subject may not be discoverable
without extensive interviewing by a clinician, again requiring a form
of clinical artistry.56 2
Furthermore, a case study is far more effective than a quantita-
tive approach at "delineating the particulars of persons and their
circumstances; conveying what individuals said, thought, felt, and
did; representing the subjective meanings of actions and events; and
developing content-specific or idiographic interpretations and ex-
planations of individual behavior.1 563 While behavior can be di-
rectly observed and recorded, subjective meanings cannot, but
rather must be inferred. The case study is the most effective means
for so doing and for effectively communicating those meanings to
others. Therefore, when mental state or subjective meaning, as op-
posed to proof of an act, is at issue in a criminal case, the case study
is likely to be the most effective way of exploring and communicat-
ing that issue.
ii. "Good" Art versus "Bad".-To say that the clinical arts can
and should play a role in legal decision making is not, however, to
say that there are no standards for distinguishing good art from bad
art. Indeed, some have argued that the distinction between art and
559. See infra notes 560-563 and accompanying text.
560. E.g., PHARES, supra note 420, at 269. An actuarial approach may also be advisable
when there are especially strong reasons to be concerned about human judgmental er-
ror, bias, fatigue, or boredom. Id.
561. Id.
562. See id. at 266; NURCOMBE & GALLAGHER, supra note 430, at 610 ("The clinician is
indispensable at the outset of the clinical process, when the world must be confronted;
clues elicited, sifted and validated; [and] inferences drawn.").
563. RuNYAN, supra note 442, at 244.
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science is itself misleading and that quantitative data and the rigid
falsificationist standards of the experimental method should not set
the boundaries for science.564 Thus Donald Campbell, long one of
the foremost proponents of the experimental method, has noted
that "the core of the scientific method is not experimentation per se,
but rather the strategy connoted by the phrase 'plausible rival hy-
potheses.' "565 This strategy, he continues, should include "a hu-
manistic validity-seeking case study methodology that, while making
no use of quantification or tests of significance, would still work on
the same questions and share the same goals of knowledge [as do
quantitative approaches]."566 Whether called art or science, there-
fore, there are ways of testing the value of intensive individual stud-
ies of a single case, which can and should be applied to gauging the
quality of a clinician's opinion and of a clinician's reliance on studies
that may not yet be fully experimentally validated.
What are these ways for distinguishing good and bad studies of
individuals?567 A case or clinical study56 has the advantage of rely-
ing upon multiple sources of data, such as interviews, observations,
psychological tests, and quantitative data, to draw conclusions. 569
An initial consideration, therefore, should be whether there has
been an adequate reference to all potentially useful sources of data
564. "Falsifiable standards" refers to the notion, most clearly articulated by Professor
Karl Popper and embraced as to the social sciences by Professor David Faigman, that the
most important hallmark of the scientific method is the ability to falsify propositions.
Theories that have survived controlled efforts at falsification are thus successful scientific
theories. See Faigman, Social Science and Policy, supra note 407, at 10 16-19. Social science
theories not yet subjected to adequate attempts at controlled falsification are, therefore,
merely "suppositional science." See id. at 1052.
565. Donald T. Campbell, Foreword to the Revised Edition of ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY
RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 7 (Applied Social Science Research Methods Series,
Vol. No. 5, rev. ed. 1989).
566. Id. at 8.
567. Strictly speaking, measuring how "good" a clinical opinion is, that is, how likely
it is to be accurate, is a reliability question. However, both the reliability and necessity
aspects of the "art versus science" controversy are better understood if considered to-
gether. It is for that reason, therefore, that both aspects are addressed here under the
single heading of "necessity."
568. The terminology is being used loosely here, for a "case" study refers to the pres-
entation of detailed information about an individual life; an "idiographic approach" re-
lies solely on datafrom the individual case; and "clinical judgment" and "statistical" or
"actuarial" judgment are ways of analyzing data, regardless of its source. See RUNYAN,
supra note 442, at 186. These distinctions are not key in this Article, for what matters is
that expert character testimony may, and usually does, include data both from the indi-
vidual case and, either explicitly or implicitly, from groups, and may analyze that data by
use of either clinical judgment or statistical methods or both. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 121-136, 406-457.
569. YIN, supra note 565, at 96.
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and whether those sources have been thoroughly explored, that is,
whether there is an adequate "data base."' 70 Database records
must carefully maintain a "chain of evidence" by identifying the
sources of the data, the evidence revealed by each source, the cir-
cumstances under which the evidence was obtained, and the consis-
tency of these circumstances with the question being studied.
57
'7
"Converging lines of inquiry" are then sought in an effort to find
corroboration of working hypotheses among the various data
sources.
5 7 2
There may be a variety of potential hypotheses that explain the
evidence generated. The pivotal step is to determine how a choice
can be made among these hypotheses. One author has suggested
the following general criteria for evaluating alternative hypotheses:
(1) their logical soundness, (2) their comprehensiveness in
accounting for a number of puzzling aspects of the event in
question, (3) their survival of tests of attempted falsifica-
tion, such as tests of derived predictions or retrodictions,
(4) their consistency with the full range of available rele-
vant evidence, (5) their support from above, or their con-
sistency with more general knowledge about human
functioning or about the person in question, and (6) their
credibility relative to other explanatory hypotheses.573
These or similar factors can be approached in a quasi-judicial fash-
ion, in which issues are clearly articulated, evidence is subjected to
critical examination by others, the sufficiency of available empirical
data both to support and to refute relevant claims is considered, and
a logical connection is demanded between a claim and the evidence
offered in support of it.574
The point is that standards do exist for judging "art" as well as
science, standards that can be articulated to, and understood by, a
jury. The strong need for art, therefore, is not to be feared but
rather to be embraced by the criminal justice system.
d. Availability of Less Objectionable Alternatives.-The need for ex-
pert character evidence cannot be fully understood without consid-
ering whether there are alternative types of evidence of similar or
570. See id. at 98-101 (noting that an adequate data base increases the reliability of the
case study).
571. Id. at 102-03.
572. Id. at 97.
573. RUNYAN, supra note 442, at 47.
574. See id. at 160-63.
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greater probative value that may present less danger of prejudice
while achieving the same results. 5 5 The most obvious alternatives
are evidence directed to insanity, diminished capacity, and more
traditional forms of character evidence.
Insanity5 76 and diminished capacity577 can profitably be consid-
ered together because they share some common characteristics.
Both require the jury to engage in the difficult, uncertain, and con-
fusing inquiry of whether the defendant suffered from a "mental
disease or defect. 5 78  Character evidence may involve such testi-
mony, but may also involve testimony regarding relatively "healthy"
persons.5 79 In any event, when expert character evidence is admit-
ted, the health or illness of the accused is not necessarily of concern
to a jury.58
Insanity and diminished capacity, unlike expert character testi-
mony, require psychologists to opine on an accused's capacity to
form the necessary mental state. 58s This is especially problematic
575. See McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 96, 98 (illustrating this point through an
example of potentially different evidence that could be presented during a child sexual
abuse case).
576. The classic test for insanity is the M'Naghten rule, which states that a defendant
cannot be convicted if, at the time the act was committed, the defendant was laboring
under such a defect of reason from a disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality
of the act or that the act was wrong. M'Naghten Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). See also
DRESSLER, supra note 4, § 25.04[C][1][a] at 299. Some jurisdictions will also find a de-
fendant insane if she acted under an "irresistible impulse." Id. at 301. See, e.g., State v.
Hartley, 565 P.2d 658, 660 (N.M. 1978) (expanding the M'Naghten rule to provide that
"if by reason of disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of ... his will which
would enable him to prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found
guilty"); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 70 S.E.2d 284, 292 (Va. 1952) (recognizing that
the irresistible impulse doctrine is applicable when a defendant's "mind has become so
impaired by disease that he is totally deprived of the mental power to control or restrain
his act").
577. "Diminished capacity," unlike insanity, requires proof that a defendant lacked
the mental capacity necessary to commit the crime. Some jurisdictions extend the de-
fense to all crimes, but most limit the defense to either some or all specific intent crimes.
See DRESSLER, supra note 4, § 26.02[B][1].
578. See PETER W. Low ET AL., THE TRIAL OFJOHN W. HINCKLEY,JR.: A CASE STUDY IN
THE INSANITY DEFENSE 20 (1986) (explaining that the insanity defense requires proof of a
mental disease or defect); Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 474 (noting a similar
requirement for the diminished capacity defense).
579. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 479; supra text accompanying notes 543-
545 (illustrating this through the case of Ms. B).
580. See Low ET AL., supra note 578 (generally tracing the confusion over disease diag-
nosis in the trial of John Hinckley, Jr.).
581. Both the insanity and diminished capacity defenses may require an inquiry into
"capacity." DRESSLER, supra note 4, § 25.04[3][a], § 26.02[3] & n. 10. Some versions of
the insanity defense, however, require merely that the defendant lacked "substantial ca-
pacity," instead of lacking any capacity. Low ET AL., supra note 578, at 18-20. Even in
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for diminished capacity because "[o]nly in connection with the con-
cepts of 'deliberation' and 'premeditation' is it clinically conceivable
that a legally sane defendant would nonetheless lack the mental ca-
pacity to perform the requisite cognitive functions. '"582 Addition-
ally, insanity is rarely used and more rarely successful, partly
because it requires proof of things unlikely to happen or extraordi-
narily difficult to prove. 5 3
Character testimony, on the other hand, involves the expert in a
more realistic and more broadly useful universe of probabilities,
through an inquiry into tendencies and predispositions instead of
absolutes. Such testimony probes into the area of probable
thoughts and behavior, not the nebulous doctrine of insanity, in
which law and morality overtly blend, where truly bizarre thinking is
standard fare, and where a defendant's actual state of mind, not her
likely one, is the subject of the testimony.584
More traditional forms of character evidence-specifically, rep-
utation, lay opinion, and prior good and bad acts-while not suffer-
ing from the same flaws as insanity and diminished capacity-suffer
from other defects that make them less effective than expert charac-
ter testimony. Reputation, for example, more properly concerns the
"shadow" a person casts on the community rather than the actual
character of the person, two sharply different notions. 585 Testimony
as to reputation is typically "bloodless, ritualistic and a bit dull. ' '586
There is, therefore, little assurance that reputation is based on trust-
worthy data reflecting an individual's true character and little op-
portunity to test the bases for reputation effectively.587 For
example, an inquiry into what particular informants told a reputa-
such situations, however, character evidence offers the advantage of not requiring a jury
to distinguish between different degrees of capacity impairment.
582. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 35, at 474-75. But see DRESSLER, supra note 4,
§ 25.04[2][b] (arguing that in practice, courts require something less than complete in-
capacity for the diminished capacity defense).
583. See DRESSLER, supra note 4, § 25.04[2][a].
584. See DAVID L. BAZELON, QUESIONING AUTHORITY 63 (1987) (noting that the in-
sanity defense involves the jury in a primarily moral inquiry); Low ET AL., supra note 578,
at 22-84 (summarizing testimony given at John Hinckley's trial, noting his bizarre
thoughts and discussing his actual state of mind at the time of the crime).
585. "Character is like a tree and reputation like its shadow. The shadow is what we
think of, the tree is the real thing." THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 40 (David S. Shrager &
Elizabeth Frost eds., 1986) (quoting Abraham Lincoln).
586. RICHARD LEMPERT & STEPHEN SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE:
TEXT, PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES 239 (2d ed. 1983).
587. See Davies, supra note 360, at 523 (explaining that there is no guarantee that a
witness will recite hearsay character assessments from observers who were well ac-
quainted with the subject and that no method exists to test a reputation witness's
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tion witness is often excluded under the hearsay rule. s88 This is so
even though "reputation" is merely the sum of individual infor-
mants' opinions. Furthermore, the sources of the gossip are un-
available for cross-examination to test the bases for their views of
the defendant. Finally, even if particular out-of-court statements
were admissible, community gossip is not, likely to connect a per-
son's traits to the particular situations that evoke the traits at issue in
the way that expert character evidence can.
On the other hand, lay opinion-the ."warm affectionate testi-
mony" of friends, neighbors, co-workers, and family-might be of
greater impact and perhaps of greater probative value than reputa-
tion. 589 But lay opinion suffers from the defects of potential bias
and the difficulty of a layperson's articulating in any precise, specific
fashion data to support his favorable opinion of the accused. 590 A
jury will be left with anecdotes and conclusions, rather than useful
information, and will likely rest its judgment primarily on the wit-
ness's demeanor.
This criticism should not be overstated, of course, for some
have concluded that laypersons are often effective judges of charac-
ter. This is particularly true when a defendant is well known to the
laypersons and they have had an opportunity to observe the defend-
ant across a wide range of situations. 59' Nevertheless, generalized
sources of information because impeaching the witness by an inquiry into what particu-
lar informants stated would violate the hearsay rule).
588. Id. Although Federal Rule of Evidence 803(21) creates an exception to the hear-
say rule for "reputation of a person's character among associates or in the community,"
that exception is often construed as overcoming the hearsay objection for reputation as
a summary of the out-of-court statements of many others in the community, not as an
exception for individual out-of-court statements. See JOHN C. O'BRIEN & ROGER L.
GOLDMAN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL TRIAL EVIDENCE 198, 422 (1989). See also United States v.
Webster, 649 F.2d 346 (1981) (stating that reputation evidence may be given only by a
person familiar with the defendant's reputation and competent to speak for the
community).
589. Put any one of us on trial for a false charge, and ask him whether he would
not rather invoke in his vindication, as Lord Kenyon said, "the warm, affection-
ate testimony" of those few whose long intimacy and trust have made them
ready to demonstrate their faith to the jury, than any amount of colorful asser-
tions about reputation.
7 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1986, at 243 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
590. See infra text accompanying notes 617-640.
591. See Davies, supra note 360, at 522 ("One study shows that it takes 1,440 direct
measurements of behavior, made over a period of eight weeks, to predict the average
behavior of a subject as reliably as the personality judgments of three knowledgeable
informants.").
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trait descriptions59 2 are still of much less value than descriptions
that refer to specific situations in which a person has demonstrated
the trait in the past.59 Indeed, this latter point is particularly im-
portant because much of the effectiveness of predicting behavior in
everyday life is due more to the situational component than to
knowledge of the "character" component of people's lives; thus,
professors can be expected to be professorial, dictators dictatorial
and servants servile, because that is what their roles demand. 594 An
expert will be more aware of the respective contributions of traits
and situations and hence of the value of the data upon which to base
an opinion in the case before the jury.
A third form of traditional character evidence-specific in-
stances of prior conduct-may also be used to prove state of mind,
but not to prove the criminal act. 595 Yet, a specific act may not be
representative of a defendant's normal character or way of function-
ing. 596 Jurors are nevertheless likely to treat a single act as demon-
strating what an actor ordinarily does.5 97 Of course, when there are
a larger number of specific acts-a wider sample of behavior
brought to the jury's attention-and when those acts are quite simi-
lar to the one with which the defendant is charged, the probative
value of prior acts is increased. 598 Even then, however, the impact
592. Generalized trait descriptors are the kind most in accord with the common
speech of laypersons. For example, most would say "John is a peaceful person," rather
than "John is peaceful in classes and the school lunchroom."
593. Davies, supra note 360, at 521-23.
594. Ross & NISBETr, supra note 365, at 150.
595. See FED. R. EviD. 404(b) (barring admissibility of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to
prove character to show action in conformity therewith, but admitting such acts for
"other purposes," such as proof of intent). Rule 405 also permits proof of specific in-
stances of conduct in cases when "character or a trait of character of a person is an
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense," FED. R. EvID. 405(b), but such a use of
character is entered as direct, not circumstantial, evidence. FED. R. EvID. 405 advisory
committee's note. Inquiry into specific instances of conduct is also permitted for im-
peachment purposes when cross-examining a reputation or opinion witness as to a de-
fendant's character. FED. R. EvID. 405(a). See also FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (permitting,
under certain circumstances, testimony concerning specific acts, but only if offered to
prove the character of a witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness).
596. See Mendez, supra note 153, at 1046-50 (explaining the tendency of people, when
predicting behavior, to generalize from one act).
597. Id. at 1048.
598. See Davies, supra note 360, at 519-20, 535-36 (recommending removal of the cur-
rent per se restriction on the prosecution's first use of prior bad acts to show conduct
and its replacement with a balancing test based on the specificity of the subject's prior
conduct, the similarity between that conduct and its surrounding circumstances to the
conduct in question, the number of provable instances of prior similar conduct, the pe-
riod over which the prior conduct occurred, and whether the conduct was inherently
likely to be repeated).
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on the jury may be inappropriate because of the "halo effect," the
tendency of people to judge others on the basis of one outstanding
"good" or "bad" quality.599 This effect may tempt jurors to judge a
defendant based on their generalized perceptions of her rather than
on the evidence as to her actions or thoughts on the occasion in
question. 00 This may be true even when the perception is based on
a single prior act or a small number of acts.
Psychological character testimony may also result in the revela-
tion of certain prior acts. Those acts, however, will not be viewed in
isolation. Unlike specific instances of prior conduct, they will be
viewed as part of a broader database designed to give a jury a fair
picture of how the actor usually thinks or behaves in similar situa-
tions. 60 ' Because effective experts are trained to behave like detec-
tives, they will seek additional data to expand their knowledge of the
nature and frequency of prior acts so that they can make a more
informed judgment. This incentive may be missing for the layper-
son.60 2 Moreover, with expert character witnesses, the precise ba-
ses, limits, and value of an opinion can be extensively probed on
both direct and cross-examination. Such extensive information will
better enable a jury to decide how much it should rely on the opin-
ion, a decision impossible to make were the jury shown only bare
reports of bad acts alone.
One specific type of prior acts evidence-prior criminal convic-
tions-should be separately addressed. Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, prior criminal convictions can be used to impeach any wit-
ness if the crime involved dishonesty or false statements. 6° s If the
crime did not involve dishonesty or false statement, a witness may
be impeached only if the crime was punishable by death or impris-
onment in excess of one year, and if testimony about the conviction
599. Mendez, supra note 153, at 1047.
600. See id. (discussing jurors' propensity to judge people based on a "unity of
personality").
601. See supra text accompanying notes 142-243.
602. Prior acts may be explored on cross-examination of a lay character witness to
impeach that witness's opinions, but not to prove the conduct at issue in the case before
the court. See WEISSENBERGER, supra note 18, at 98-99. Davies argues that when prior
acts survive a balancing test focused on the number and similarity of the prior acts to the
conduct in question, they should be admitted as substantive proof of conduct in the
present case. See Davies, supra note 360, at 535. Because an expert is likely to have
uncovered even more acts identified as situationally specific to the conduct in question
than would a lay witness, Davies's approach has even more merit as a justification of the
admissibility of prior acts revealed in cross-examining expert character witnesses.
603. FED. R. EvID. 609(a).
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is determined by the court to be more probative than prejudicial.6 04
The latter part of this rule turns on a character judgment un-
supported by modern psychological theory. No theory suggests that
a witness will lie to the court merely because that witness previously
was convicted of a crime unrelated to lying. 1 5 Yet the rules assume
that someone convicted of an offense punishable by death or impris-
onment for more than one year is indeed the kind of person who is
more likely to lie. This assumption ignores the need for more-nar-
rowly defined traits and the powerful role of the situation in deter-
mining human behavior. 6  Aggravating the fallacy of these
assumptions is the possibility that the jury may be asked to draw
broad conclusions about honesty based on a narrow sample of one
or two prior convictions.6°7 This ignores the principles of aggrega-
tion discussed above.6 °" Indeed, even the use of convictions for dis-
honesty or false statements, without further limitations on
admissibility, may be unwise. Honesty is a trait very much influ-
enced by situational factors; a willingness to lie in one situation,
therefore, says little or nothing about the propensity to lie in a dif-
609ferent situation.
Finally, a comparison must be made between habit evidence
and psychological character evidence. Habit evidence is admissible
to prove that a person's conduct was in conformity with the habit
displayed on a particular occasion." 1 Evidence of habit, therefore,
is not subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 404's character evidence
ban.61 While character concerns one's general disposition or one's
604. Id. When the accused's conviction is offered, the court must determine that the
probative value of the evidence outweighs the prejudice to the accused. Id. When the
conviction concerns someone other than the accused, the test is the standard pragmatic
relevancy balancing test: whether probative value is substantially outweighed by counter-
vailing considerations. See id.; FED. R. EVID. 403.
605. See Davies, supra note 360, at 520-21.
606. See supra notes 142-163 and accompanying text; Davies, supra note 360, at 520-21
(describing the underlying assumption that a prior conviction demonstrates a "readiness
to do evil," from which a jury is meant to infer a readiness to lie in the specific case
(quoting Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884))).
607. See Davies, supra note 360, at 520-21.
608. See supra text accompanying notes 363-374.
609. Davies, supra note 360, at 521. Davies's suggested cure is to admit evidence of
the prior bad acts if placed in the context of the situation that produced the acts. To
avoid jury prejudice from learning of an official condemnation of those acts, however,
Davies would delete reference to the fact of conviction unless necessary to rebut a de-
fendant's denial that the acts took place. Id. at 536-37.
610. FED. R. EVID. 406.
611. See FED. R. EVID. 404. However, even "habit" evidence must survive a careful
weighing of probative value against countervailing concerns. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG
& MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 318 (5th ed. 1990).
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disposition in respect to a general trait, habit is a more specific con-
cept describing one's general response to a repeated specific situa-
tion.612 But if, as many psychologists contend, personality traits
should often be more carefully defined in terms of likely responses
in certain situations, how can "traits" and "habits" be
distinguished?
From an evidentiary perspective, this distinction may be made
by recognizing the primary justification for the court's greater will-
ingness to accept habit evidence than character evidence: the as-
sumption that habit involves more than a routine practice-that a
habit must also be an unconscious, mechanical, and at least "semi-
automatic" response to a very particular kind of situation. 61 3 So
viewed, character differs from habit in that character concerns gen-
eral dispositions to behave in a certain way, a quality thought to
have less predictive power in a given situation than the automatic
reaction that is habit.61 a Moreover, from the psychologist's perspec-
tive, trait often remains a more general concept than habit; for ex-
ample, the trait of cleanliness might in part be viewed as
synthesizing the habits of brushing one's hair and teeth, washing
one's hands, cleaning one's nails, and wearing clean clothing.6 5
While psychological character testimony may, therefore, be
based partly on observations of habits, such testimony should be
governed by character evidence rules alone. The greater resulting
difficulty in admitting psychological evidence of this nature will not
diminish the potential usefulness of character evidence over habit.
For example, it is highly unlikely that a habit for killing someone can
be demonstrated, but a "character" for violence or for peacefulness,
at least in certain ranges of situations, can. Moreover, habit's use-
fulness is probably limited to proving conduct,6 16 while, as defined
in this Article, character may also be used to prove state of mind, a
central question in much criminal litigation.
612. FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory committee's note.
613. See id.
614. See id.
615. See HERGENHAHN, supra note 144, at 184; see also FED. R. EvID. 406 advisory com-
mittee's note ("Character may be thought of as the sum of one's habits though doubtless
it is more than this." (quoting MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 16, § 195, at n.7)).
616. "Habit" is by definition an observable "response." See FED. R. EvID. 406 advi-
sory committee's note. Even were this not so, it is hard to prove in any meaningful way a
"habit" of thought that is so situationally specific, frequent, and automatic as otherwise
to fit Rule 406's definition of "habit."
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3. Understandability.-Understandability gauges the jurors'
ability both to comprehend testimony and to give it proper
weight.6" 7 The law of evidence's long-standing hostility toward
much character evidence is based on the assumption that such evi-
dence will not be properly understood, will be overvalued, or will
lead juries to convict because of a defendant's character rather than
what that defendant thought or did.6" 8
Psychological research suggests that there is good reason to
worry about jurors' overvaluing character evidence. Psychologists
express this concern by describing the well-documented "funda-
mental attribution error": the tendency of people to inflate the im-
portance of personality traits while failing to recognize the
importance of situational factors in prompting behavior.619 People
often overlook important situational factors and "infer dispositions
from behavior that is manifestly situationally produced. '620
A classic illustration is Darley and Batson's "Good Samaritan"
experiment, in which some students at a religious seminary were
told that they were late for a talk while others were told that they
had plenty of time.621 Both groups passed by a man slumped in a
doorway, groaning and coughing.622 Only ten percent of the "hur-
rying" seminarians stopped to help, while sixty-three percent of
those not hurrying stopped to help.623 This suggests that the situa-
tional factor of lateness was the most important factor affecting
whether the seminarians would be "good samaritans. '"624 Yet, in a
similar experiment, when laypersons were asked how they thought
people would behave, the subjects predicted that the great majority
of seminary students would stop to help and that being in a hurry
would make no difference at all.62 '5 They believed very simply that
"altruistic people" would help while "selfish people" would not, re-
gardless of how much time they had on their hands.626
Related concepts raise additional reasons for concern. Notably,
laypeople overestimate the ability to predict from one observation
617. McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 100.
618. Davies, supra note 360, at 523-25.
619. Ross & NiSBETr, supra note 365, at 4.
620. Id. at 126.
621. See id. at 48-49.
622. Id. at 49.
623. Id.
624. Id.





what will happen on another occasion, showing little understanding
that predispositions address average behavior only, while individual
instances of behavior remain highly variable.627 Moreover, laype-
ople show little awareness of the advantages of aggregating many
behavioral measures to craft better predictors of average behav-
ior.628 This suggests in turn that people are generally willing to
make confident, disposition-based predictions, based upon limited
data.629
Furthermore, because they ignore situational factors, laypeople
are much more willing to overgeneralize: to assume wide predictive
power of a trait across a broad range of situations when the true
range may indeed be quite narrow. 630 Additionally, laypeople often
ignore the importance of base rates as central to accurate predic-
tions of behavior.63 '
Each of these tendencies, however, should be of greater con-
cern with lay character testimony than with expert character testi-
mony, because expert testimony can counteract these tendencies in
a number of ways. First, competent expert character testimony will,
by definition, emphasize the interaction of traits and situations. Pre-
liminary research conducted in this area suggests that expert charac-
ter testimony helps to focus juries on the importance of situational
factors in eliciting behavior and in offering opportunities for traits
to manifest themselves.63 2
Second, expert character testimony educates jurors about a va-
riety of matters that will help them place the testimony in proper
perspective and make informed judgments. Most importantly, that
education should emphasize the need for a wide sample of behav-
ior-aggregation-to gauge traits accurately, and the usefulness of
traits as predictors of average behavior only. Preliminary research
on the effect of educating juries on "social frameworks"-compari-
sons between a participant in litigation and a larger social grouping,
similar to what has been called "group character evidence" in this
627. See id. at 122-23.
628. See id. at 123-24.
629. Id. at 124.
630. See id. at 129-30. On the other hand, at least one study suggests that when peo-
ple are given information about specific acts in situational settings, rather than in the
form of a global trait descriptor, they may not always experience fundamental attribu-
tion error. Davies, supra note 360, at 531-32 & n.159.
631. Ross & NISBETr, supra note 365, at 134-36.
632. Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 135, at 154, 160 (reporting experimental data that
suggests that both battered woman and rape trauma syndrome testimony draw the jury's
attention to contextual and situational factors).
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Article 6 33 -suggests that, at least under certain conditions, expert
education of juries does affect their decision making without "over-
awing" them.63 4
Third, expert testimony can alert jurors to their own beliefs re-
garding personality traits and point out logical errors made in acting
on those beliefs. Again, while the evidence is sparse and tentative,
there is some support for the notion that jurors can improve the
accuracy of their decisions if alerted to their own biases and deci-
sion-making flaws.63 5 A caution is in order: improving the quality of
juror decision making does not necessarily mean eliminating the ef-
fect of juror reasoning errors and preconceptions; rather, it may
merely mean reducing that effect.63 6
Fourth, the tendency ofjurors to make "snap judgments" about
character based on limited information can only be counterbalanced
by giving them more information. For a psychological character ex-
pert's testimony not to be undervalued, the expert must relate
broad descriptions of group behavior to the behavior of the specific
defendant. 637 So doing requires the injection of clinical judgment
based on the wide database discussed earlier-large samples of the
defendant's prior behavior; descriptions by family members,
friends, and co-workers; results of psychological tests, interviews,
observations, and so on. Jurors will then have a much larger and
633. See Robert P. Mosteller, Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Concerning Social Framework Evidence, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 86, 104-05 (1991)
(defining "social frameworks" and analogizing the concept to character evidence).
634. See, e.g., Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 135, at 154 ("The introduction of expert
testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome appears to have a salutary effect on
the more prejudicial beliefs, but the primary effect seems to be to shift jurors toward the
lesser included offense of manslaughter rather than toward a verdict of not guilty .... );
ABA, JURY COMPREHENSION, supra note 535, app. 10, at 9 (noting that a study on the
impact of probability data in the form of expert scientific testimony in a rape trial con-
cluded that "jurors may make considerable use of the expert testimony, even though
they may not spend a great deal of time discussing it and when asked they may report it
had little impact on their decision . . .").
635. See, e.g., NISBETr & Ross, supra note 344, at 191 (discussing experiments in which
subjects confronted with information discrediting certain faulty beliefs nevertheless per-
severed in those beliefs; that tendency to persevere, however, was almost totally eliminated
when those subjects were given an explicit theoretical explanation of the mental processes that cause
them to hang on to their flawed beliefs).
636. See Ross & NISBErr, supra note 365, at 131-32 (noting that telling subjects about
the results of the "Good Samaritan" experiment, see supra text accompanying notes 621-
626, did have an impact on their estimate of the effects of hurrying; but the effect was a
mere 18% difference, much less than the 53% difference in fact observed by Darley and
Batson).
637. See sources cited supra note 328.
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fairer sampling-a better database-upon which to base their char-
acter judgments.
Finally, it must be emphasized that in many cases, the potential
for jury prejudice may be relatively small when weighed against the
potential gains offered by expert psychological character testimony.
This is particularly true when the subject matter of the expert testi-
mony is very close to the jurors' common experience, because they
are then more likely to understand the testimony fully.638 But the
magnitude of the prejudicial effects will vary, sometimes dramati-
cally, based on the specific type of expert character evidence offered
and the facts of the specific case. 63 9 The availability of literature
addressing the value of particular types of character evidence-a
literature that is now growing-will improve the quality of lawyers'
preparation and cross-examination and, therefore, improve jurors'
ability to accord the testimony its proper weight.64°
4. Weighing the Balance.-Having identified the primary areas
for analysis, the question remains: how should a judge weigh these
various factors? The answer will, of course, vary with the precise
type of evidence involved and the facts of specific cases, but several
general observations can be made to guide the weighing process.
The most important observation is that the moral and social
psychological justifications for admitting psychological character ev-
idence, and the related cathartic functions served by such evidence,
must be an important part of the weighing process though we
should not blindly ignore truth-seeking as a predominant value. At-
tention to goals other than truth-seeking, however, suggests several
consequences.
Notably, a court should not view its decision as "either/or": to
admit or exclude. Instead, the court should take an activist role in
pursuit of a third alternative: full disclosure of all relevant informa-
tion to both the court and the jury regarding the strengths and
weaknesses of the evidence, presented in a fashion likely to reduce
jury misuse and increase accurate appreciation of the value of the
evidence offered. 64 1 Recent scholarship has recognized that in-
638. See McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 100 (suggesting that the more jurors are
able to relate expert testimony to their common understanding, the more likely they will
afford the testimony its proper weight).
639. See id. at 100-01.
640. See id. at 100.
64 1. The activist role suggested here is admittedly time-consuming. However, courts
should be most receptive to expert character testimony when a defendant claims to have
unusual or unique traits. Expert character evidence should usually be rejected in run-of-
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creasing the quantity and quality of evidence is often an implicit
goal of much evidence law. 42 There is a strong justification for a
trial court to make that goal explicit and to take an activist role-not
relying solely on the parties-to ensure that the best quality and
quantity of data regarding the value of the psychological character
evidence are presented to a jury. Only if, after making such an ef-
fort, a court remains convinced that such evidence cannot be helpful
to the jury, should it be excluded.
An activist judge would, therefore, require "Brandeis briefs"" s
concerning the value and likely impact of the evidence before the
court; would carefully examine the extent and status of discovery
regarding the evidence and issue any orders necessary to ensure full
and fair disclosure; would insist on detailed proposed jury instruc-
tions regarding the evidence; and would require that briefs and oral
argument carefully address each of the concerns identified in this
Article. Admittedly, in many jurisdictions discovery rules in crimi-
nal cases are so limited that this task will be difficult. However,
changes are under way. For example, a proposed amendment to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 would require the prosecu-
tion to disclose to a defendant any expert evidence that the prosecu-
tion will offer at trial. 4 Such disclosure would be required to be in
the form of a written report prepared and signed by the witness,
the-mill cases, thus limiting the number of cases in which an activist judge must invest
her time. Moreover, the value of a certain technique need not be re-examined in every
case if the technique was thoroughly analyzed before, although particular applications of
that technique should still be open to dispute. Furthermore, the pretrial screening
methods discussed throughout this Article, while time-consuming, should at least pre-
vent jury trial time from being wasted on frivolous claims. Finally, some significant in-
vestment of time is simply unavoidable under our criminal law. The system must
choose: either abandon morality-based judgments or sometimes pay the price of im-
paired efficiency to enhance higher goals. See TYLER, supra note 341, at 110 (arguing that
citizens will accept delays from increased caseloads in the courts if they believe that
there is fairness in trial procedures and in the allocation of benefits and burdens of
litigation).
642. The best article on this point is Dale Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L.
REV. 227 (1988).
643. A "Brandeis brief" is an extensive brief containing economic and social survey
material along with legal principles. The name is taken from the late Supreme Court
Associate Justice Louis D. Brandeis. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419-20
(1908) ("In the brief filed by Mr. Louis D. Brandeis, [then a practicing attorney] ... is a
very copious collection of all these matters ....").
644. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE,
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AND THE RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2255 PRO-
CEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS UNDER SECTION 2255 OF TITLE 28,
UNITED STATES CODE 62 (August 1991).
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including a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed, the
basis and reasons therefor, the data or other information relied
upon in forming such opinions, any exhibits to be used as a sum-
mary of or support for such opinions, and the qualifications of the
witness. 64 5 The proposal also would require disclosure of "any infor-
mation which might be recognized as [a] legitimate basis for an opin-
ion under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, including opinions of other
experts. " 6 The prosecution would be entitled to similar reciprocal
disclosure by the defense. 6 7 Recent scholarship has argued as well
that court-appointed experts can be more extensively used under
Rule 706, which permits the scheduling of expert depositions, and
has argued that, in any event, courts have inherent power to order
depositions of any expert witnesses. 648 The tools for active judicial
control of effective discovery are thus becoming available. Further-
more, judicial activism and more effective discovery rules are likely
to develop in tandem, as one lends impetus to the other.
An activist trial judge would also closely scrutinize an expert's
qualifications, not simply to determine whether the expert is quali-
fied to make the relevant judgment, but also to determine whether
the expert is adequately qualified to inform the jury fully and fairly.
Such an expert must have both practical experience and substantial
theoretical knowledge, and any expert who fails to meet the neces-
sary background and abilities to educate the jury should be barred
from testifying.
Additionally, an activist judge must weed out highly generalized
trait descriptions that are likely to mislead juries. Descriptions or
explanations that fully outline the relationship between the posited
traits and the particular type of situation that brought a defendant
into court should be encouraged instead. Testimony must also be
qualified in terms of cautious probabilities, not certainties, and of
the likely impact of different posited versions of the relevant situa-
tion on a defendant's thoughts and behavior. This last point is espe-
cially important because the central dispute in a criminal case often
concerns the situation indeed faced by the defendant.
The importance of the cathartic function has implications for
the standard of proof to be applied in determining whether the pro-
bative value of the proffered evidence is substantially outweighed by
645. Id.
646. Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
647. Id. at 63.
648. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 VAD.
L. REV. 822 (1991).
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countervailing concerns. Professor McCord has argued, based on
constitutional grounds, that there is a strong justification for impos-
ing a higher burden of proof on the prosecution than on the defense
regarding the reliability of nontraditional psychological evidence." 9
This Article reaches a similar conclusion but on different, non-
constitutional, grounds; 650 specifically that, as discussed earlier, the
cathartic values favoring admissibility are substantially greater for
psychological character evidence offered by the defense than by the
prosecution. 65' This Article recasts Professor McCord's focus from
the preliminary question of reliability to the preliminary question of
whether probative value is substantially outweighed by other con-
cerns. While reliability is one preliminary fact to be determined in
the admissibility decision, many other facts-for example, jury im-
pact, availability of alternatives, qualifications of the expert-must
also be determined to find the "ultimate preliminary fact": the de-
gree to which probative value is or is not outweighed by other con-
cerns.6 5 2 The critical question, therefore, must ultimately be this:
How convinced must a judge be that the test of pragmatic relevancy
has been passed?
Recognizing, as did Professor McCord, that the answer to this
question may differ for defense and prosecution, the question must
be posed separately for each. Professor McCord suggests that a pre-
ponderance-of-the-evidence standard is adequate as to the prosecu-
tion, rejecting Professor Giannelli's argument that a beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt test is required.653 Professor McCord would,
under his own version of the pragmatic relevancy balancing test, re-
quire proof of a higher degree of reliability as the issues in question
grow "more important"-that is, the more likely the issue is to be
654Foscdispositive of the case. For such issues, he argues that only
"highly reliable" evidence should be admitted. 655 Because such evi-
dence must be "highly reliable," he argues that there is no need for
the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.656
But, as applied to expert character evidence, there are several
flaws in Professor McCord's recommendation. First, he offers as an
649. See McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 105-07.
650. Many of the constitutional issues raised by psychological character evidence will
be addressed in an upcoming article.
651. See supra text accompanying notes 331-345.
652. See supra text accompanying notes 347-354.
653. See McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 106.
654. Id. at 101.
655. See id. at 101-02, 106.
656. Id. at 106.
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example of an issue that would be "decisive" an expert's testimony
that an alleged child sexual abuse victim was indeed abused.657
However, as defined here, expert character evidence would never
include an opinion that an act or a thought occurred. Rather, the
opinion would be limited to identification of a defendant's trait and,
in the usual case, use of that trait as circumstantial evidence of the
likelihood that an element of a crime or defense existed. 658 Expert
character evidence would thus rarely, if ever, be "decisive" in the
way envisioned by Professor McCord.
Second, the importance-reliability relationship suggested by
Professor McCord offers judges even less guidance in exercising
their discretion than is now true, for conceivably there can be an
infinite range of levels of required reliability for different levels of
importance. A single, familiar standard of proof is more likely to
give courts clearer guidance.
Third, because of the need to give parties a strong incentive to
be fully prepared and provide the court with as much information as
possible-a need clearly recognized by Professor McCord but ap-
parently not viewed by him as relevant to choosing the appropriate
level of proofi 59-a high standard should be adopted to motivate
both prosecutors and defense counsel to prepare thoroughly.66 °
Anything less than a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is un-
likely to do this. This Article, therefore, suggests that a preponder-
ance standard should be the minimum applied to either side, and
rejects Professor McCord's view that a "reasonable possibility" stan-
dard would be adequate as to the defense.6 6 However, if we recog-
nize the need to impose a higher standard on the prosecution for
first use of expert character evidence-because of the lesser prose-
cution claim to promoting cathartic values-the prosecution stan-
dard should be greater than a preponderance of the evidence. But
this does not necessarily mean a standard of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.
Indeed, one of the reasons articulated by Professor Giannelli in
first suggesting the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for the
prosecution is that scientific evidence often may result in erroneous
657. Id. at 101.
658. See supra text accompanying notes 16-24.
659. See McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 95-98, 106-07 (suggesting that the level of
proof should be decided by an estimate of how likely it is that the proposed testimony
will assist the jury).
660. See Taslitz, supra note 270, at 123 n.646 (discussing a similar point).
661. McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 105-07.
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verdicts, either because the issue involved is dispositive of the case
or because the evidence is likely to overawe the jury.662 As just
noted, rarely will expert character evidence be dispositive of a case,
and, while jury impact must be assessed in every case, it is unlikely
that psychological character evidence will "overawe" the jury in
most cases, and much of any undue impact can be significantly mod-
erated by an activist trial judge. 66- The highest standard of proof,
therefore, is probably not needed. The proposal here, therefore, is
that the standard of proof for prosecution first-use of psychological
character evidence should be "clear and convincing evidence," a
standard high enough to recognize the reduced cathartic justifica-
tion for prosecution-proffered character evidence and to offer a
strong incentive for thorough prosecution preparation, but not so
high as unduly to burden reasonable prosecution efforts to per-
suade the jury. Remember, however, that when a prosecutor seeks
to make first use of expert character evidence to prove an act, Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 404 will act as a flat bar." 4 The "clear and
662. Compare Giannelli, supra note 347, at 1247-48 (addressing jury impact and relia-
bility) with Taslitz, supra note 270, at 123-24 (addressing significance of the dispositive-
ness on guilt).
663. See supra text accompanying notes 293-308, 642-649.
664. See supra text accompanying notes 244-265. A similar flat bar arguably should
apply to prosecution first-use of one type of expert character evidence-"group" charac-
ter evidence-even when offered to prove mental state. The primary argument would
be that when offered by the prosecution, group character evidence is so inflammatory
that a jury is likely to ignore all evidence in the defendant's favor; ignore the need ulti-
mately to judge the defendant's actual, individual mental state; and instead convict him
merely for his apparent membership in a group.
For example, the prosecution might, to prove a defendant's awareness of lack of
consent in a rape prosecution, offer evidence that the defendant was a "typical, violent
rapist." Therefore, he thought as violent rapists do, that is, he wanted to have noncon-
sensual sex. In one sense this individualizes justice, for, if believed, the jury arguably
knows something about the defendant that they did not know before. But what they
know is ugly. It is arguably likely to anger the jury, to make the jury ignore defense
evidence that the defendant is not like "typical" rapists or that, if he does share their
qualities, he has other qualities that make him unlikely to think as they do, or he simply
did not think that way on this occasion. Instead, he will be judged as a stereotype, a
cipher, to be punished for membership in a group to which he apparently belongs, not
for what he truly thought.
While this argument makes some sense, the empirical data and psychological theory
suggest that expert character evidence often will not overwhelm the jury, although this
question must ultimately be decided on a case-by-case basis. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 616-640. It is precisely because a case-by-case judgment is appropriate that a
flat bar would be unwise. Furthermore, under the proposal made here, prosecution-
proffered expert character evidence must survive both Frye and the weighing of proba-
tive value against prejudice and catharsis-related values embodied in a broadened no-
tion of "pragmatic relevancy." Moreover, pragmatic relevancy must be shown by clear
and convincing evidence. Finally, an activist judge must have made careful efforts to
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convincing" standard of proof for pragmatic relevancy therefore be-
comes pertinent only when the prosecution seeks to make first use
of character evidence to prove mental state, because many courts
find such evidence to be outside of Rule 404's per se bar.665
On rebuttal, however, a lesser standard is justified. Once the
defense has offered expert character evidence, the prosecution must
be allowed to "repair the damage." '666 The door has been opened
and fairness demands some opportunity for the prosecution to re-
spond. More than this, if the prosecution cannot respond, a jury
may receive incomplete information and may thereby be misled; fac-
ing only one real option, the jury is likely to choose it. The jury-
centered value of full disclosure, serving both truth-seeking and
political goals, 667 is thus enhanced by the admission of prosecution
rebuttal evidence. This justifies a reduced standard of proof.
But should the standard be so reduced as to place the prosecu-
tion in perfect parity with the defense? If not, a standard between
preponderance and clear-and-convincing, perhaps labeled a "heavy
preponderance," would be appropriate. Because the cathartic value
of individualized justice is particularly powerful for defense-prof-
fered evidence-powerful enough to outweigh to a significant de-
gree lingering concerns about reliability-this would be a wise
compromise. The heavy preponderance standard would be some-
what higher than the defense standard, recognizing the reduced
prosecution justification for such evidence and ensuring somewhat
greater confidence in the evidence. On the other hand, the heavy
preponderance standard would be significantly less than the clear-
and-convincing standard for prosecution first-use, giving proper
reveal all evidentiary weaknesses to the jury, including cautions about ways they might
abuse the evidence. This combination of safeguards seems ample to prevent the jury's
being misled by, or giving undue weight to, even prosecution-proffered group character
evidence (for prosecution-proffered individual character evidence, there should by defini-
tion be even less reason to worry about stereotyping and de-individualizing justice). In-
deed, absent extensive scientific support, it is unlikely that the "typical, violent rapist"
example just given would survive that pragmatic relevancy weighing process.
In any event, because most courts find that Rule 404 does not flatly bar use of
character evidence to prove mental state, see supra note 251 and accompanying text, it is
likely that courts will be more receptive to arguments cast in terms of standards of proof
than in terms of per se rules of exclusion.
665. See supra text accompanying notes 251-260.
666. Cf. McCord, Profiles, supra note 119, at 102 (making this point in discussing the
relationship between reliability and necessity, not as to the standard of proof).
667. Political goals require giving the jury, as a political institution central to demo-
cratic decision making, more, not less, information to enable it to make decisions critical
to a trial's outcome whenever reasonably practical. See supra text accompanying notes
487-513.
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recognition to the prosecution's strong fairness claim to a right to
rebuttal.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on the moral and social psychological
need for individualized justice in criminal cases, a need recognized
by the substantive rules of criminal law and which appropriately
crafted rules of evidence can help to fulfill. Individualized justice
requires consideration of a defendant's unique traits and circum-
stances to determine what that individual did or thought, not only
what she should have done or thought. Yet our assembly-line jus-
tice system and common myths, prejudices, and misconceptions
combine to lead to "normalized justice," to the trial of defendants
for whom they are assumed to be and what they are assumed, there-
fore, to have done and thought. Such assumptions are largely based
on what most people would do, clearly the opposite of individual-
ized treatment.
This Article has thus focused on psychological character evi-
dence-expert testimony as to the kind of person a defendant is-as
a way to move judges and juries back toward an individualized as-
sessment of the particular defendant before them. Psychological
character testimony, because it focuses in part on a defendant's his-
tory, on special traits and their consequences, and on the interaction
between those traits and situational factors, offers the prospect of
leading juries to think of defendants as special human beings, rather
than as stereotypes. The clinical judgment often required in such
testimony, however, can be of uncertain accuracy, part science but
part art as well. This Article has thus sought to outline a general
framework for revealing and testing the value of both the scientific
and the artistic elements of such testimony.
Moreover, given the uncertainty about questions of accuracy,
the Article has sought to explore justifications in addition to truth-
seeking for admitting psychological character evidence. In particu-
lar, this Article focused on the "cathartic function"-the increased
sense of individual and public respect for the justice system that
comes from admitting evidence that enhances the prospect of indi-
vidualizing justice.
The Article has advocated a judicial alternative to the
"either/or" notion of admitting or excluding evidence, namely tak-
ing an activist role designed to improve the quantity and quality of
the evidence presented to the jury. Strong political values are
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served by giving the jury more, rather than less, information, wher-
ever possible.
Finally, this Article has sought to contribute to a growing new
understanding of the rules of evidence as not merely mechanical de-
vices for reconstructing truth or as weapons of war for battle-starved
litigators, but also as basic tools for enforcing society's moral and
political values and for achieving that all-too-often-ignored goal in
evidentiary discussions: justice.66
668. For an effective overview of the role ofjustice in legal decision making, including
an analysis of some issues of individualized justice that, while not so identified by the
authors, are fundamentally evidentiary questions, see ANTHONY D'AMATO & ARTHUR J.
JACOBSON, JUSTICE AND THE LEGAL SYsTEM: A COURSEBOOK (1992).
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